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     ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses the legal and ethical issues posed by introduction of electronic 
patient health records.  Against the background of an analysis of broader conceptual and 
theoretical understandings of development of electronic patient health records (EPR) and 
e-health regimes in Australia and comparable countries over the last few decades, the 
thesis critically examines the extent to which its implementation is consistent with 
established legal and ethical principles underpinning traditional health assumptions and 
practices.  To this end the thesis explores the evolution and progress of modern health, 
technology, law and governance issues in e-health, identifying critical features of emerging 
EPR and e-health systems such as broad innovative industry technology involvement, and 
potentially problematic practices such as personal information ‘collection’, ‘sharing’ and 
‘networking’ activities.  The thesis contends that while adopting technology such as e-
health comports with modern day progress, the transformational power of technology on 
society and individual lives has the potential to impose significant human costs for health 
consumers and everyday life.  Through an analysis of the new electronic regime the thesis 
reveals how Australian Governments, healthcare providers, consumers and other 
stakeholders interpret and deal with advances in personal healthcare information changes 
in the new electronic system.  
The healthcare privacy model advanced in the thesis, in conjunction with an analysis 
grounded in theories of deliberative democracy, provides the foundation for the thesis 
argument that the legal, ethical and democratic challenges posed to privacy and 
participation interests by implementation of e-health policies can best be alleviated in 
Australia through further structural reforms beyond those recently proposed by a federal 
review.  The thesis contends that an independent ‘Council’, with broad powers to consult 
and engage the public is an important part of the solution to the political and economic 
problems identified by the thesis analysis showing that individual privacy protection in 
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healthcare is threatened and that earlier privacy protection mechanisms may prove 
inadequate in the emerging global information era.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 THESIS PROBLEM QUESTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
The thesis inquiry traces the development and implementation of the new electronic 
health regime by the Australian Government.  It does this by exploring the historical 
and theoretical progress of Electronic Patient Records (EPR or PCEHR) and e-health 
systems in Australia that commits to broad innovative industry technology 
involvement and practices including concepts such as personal health information 
‘collection’, ‘sharing’, ‘networking’ and ‘linkage’ activities.1  Changes in how 
Australian Governments, consumers, healthcare providers and other stakeholders 
interpret and deal with EPR and e-health has significantly impacted on established 
legal and ethical principles underpinning traditional assumptions and practices 
within health.  These particular technological changes include: patient medical records 
— creation, collection, access, storage, control, and ownership issues, as well as 
individual versus collective privacy protection considerations, especially within the 
new expanding electronic healthcare ‘sharing’ environment.2  
                                                 
1 Australian Health Information Council (AHIC), E-Health Future Directions Briefing Paper (4 October 
2007); National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA), Privacy Blueprint for the Individual Electronic 
Health Record (3 July 2008); Australian Government, NEHTA, Concepts of Operations: Relating to the 
Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record System (September 2011). 
2 Andrew Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and 
Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Moira Paterson, Freedom of Information and 
Privacy in Australia (LexisNexis, 2005). 
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The central thesis proposition advances the notion that individual privacy is 
under threat and is in danger of being further compromised and eroded by broader 
economic ‘networking’ interests, unless there is an assurance by the Australian 
Government that individual privacy rights are afforded ongoing appropriate 
protection.3  In order to advance the proposition that individual privacy protection is 
indeed compromised by the advancement of modern information technology the 
thesis analysis reconnoitres the growing interaction, interrelation and developing 
‘links’ between health, technology, law and governance mechanism and its impact on 
communities.  The privacy problem question also considers the adequacy of 
individual healthcare privacy protection rights in light of the transformational 
political, economic and social changes to Australian healthcare systems, which 
include recent Government policies that further extend the possibility of increasing 
private sector actor involvement in healthcare services, public sector and service 
delivery cuts, devolution policy adoption, and the future impact associated with 
privatisation and commercialisation of health on Australian citizens.4  
In Western democracy, a dominate focus and preoccupation for many 
governments and citizens has been on recognising and promoting privacy and privacy 
rights.  However, broader influences that extend beyond the notion of citizen privacy 
rights and protection have resulted in questions concerning the ongoing relevance and 
                                                 
3 See Evgeny Molozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (Penguin Books, 2011); Evgeny 
Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem” (22 October, 2013) 116(6) MIT Technology Review 32-43.  
4 See Paul Smith, ‘Battle Won, But War Not Over: Short Consult Breakdown Can’t Mask Uncertain 
Future’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 23 January 2015, 1 [Where Federal Health Minister, Sussan Ley, 
explains Government’s back down regarding plans to slash Medicare funding for General Practitioner’s 
(GP) care]. 
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importance of privacy as a core human value in the new technology-driven world.5  
This traditional preoccupation with privacy and privacy rights is no less significant in 
Australia than other countries and can be evidenced over the last few decades by 
successive Australian Governments (and Opposition parties) backing the introduction 
of e-health systems, including a new electronic healthcare record regime.  This e-
health government policy development has generally been in response to emerging 
complex national and international social and economic problems.6  Other local, 
national and international influences also challenging traditional healthcare delivery 
modalities include: an ageing population with fewer and more dispersed family 
support networks, increasing healthcare provision costs, remote and indigenous 
healthcare access and equity issues, increasing migration and cultural diversity, 
diminishing national, local employment opportunities and expanding globalisation.7   
While it can be contended that adopting technology such as e-health comports 
with modern-day human progress, it can also be posited that there is a significant 
human cost in relying on technology as the determinant to everyday problems due to 
the danger of underestimating the transformational power that technology has on 
                                                 
5 See, e.g. Daniel Solove, Marc Rotenberg and Paul Schwartz, Privacy, Information and Technology (Aspen 
Publishers, 2006); Daniel Solove, The Digital Person (New York University Press, 2004); Jeffrey Rosen, 
The Unwanted Gaze (Vintage Books, 2000); see also National E-Health and Information Principal 
Committee, Deloitte, National E-Health Strategy (30 September, 2008): at 8-10. 
6 See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Health on Line 
(1997); see also John Mitchell, National Office for the Information Economy, Department of 
Communication, From Telehealth to E-Health: The Unstoppable Rise of E-Health (1999) 
7 See Stephen Sammut, ‘Biotechnology Business and Revenue Models: The Dynamic of Technological 
Evolution and Capital Market Ingenuity’ in Lawton Robert Burns (ed), The Business of Healthcare 
Innovation (Cambridge University Press, 2005): at 190; Deloitte, National E-Health Strategy, above n5; 
George Palmer and Stephanie Short, Health Care and Public Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 4th ed, 2010): at 
38; Sandra Taylor, Michele Foster and Jennifier Fleming (eds), Health Care Practice in Australia (Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Eileen Willis, Louise Reynolds and Helen Keleher (eds), Understanding the 
Australian Health Care System (Elsevier, 2012); Smith, Paul, ‘Will Universal Healthcare Survive the MBS 
Ice Age?’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 3 April 2015, 3. 
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society and individual lives.8  For all the above reasons the thesis contends that it is 
now imperative for Australians to recognise that individual healthcare privacy rights 
are under threat by advancing reliance on modern technology and begin to question 
healthcare privacy protection rights in light of these political, economic and social 
changes.9  Given this consideration, the thesis maintains that one significant way to 
begin the process of raising citizen awareness and involvement in protecting 
healthcare privacy rights is to shift the focus away from advancing capitalist economic 
imperatives and back on what local society and individuals expect from a modern 
participatory democracy.10 
The thesis asserts that broader social, political and economic ‘macro’ concerns, 
as well as ‘micro’ changes now underpin our concept of health and that these changes 
impact upon individual healthcare privacy rights in the modern information economy 
era.  To demonstrate the extent of the problem facing individual healthcare privacy 
protection, the thesis exploration captures relevant theoretical concepts, legal and 
ethical obligations, along with possible solutions that aim at supporting, 
supplementing and strengthening individual privacy protection in Australia. 
 
 I.   AN INDEPENDENT COUNCIL FOR AUSTRALIA 
                                                 
8 See Simon Davies, ‘Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed from a 
Right to a Commodity’ in Philip Agre and Marc Rotenberg (eds), Technology and Privacy: The New 
Landscape (The MIT Press, 2001) 143; see also Christopher Arup, Innovation, Policy and Law: Australia and 
the International High Technology Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
9 See, e.g. Philip Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State: Society and Law Beyond the 
State (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Lawton Robert Burns (ed), The Business of Healthcare 
Innovation, above n5; Ramesh Subramanian and Eddan Katz (eds), The Global Flow of Information (New 
York University Press, 2011). 
10 See chapter 2, pp41-42 
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The thesis develops an argument for proposed privacy protection solutions that 
would strengthen individual privacy rights, ensure  cross-government coordination, 
accountability and further support existing public participation mechanisms for the 
implementation of PCEHR and e-health systems include: fixing legal fragmentation 
caused by harmonising privacy legislation; ensure local democratic citizen 
participation in the new PCEHR system, and insisting upon better long-term 
transparent management of e-health privacy technical measures and processes.  The 
thesis argues that an important step towards realising some of these goals would be 
by introducing an Independent Council (‘Council’).  It is envisaged that this would 
guarantee citizen visibility, encourage wider participation and foster much needed 
consumer and healthcare provider confidence and voluntary uptake of the PCEHR 
and e-health system;11 as well as insist upon Government and non-government action 
transparency and open government measures in light of advancing healthcare 
privatisation and commercialisation adoption. 
The creation, purpose, character, formation, membership, details and function 
of a Council are the subject of detailed discussion in light of the thesis analysis of the 
issues and concerns raised by EPR and e-health.12  However, it is anticipated that the 
membership of a Council would include a broad range of citizen representatives from 
across Australia13 — with wide powers to conduct hearings, access and disseminate 
                                                 
11 See John Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); 
see also John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism (Edward Elgar, 2008); Philip Allott, The Health of Nations, 
above n9; Andrew Kenyon, et al, New Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and Comparative 
Perspectives, above n2. 
12 See chapter 6, pp184-187; chapter 7, pp255-260.   
13 See chapter 7 for details for the proposed structural mechanisms and membership of a Council, pp255-
260. 
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information, and liaise with appropriate governing and coordinating bodies14 
ensuring that it can discharge its responsibility for identifying and reporting to the 
public, independently of Parliament and Ministers, on the likely impact of 
administrative policy decisions relating to current and future PCEHR, e-health 
implementation and roll-out systems.   
The thesis analysis is predicated on the recognition that healthcare issues are 
multifarious and that there is an urgent need to find appropriate solutions to complex 
dilemmas relating to values and concepts attached to civil liberties and human 
rights,15 and that this involves consideration of the advancement of modern-day 
commercial reality that insists upon the notion of competition and ‘free flow’ 
information markets.16  The ensuing tension between humanisation and 
commodification processes is not unique to healthcare and remains a major concern 
for all aspects of modern day social intercourse including employment and welfare.17  
To help counterbalance the very real problem of government’s adoption of market 
competition ideology and the power of technology to transform citizen healthcare 
                                                 
14 See Panel members, Richard Royle, Steve Hambleton and Andrew Walduck, Review of the Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (‘Royle Review’) (December 2013).  A  recommendation proposed by 
the Royle Review, included the establishment of an Australian Commission for Electronic Health 
(‘ACeH’) and the Standing Council on Health (‘SCoH’): at 10. 
15 Richard Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2008); Lawton Robert 
Burns (ed), The Business of Healthcare Innovation, above n7. 
16 See Subramanian and Katz, The Global Flow of Information, above n9; see also Brian Galligan, Winsome 
Roberts and Gabriella Trifiletti, Australians and Globalisation: The Experience of Two Centuries (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); see also Rhacel Salazar Parrenas, Servants of Globalisation: Women, Migration and 
Domestic Work (Stanford University Press, 2001). 
17 See Martha Nussbaum, ‘Educating Citizens’ in Martha Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs 
the Humanities (Princeton University Press, 2010): at 27; Huw Beverely-Smith, The Commercial 
Appropriation of Personality (Cambridge University Press, 2008);  Frederick Lane, The Naked Employee 
(Amacom, 2003); Peter Jackson, Michelle Lowe, Daniel Miller and Frank Mort, Commercial Cultures 
(Berg Publication, 2000); Robert Locke and J-C Spender, Confronting Managerialism (Zed Books, 2011); 
Dexter Dunphy, Andrew Griffiths and Suzanne Benn, Organisational Change for Corporate Sustainability 
(Routledge Press, 2003). 
7 
 
recipients into passive receivers of goods and services,18 it is proposed that 
mechanisms be introduced to further strengthen democratic processes and 
supplement citizen healthcare privacy protection such as through the Council 
advanced in the thesis.  In other words the purpose of a Council is to primarily focus 
on the local/national citizen interests rather than international impact of electronic 
privacy reform. 
Given the thesis focus on Australian health, technology, governance and 
privacy concerns, chapter 2 begins this e-health analysis by tracing historical and 
evolving health development government policy trends over the last few decades in 
Australia.  Furthermore the chapter identifies the multiple dimensions that help 
delineate contextual understanding of modern-day Australian health, privacy and 
technology concerns.  This exploration provides a ‘framework’ for understanding the 
political, economic and social influences that underpin how health, privacy and 
technology are connected and why this area of human activity remains an important 
concern for ongoing Australian citizen involvement.  
Additionally, it is argued that there is a major shift by the current federal 
Coalition Liberal Government away from its primary responsibility of providing 
healthcare delivery and maintaining leadership within health, to that of political 
economic ‘enabler’, whose main purpose is to serve the expanding needs of a growing 
number of private/public economic actors who wish to invest and engage in 
healthcare delivery opportunities.  This recent political change is shown to be 
important to Australian healthcare delivery systems because it has the potential to 
                                                 
18 Evengy Morozov, “The Real Privacy Probem”, above n2: at 3 
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transform the focus and overall outcome of healthcare provision (and privacy 
protection rights) in Australia away from established administrative law values such 
as transparency and accountability towards private sector economic imperative 
principles such as ‘commercial in confidence’ and ‘competitive business needs’ and 
values, potentially altering the very nature of what have previously been understood 
as healthcare rights in this country.19  
Chapter 3 continues the health, technology and privacy focus analyses by 
detailing the nature and scale of the challenges to privacy and democratic policy-
making posed by the technologies implicated in an electronic healthcare regime.  It 
provides a deeper conceptual analysis of the evolution of technology and the 
transformational power of technology on society and highlights various concerns 
about electronic healthcare privacy.  Appreciating how technology has impacted on 
not just health in Australia but other significant aspects of day-to-day life contributes 
to a fuller awareness of the awesome transformational power of technology in 
reconceptualising clinical, social and legal issues.  Specifically, this chapter argues that 
e-health technology gives rise to an increasingly ‘symbiotic’ relationship between 
health and technology: one which is more multi-faceted, more interconnected (linked), 
                                                 
19 See Moira Paterson, Freedom of Information and Privacy in Australia(LexisNexis, 2005); see also ‘Royle 
Review’, above n14; see also Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo, “The New Political Role of 
Business in a Globalised World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implications for the 
Firm, Governance, and Democracy” (4 June 2011) 4 Journal of Management Studies 48; Pat Barrett, 
Auditor-General for Australia, ‘Public Private Partnerships – Are There Gaps in Public Sector 
Accountability?’ (Paper Presented at 2002 Australasian Council of Public Accounts Committees 7th 
Biennial Conference, Melbourne, 3 February 2003). ‘This paper considers the question of public sector 
accountability in the context of public-private partnerships (PPPs) for the delivery of public sector 
outcomes; and the challenges facing Parliaments in protecting the public interest and maintaining 
accountability for the expenditure of public funds’: at 1; Colin Fisher and Alan Lovell, Business Ethics 
and Values (Prentice Hall, 3rd ed, 2009); Marvin Brown, Corporate Integrity: Rethinking Organisational 
Ethics and Leadership (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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and more ‘complex’ than was the case with the technologies replaced; one that chapter 
4 will suggest has implications in terms of calling forth a need for more complex or 
relational concepts of privacy to mirror these characteristics.  To this end, chapter 3 
identifies and discusses the legal and ethical responses to modern technology 
including those associated with healthcare, referred to by Ronda Jolly as a ‘revolution’ 
in health.20  Furthermore, chapter 3 highlights a very significant aspect of the 
healthcare privacy debate, which is the way e-health technologies necessarily interface 
with the threats to privacy generated by the rapid development of national and 
international surveillance, security and biometric mechanisms since the ‘war on 
terror’.21   
To progress the thesis argument that electronic healthcare privacy rights 
requires further consideration and protection in our modern technology driven age, 
chapter 4 presents what the thesis contends is the appropriate conceptual 
understanding of the notion of privacy.  This chapter reviews key contours of the 
debate surrounding different concepts of privacy whilst arguing in favour of a 
particular theoretical framework of privacy, which best captures the challenges posed 
by the ‘symbiotic’ relationship between health and technology.  Chapter 4 argues that 
such a relational conception of privacy requires renewed consideration by 
governments and public sector decision-makers of what may be termed public law 
                                                 
20 See Rhonda Jolly, ‘The E-Health Revolution – Easier Said than Done’ (Research Paper No 3, 
Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 17 November 2011).   
21 See Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). According to Duffy the term ‘war on terror’ was first used by George W Bush (US 
President) on 20 September 2001: at 2. 
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elements or mechanisms, such as by incorporating into healthcare privacy protection 
administrative law values and principles such as transparency and accountability.22   
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 do not suggest that the Australian Government has not been 
transparent in its dealings relating to individual privacy protection in the past 
(existing avenues for healthcare policy feedback have been acted upon in a 
transparent and accountable fashion).  Rather, these chapters provide a basis for the 
thesis contention that there is considerable room to supplement these existing 
mechanisms, and that the adoption of a Council would promote the notion of citizen 
participation, accountability and transparency further.  
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the current legal arguments concerning 
health and privacy regulations and highlights the shortcomings of common law and 
statutory law in protecting individual privacy rights and the numerous challenges 
posed by ongoing legal fragmentation that exists in Australia when it comes to health 
and privacy regulations.  It also emphasises the inconsistent approaches and problems 
associated with federalism such as federal, state and territory responses to health and 
privacy and the impact this has on the present situation.  It does this by recognising 
constitutional limitations existing in the area and the effect this has on a uniform 
‘harmonised’ approach to the broader problems and challenges of privacy 
protection.23  The chapter provides an outline of the relevant states/territory and 
                                                 
22 See Pat Barrett, Auditor-General for Australia, ‘Public Private Partnerships – Are There Gaps in 
Public Sector Accountability?’ above n19; Rhonda Jolly, ‘The E-Health Revolution – Easier Said than 
Done’, above n20. 
23 Dan Jerker B Svantesson, “Privacy, The Internet and Transborder Data Flows: An Australian 
Perspective” (2007) 19 Bond Law Review 1; see ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: 
Issues Paper 43 (October 2013). 
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federal response to healthcare and healthcare privacy and limitations associated with 
a more coordinated approach by inter-governmental bodies such as the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG). 
To illustrate the gravity of the challenge of legal fragmentation, the chapter 
analyses of privacy reports and government responses to these reviews is highlighted.  
For instance, in response to the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) 2008 
report and recommendations in — For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice — and the ALRC final report in September 2014 — Serious Invasions of Privacy 
in the Digital Era — this chapter outlines recent legislation on health privacy.24  By 
demonstrating the inadequacy of existing legal approaches across the federation to 
the problem of privacy rights and protection in light of economic and social changes, 
the chapter makes the case for a coordination and liaison role of the proposed Council 
in relation to the government’s trilogy solution — legislation, technical measures and 
governance — and its first leg namely legislation.25  
                                                 
24 See ALRC, Review of Australian Privacy Law: Discussion Paper 72 (September 2007);ALRC, For Your 
Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice: ALRC Report 108 (August 2008);  ALRC, Review of 
Privacy: Issues Paper 31 (October 2006); ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Discussion 
Paper 80 (March 2014); ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era - Final Report: ALRC Report 
123 (3 September 2014); see also ALRC, Copyright and the Digital Economy: Summary Report 122 
(November 2013); ALRC, Issues Paper 43, above n23. 
25 See ALRC, Issues Paper 43, above n23. Issues Paper 43 recognises ‘gaps’ in the existing Australian 
law such as that the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and ‘State and Territory equivalents deal only with 
information privacy and not with intrusions into personal privacy’: at 47.  It also acknowledges  that 
there is ‘no tort or civil action for harassment, nor is there sufficient deterrence against ‘cyber-
harassment’ in Australian law, compared with overseas jurisdictions’ (see, for example, Nova Scotia, 
Canada, Cyber-Safety Act, SNS 2013, c 2 criminalises cyber-bullying): at 47. 
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Chapter 6 considers the other two trilogy solutions proposed by the previous 
federal Government26 — technical measures and PCEHR and e-health governance — 
and provides further insight into their current application and status.  This chapter 
extends the privacy protection analysis beyond the legal dimensions by exploring 
other various proposals for the adoption of privacy-friendly technical and PCEHR 
governance measures.  Chapter 6 also includes an analysis of earlier and recent 
government and other recommendations about how governance in this area should 
be organised.27  This chapter adopts a multi-dimensional approach by identifying the 
wider political and economic shift in healthcare governance discourse and its 
importance in Australia’s political, economic and social context.   
Given the information contained and discussed in chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 
chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising the main arguments and reinforcing 
the thesis proposition that a Council will further the objectives of strengthening 
individual privacy protection, accountability and coordination issues confronting the 
new electronic health regime.  It does this by questioning and extending orthodox 
healthcare theories of privacy that have a tendency to limit public input in the area, as 
well as recognising and responding to the changing political dynamics in Australia.  
The chapter argues that reliance on antiquated concepts of privacy in a rapidly 
changing environment have a tendency to restrict the debate and the democratic 
                                                 
26 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n1. The Concepts of Operations report document sets out the 
proposed government privacy protection trilogy as encompassing – legislation, technical measures and 
governance: at 20-21. 
27 See, for example, ‘Royle Review’, above n14. 
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process.28  Prior privacy protection machinery put in place by the Australian 
Government have recognised the importance of healthcare provider experts and other 
stakeholders such as business interests and consumer advocacy groups.  However 
despite the creation of expert Councils and Committees, there continues to be 
dissatisfaction relating to the power of the expert such as health industry and 
professional groups to influence and direct EPR and e-health policy changes.  This 
chapter examines the reasons why the current approach taken by government in 
regards to affecting policy change by self-interested expert groups such as medical 
practitioners has not worked and why a Council is necessary to direct and oversee 
changes occurring in this area.  
Furthermore chapter 7 posits that while it can be appreciated that current 
proposed trilogy of privacy protective mechanisms — legislation, governance and 
technical measures — go a long way towards balancing an individual’s healthcare 
information rights, this mechanism alone provides insufficient protection in light of 
growing contextual social, economic and political changes that impact on modern 
society.  This is because existing privacy protection mechanisms do not sufficiently 
anticipate or reflect the rapid transformation powers of information technology and 
its overall effect on democracy to drive digital information data collection, use and 
disclosure in the new knowledge and information economy.  
                                                 
28 See Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, above n1; see also Evgeny 
Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n3; see also Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy 
(Harvard University Press, 2008); Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide (Yale University Press, 2011); Daniel 
Solove, The Digital Person, above n5; Martha Nussbaum, Not for Profit, above n17: at 47-77 [Nussbaum 
supports the notion of citizen engagement and debate such as Socratic Pedagogy and highlights the 
importance of argument].  
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II.    METHODOLOGY AND THESIS CHAPTER STRUCTURE AND 
CONTENT 
The methodology employed in the thesis represents a combination or ‘mixed mode’ 
approach and includes literature review, historical analysis, theoretical and ethical 
inquiry, case studies and legal critique.  This combination approach to methodology 
will support the contextual framework of privacy, health, technology and law and 
progress the thesis argument by enabling exploration of both ‘macro’ ‘meso’ and 
‘micro’ issues that arise in the inquiry.  It is integral to the Australian Government 
approach that the adoption of information technology (IT) is a key component of 
communication,29 and therefore it is incumbent that any examination of developing 
health technology and issues around broad privacy protection requires a solid 
understanding of the available government and scholarly literature in order to 
appreciate the extensive range of national and international information, opinions and 
debate in the area.  
The thesis adopts historical analysis in order to contextualise and frame current 
understanding of privacy and privacy issues arising from health, technology, privacy 
and law.  The relevance of utilising theoretical, ethical and legal enquiry is that it 
distinguishes the foundational concepts and discourse that underpin questions such 
as why health privacy values are important and why we need to protect privacy rights 
in the future.  Case scenarios are also included in the analysis because they extend and 
                                                 
29 See Australian Government, National Health Reform: Progress and Delivery (September 2011) 1. 
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support theory development; they do this by demonstrating, in a practical way, how 
health, technology, law and ethics impact on individual privacy.30   
It is foreshadowed that identifying the evolution of Australian health law,31 
EPR and e-health systems will provide a deeper appreciation of the legal advantages 
and disadvantages (limitations) of current and proposed confidentiality and privacy 
protection instruments.  Importantly, it will be argued that law represents a very 
significant regulatory mechanism for promoting individual privacy protection in the 
digital age and needs to take a more active role in modern-day human rights 
protection.  Moreover the thesis acknowledges the increasing number of related legal 
problems such as surveillance, cybercrime, identity theft and intellectual property 
activities that will also impact substantially on individual privacy protection rights.32  
To conclude, as the above chapter content summary explains, Chapters 2-7 will 
support the main thesis.  This primary focus is achieved by providing an analysis of 
the introduction of the new electronic health regime by Australian Government’s 
policy and law commitments over the last few decades and the impact this 
development has had on individual healthcare privacy protection in Australia.  
Against this background of an analysis of broader conceptual and theoretical 
underpinnings of development of EPR and e-health regimes in Australia and 
comparable countries over the last few decades, the thesis also attempts to critically 
examine the extent to which its implementation is consistent with established legal 
                                                 
30  See chapter 3, pp78-79. 
31 See chapter 5, pp146-163. 
32  See chapter 5, pp163-174; chapter 3, pp78-80. 
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and ethical principles underpinning traditional health assumptions and practices.  As 
a consequence of the broader comparative analysis requirement the following 
discussion on international EPR and e-health considerations and international privacy 
protection highlights how, similar to Australia, other countries have adopted EPR 
systems and examines what lessons Australia might take away from these 
international experiences.  Additionally, it is contended that identifying the broader 
international experience and challenges of e-health implementation and its impact on 
privacy and democratic rights provides further confirmation of the multi-dimensional 
and economic complexity of this type of technology on individual lives.  
 III.  INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC PATIENT RECORDS AND E-
HEALTH  
The formal introduction of EPR and e-health of course is not confined to Australia and 
since the 1990s the potential of e-health has been discussed globally, but remains a 
work in progress in most countries.  Many Western countries in some parts of 
Europe,33 as well as the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and New Zealand have over 
the last few decades introduced EPR and e-health systems into their healthcare 
delivery programs.  Indeed even in 2015 EPR and e-health systems are well advanced 
in many places including Canada and New Zealand and it is recognised that Australia 
lags behind in its IT investment and infrastructure development in the area.34  
However, despite the availability of extensive knowledge from other countries 
regarding EPR and e-health systems implementation experiences, the thesis has 
                                                 
33 See, for example, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Germany. 
34 See Deloitte, National E-Health Strategy, above n5: at 21.  
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elected, due to the focus on Australia, to engage in an in-depth exploration of selected 
countries in order to highlight shared concerns relating to the introduction of EPR 
rather than provide a comprehensive analysis of international EPR and privacy law.    
A.   Parts of Europe 
Examples of international EPR and e-health investment can be seen in countries such 
as Norway, Denmark, Germany and UK.  For instance, every patient in Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark is allotted a unique personal identifier.  Norway has achieved 
a remarkably high degree of EPR penetration with more than 90 per cent of healthcare 
providers using e-health technology and patient records.35  Norway has a dedicated 
healthcare ‘network’ ─ the National Health Network (Health Information Technology 
(HIT)), which interconnects five health networks and provides a number of basic 
services such as web, email, catalogues and registries of personnel.36   
In 2013-2014 despite much progress in the uptake of e-health and patient 
records it was recently reported that Norwegian primary care is still fragmented and 
in some areas of service lacks the resources and equipment for its implementation.37  
All hospitals use electronic health records, but the lack of structured patient records 
in both primary and secondary care precludes automatic data extraction; hence there 
                                                 
35 The Commonwealth Fund, International Profile of Health Care Systems, December 2013 (December 2013): 
at 90-91. 
36 See Jan Tore Lium and Arild Faxvaag ‘Removal of Paper-Based Health Records From Norwegian 
Hospitals: Effects on Clinical Workflow’ (Report Norwegian Research Centre for Electronic Patient 
Records, Faculty of Medicine, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway, 
2006): at 1-2.    
37 The Commonwealth Fund, International Profile of Health Care Systems, above n35: at 90. 
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is insufficient data for quality improvement or national activity registration at both 
the local and national level.38 
Denmark is described as a ‘shining example’ and records the highest 
satisfaction with the healthcare system.39  In 2008 Danish General Practitioners (GPs) 
were ranked first by the European Commission report on the use of health IT in 
Europe.  In a recent 2013 report ─International Profile of Health Care Systems, December 
2013 ─ it noted that Danish Information technology (IT) is used at all levels of the 
health system.40  The primary Danish Health Care Data Network is MedCom and it is 
responsible for developing a strategy for digitisation of Denmark’s healthcare 
service.41    
The Sundhed.dk is a national IT portal for Denmark with differentiated access 
for health staff and the public.  The portal provides general information on health and 
treatment options and access to individual’s own medical records and history.42  A 
number of factors contribute to the Danish e-health system success, including: the 
countries relatively small size and population (about 5 million), with an IT-savvy 
citizenry; trust in the federal Government is high; the countries healthcare is run by 
                                                 
38 The Commonwealth Fund, International Profile of Health Care Systems, above n35; see also Robert 
Fichman, Rajiv Kohli and Ranjani Krishnan, “The Role of Information Systems in Healthcare: Current 
Research and Future Trends” (September 2011) 22 (3) Information System Research 419-428; D A Ludwick 
and John Doucette, “Adopting Electronic Medical Records in Primary Care: Lessons Learned from 
Health Information Systems Implementation Experience in Seven Countries” (2009) 78 International 
Journal of Medical Informatics 22-31 
39 Rhonda Jolly, ‘The E-Health Revolution – Easier Said than Done’, above n20: at 7. 
40 See The Commonwealth Fund, International Profiles of Health Care Systems, 2013, above n35; National 
Board of Health, Denmark, National Strategy for Information Technology in the Health Care System, (2003-
2007) published 2002.  Sets out shared EPR concept models including security and patient rights, 
multidisciplinary operation and common national terminology: at 6-7.   
41 MedCom Denmark E-Health and Implementation of EHR Hall in Tirol 26.04.2006 http://www.ehealth-
benchmarking.org/2006/images/stories/06-johansen_denmark.pdf (viewed on 16/6/2012). 
42 The Commonwealth Fund, International Profiles of Health Care Systems, 2013, above n35: at 30. 
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the public sector, and the Danish Government placed a high priority on engaging GPs.  
The Government also provided and paid for technical support for primary care 
practitioners to encourage widespread adoption of electronic records.43  
In contrast to Norway and Denmark, the German healthcare system is the 
biggest in Europe.  Germany has a detailed specification of its technical and 
organisational framework for IT including information, communication, healthcare 
privacy and security, providing the basis for the introduction of its national 
smartcard.44  In 2013, it was estimated that approximately 90 per cent of physicians in 
private practice use EPR to help with billing, documentation, tracking laboratory data 
and quality assurance.  In some regions about 60 per cent of physicians use online 
services to transmit information.  In Germany a unique patient identifier does not exist 
as data-safety concerns still represent a significant obstacle for its introduction.45  For 
example, the German medical profession continues to express fears that EPR and e-
health implementation will result in the loss of privacy, increase security risks 
associated with electronic prescriptions, bringing an increased reliance on digital 
signatures, as well as the increasing threat of bureaucracy and government oversight 
to professional independence.46  Similar to current 2015 Australian GP pleas for 
reimbursement of costs, German doctors also sought the provision of EPR payment 
and reimbursement of costs for technology set-up and professional time. This battle 
                                                 
43 K Stroetmann, J Artmann, V Stroetmann with D Protti, J Dumortier, S Giest, U Walossek and D 
Whitehouse, ‘European Countries on Their Journey Towards National E-Health Infrastructures: Final 
European Progress Report ICT for Health Unit’, European Commission, January 2011 cited in Rhonda 
Jolly, ‘The E-Health Revolution – Easier Said than Done’, above n20: at 6-7. 
44 Rhonda Jolly, ‘The E-Health Revolution – Easier Said than Done’, above n20. 
45 E-Health ERA, E-Health Strategy and Implementation in Germany (30 June 2007). 
46 E-Health ERA, E-Health Strategy, above n45. 
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for EPR reimbursement and compensation remains an open-ended issue in 
Germany.47  
Apart from the ongoing professional issues, the greatest problem with 
implementing a system wide EPR in Germany is the continuing incompatibility of the 
different programs within and between hospitals, and between hospitals and 
ambulatory care.  Previously, Germany implemented an earlier version of an 
electronic medical chip card (KVK), however, on 1 January 2015, this card, which is 
universal, has now been replaced — by the ‘elektronische Gesundheitskarte’ 
(electronic health card).48  The ‘Gesundheitskarte’ is issued to citizens by statutory 
health insurance providers and gives doctors and dentists access to patient data via 
an electronic chip located on the card.49  The new electronic health card can only be 
used for health treatment; to further ensure privacy the health card is also available 
with or without an identity photograph on the card. 
E-health and EPR progress in the United Kingdom (UK) illustrates a number 
of difficulties that can be encountered in realising e-health initiatives.  The 
implementation of a Personal Demographic Service (PDS), which comprises 
demographic information such as name, address, date of birth and National Health 
Service (NHS) number, commenced across the UK in July 2004.  Despite holding no 
clinical health information the PDS has long been considered the first step towards 
instigating EPR for every patient registered with the NHS and replacing NHS regional 
                                                 
47 See Sarah Colyer, ‘E-health Indemnity Stand-off’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 15 June 2012, 1; Paul 
Smith, ‘Big Stick Looms Over e-Health’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 18 May 2012, 3. 
48 E-Health Europe, Germany’s National e-Health Programme: Contested but Driven Forward (17 June 2012).  
49 E-Health Europe, Germany’s National e-Health Programme, above n48: at 1. 
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databases.50  Authorised healthcare professionals are able to access the PDS through a 
health smartcard.51  Every patient registered with the NHS receives an NHS number, 
which acts as a unique patient identifier.  Most GP patient records are computerised.  
Some practices use electronic systems to allow patients to make appointments and e-
mail their GP but there is no requirement to do so.  However, hospitals and general 
practice records are not integrated into a single system. 
In the UK the previous Labour Government attempted to introduce a patient 
record covering all service providers, but due to circumstances at the time had to 
abandon it because of cost and other factors.  For example, in 2007 the House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts in its first report — National Programme for 
IT in the NHS: Twentieth Report of Session 2006-2007 (‘First Report’)—questioned the 
enormous costs and limited benefits derived from the National Health IT Program.52  
The First Report considered the current status of shared electronic patient clinical 
records, the costs of the program, the local management and implementation of the 
system within the NHS, the extent of clinician involvement, and patient 
confidentiality and security risks.53  The First Report noted the high stakes of the IT 
Program and acknowledged that electronic technology could revolutionise the way 
                                                 
50 Rhonda Jolly, ‘The E-Health Revolution – Easier Said than Done’, above n20: at 10. 
51 See also UK, National Health Services (NHS), Connecting for Health ‘Spine’ (2012). UK Government 
pushed its implementation of a national EPR and e-health vision forward by creating the ‘SPINE’ 
Program.  This program remains one of the largest civilian projects in the world and operates 24 hours 
a day, 365 days a year to provide the IT infrastructure and support programs for GPs and Pharmacists 
in the UK, including the Summary Care Record, electronic prescription service connections, NHS 
number and secondary use services. 
52 UK Parliament, Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AGs) Report, Department of Health: The National 
Programme for IT in the NHS, HC (2005-2006) (March 2006): at 1173. 
53 UK Parliament, House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Department of Health: The National 
Programme for IT in the NHS’ Twentieth Report of Session 2006-2007 (26 March 2007) (‘First Report’): at 1. 
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the NHS in the UK used information, including patient healthcare information.  
However, it was equally observed by the report that if it failed it could set back IT 
developments in the NHS for years and divert money and staff time from frontline 
patient services.54 
The First Report recommendations formed the basis for the later 2011 House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounting —The National Programme for IT in the 
NHS: An Update on the Delivery of Detailed Care Records Systems (‘Second Report’) —of 
healthcare record systems in the UK.55  The Second Report found that the 
implementation of an alternative up-to-date IT system had once again significantly 
fallen behind schedule and costs had continued to escalate.56  Further it was noted that 
the Department of Health had now accepted its inability to deliver its original vision 
of a standardised care record system for NHS patients and as a result was now relying 
on individual NHS Trusts to develop systems compatible with those in the program.  
This situation indicated that different parts of the country continued to rely on 
dissimilar systems that might be incompatible with each other.  It was also 
recommended that the Department review its commitment to the program and 
consider whether the remaining £4.3 billion would be better spent elsewhere.  In its 
findings the Second Report was very critical of the fact that the Department of Health 
had not received the best out of suppliers, despite having paid them some £1.8 billion 
                                                 
54 UK Parliament, First Report, above n53.  
55 UK Parliament, House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts Report, The National Programme 
for IT in the NHS: An Update on the Delivery of Detailed Care Records Systems released (July 2011- Second 
Report) (‘Second Report’).  
56 UK Parliament, Second Report, above n55. 
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since 2002.57  Other significant report outcomes included the need for the NHS Trusts 
to take over responsibility for care records in the UK from 2015, and the responsibility 
of the Department’s weak project management and poor accountability style for the 
system failings.58   
The present Conservative-Liberal Coalition Government in Britain introduced 
the Summary Care Record,59 which store a limited range of data for all patients except 
those who choose not to have one.  Electronic transfers are widely used for 
prescriptions from GP practices to pharmacies and for the storage and distribution of 
digital images (X-ray, scans, etc.).  The ‘Choose and Book’ system allows patients to 
choose where they wish to be treated and to book an appointment online.60  These 
developments had been centrally led by the Department of Health.  However, since 
the election of the current government it appears that significant e-health progress in 
Britain is being stalled and that the national program is being dismantled and future 
developments are increasingly being left to local area authorities.61  
                                                 
57 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Second Report, above n55. 
58 Ibid.  
59 See UK Conservative Party (2015 - David Cameron Prime Minister); United Kingdom, UK Summary 
Care Record includes: current medication, adverse reactions and allergies. 
60 United Kingdom, National Health Services (NHS), Connecting for Health ‘Spine’ (2012) 
<http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/spine> (viewed on 14/6/2012). 
61 See The Commonwealth Fund, International Profiles of Health Care Systems Report, above n35. For 
example, from 2011-2013 pay for NHS staff was frozen for all but the lowest-paid workers; initiatives 
have been taken to cut the costs of purchasing medical supplies, including national and regional 
contracts designed to achieve savings through bulk purchases; NHS Shared Business Services—‘a joint 
venture between the Department of Health and a private company  provides shared functions such as 
finance, payroll, and e-procurement for an estimated 100 NHS organisations to reduce costs of back-
office services’: at 37; see also J Hughes, ‘Upload of NHS records suspended’, BBC News (UK), 16 April 
2010 (online) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8625007.stm (viewed on 10/5/2011). 
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The Canadian Government has made substantial investments in the area of 
EPR and e-health since the 1997 federal budget.62  Canada has also made the most 
significant progress in EPR and e-health system implementation through its delivery 
of shared diagnostic imaging between providers, a patient registry and progress in 
the field of provider registry, drug and laboratory capabilities and a unified push to 
advanced standards for computer language and messaging.63  Canada Health 
Infoway,64 a federally funded independent not-for-profit organisation, works with 
governments and health organisations to accelerate the adoption of EPR and other 
electronic health information systems (e.g. telehealth, public health surveillance).  
A healthcare identifier (HI) number is used in Canada, but there exist 
limitations as to its use (it can only be used for health treatment), EPR patient 
enrolment is voluntary and participation in the system continues to have a ‘consumer-
centric’ focus.  Despite earlier successes and commitment by the Canadian 
                                                 
62 Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of 
Canadians – The Federal Role: Final Report on the State of the Health Care System in Canada (2010), Volume 
Six, recommendations for reform in The Federal Role in Health Infrastructure Ottawa, (October 2002) 
[Chair: Michael Kirby - The Health of Canadians – The Federal Role, chapter 10 of the ‘Kirby Report’]. 
63 See Deloitte, National E-Health Strategy, above n5: at 21. 
64 Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of 
Canadians – The Federal Role: Final Report on the State of the Health Care System in Canada (2010) (‘Kirby 
Report’), above n62; see also Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and 
Technology, The Federal Role in Health Infrastucture: Ottawa (October 2002) (‘White Paper’).  This White 
Paper recommended and introduced strategies that would further encourage consumer and healthcare 
provider participation in EPR and e-health.  As a consequence of these recommendations, in 2010 a 
public and private partnership known as the BRIDGE project was created and continues to work 
towards designing and standardising health technology.  The White Paper also resulted in the 
establishment in 2011 by government of ‘Health Infoway’ an independent not-for-profit organisation 
whose main commitment includes the transformation of Canada’s healthcare system through health 
IT.  The main priorities of Canada’s ‘Health Infoway’ include addressing policy issues and challenges in 
mainstreaming e-health services within its healthcare system and evaluating progress in the 
deployment and investment of these services.   
25 
 
Government, uptake of health information technologies has remained limited and still 
varies widely across Canada.65  
The New Zealand Government began investing in EPR and e-health through a 
devolved funding model led by the 2001 ‘WAVE’ initiative and the subsequent 2005 
Health Information Strategy (HISNZ) group.  New Zealand has one of the world’s 
highest rates of information (IT) technology use among primary care physicians.  
Underpinning New Zealand’s commitment to developing EPR systems is the 
recognition that various providers collect information for different purposes and as a 
consequence there is a recognisable need to have safe sharing and transfer of health 
information among users. 66  The New Zealand Government’s 2011 — National Health 
IT Plan — committed to an objective that by 2014 all citizens would have electronic 
access to a core set of personal health information.  While this plan of national IT 
health coverage is well advanced, it is yet to be fully realised.  The National Health IT 
Board continues to work with a number of sector groups and receives advice from 
others, including consumers, clinicians and vendors.  The Health Information 
Standards Organisation (HISO) supports and promotes the development and use of 
                                                 
65 Department of Health, Canada, National Physician Survey 2010 cites The Commonwealth Fund, 
International Profiles of Health Care Systems 2013, above n35: at 23-25.  The National Survey reported in 
2010 that only about one-third of Canadian physicians were using a combination of paper and 
electronic records, and 16 per cent were using only electronic records (there are no updated statistics 
on this survey): at 24. 
66 New Zealand, Health Information Strategy New Zealand (2009) favours a distributive approach for the 
safe sharing and transfer of patient electronic health information using interoperability standards set 
by the Health Information Standards Organisation (HISO).  A distributed approach aims to enable the 
different systems of different providers to share information and differs from a single enterprise sector-
wide approach that requires all providers use the same system, see Ministerial Review Group Report, 
Minister of Health (NZ) Tony Rydall, Meeting the Challenge: Enhancing Sustainability and the Patient and 
Consumer Experience within the Current Legislative Framework for Health and Disability Services in New 
Zealand (16 August 2009).  This is a comprehensive report with 170 recommendations on how to reduce 
bureaucracy, improve frontline health services, and improve value in the public health and disability 
sector (released 16 August 2009).  
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health information standards to ensure interoperability between systems.  Every 
person who uses health and disability support services in New Zealand has a national 
health index number as a unique identifier.  
The present situation in New Zealand enables health professionals to view 
patient information through a single, secure, web-based system provided by District 
Health Boards (DHBs).67  New Zealand is divided into four health areas and health 
programs primarily run through a District Health Board with a single IT Program 
Director for each region.  Currently most health professionals use their own 
computers to log on to clinical workstations in order to obtain a fuller picture of a 
patient’s information, including real-time laboratory results, radiology images and 
discharge information.68  This continuing reliance on local computers (security and 
software programs) highlights the problem of regulating standardised EPR data 
protection and security, an issue that is further examined in later chapters of the 
thesis.69 
B.  International Privacy Protection 
The dominant approach by various countries adopting e-health is to view privacy as 
a human right.70  It is recognised by signatory countries in Article 12 of the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
                                                 
67 New Zealand Ministerial Review Group, Meeting the Challenge, above n 66.  
68 New Zealand Ministerial Review Group, Meeting the Challenge, above n66: at 3.  
69 See chapter 3, pp70-98; chapter 4, pp99-120.  
70 See, eg, United Nations (UN), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), GA Res 217A, 3rd sess, 
183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).  
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Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 16 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child that privacy protection is a human right.71  
The European Union’s protection of privacy rights is contained in Article 8 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights and covers the right to respect for an 
individual’s private and family life, home and correspondence —Article 12.72  The 
European Court of Human Rights established a benchmark for analysis and 
application of Article 8 in the case Von Hannover v Germany in 2004.73  In this case, the 
European Court set out application of Article 8 standards,74 and recognised the 
‘fundamental importance of protecting private life from the point of view of the 
development of every human being’s personality.’75  It also noted that this right 
‘extends beyond the private family circle and also includes a social dimension’76 and 
further that ‘anyone, even if they are known to the general public, must be able to 
enjoy a legitimate expectation of protection of and respect for their private life’.77  
                                                 
71 See United Nations Convention on Human Rights, GA Res 217A, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 at 
71 (1948); United Nations Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966), Art 17; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), Article 17; Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human 
Rights (October 2005) Article 1; see generally Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), 
33rd Session of the UNESCO General Conference 19 October 2005; Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights (1997), adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on 11 November 1997; endorsed by GA Res 53/152, 
UN Doc A/Res/53/152 (1998); International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003); OECD Guidelines 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980) reprinted in (1981) 20 
International Legal Materials 422. 
72 United Nations (UN), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), above n70.   
73 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294. 
74 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294. 
75 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294: at 69. 
76 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294.  
77 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294.  
28 
 
However despite this judgment, the extent of ‘private life’ still remains unclear and 
contested.   
There is no freestanding right to privacy in the UK.  The courts repeatedly 
rejected a common law tort of invasion of privacy.78  This position was confirmed by 
the House of Lords in Home Office v Wainwright79 and Kaye v Robertson,80 instead of a 
separate tort of privacy the cause of action for breach of confidence has been extended 
to encompass misuse or wrongful dissemination of private information.  Nevertheless 
UK development in the area has been influenced in recent years by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).  The Human 
Rights Act incorporates the ECHR into domestic law of the UK.  Another piece of 
legislation that impacts on UK information privacy is the Data Protection Act 1998,81 
enacted to ensure compliance with the 1995 European Directive82 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of 
such data.83  The Data Protection Act 1998 exemptions for small-to-medium enterprises 
were abolished to comply with European Directive -95/46/EC.84  The Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Regulations 2003,85 a European Directive - 2006/24/EC and the 
                                                 
78 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2007] 2 WLR 920: at 272. 
79 Home Office v Wainwright [2003] UKHL 53; [2003] 3 WLR 1137 [This case concerned the tort of privacy 
and battery]. 
80 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, Lord Justice Glidewell held that there was no common law right to 
privacy in England: at 6. 
81 Data Privacy Act 1998 (UK). 
82 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on 2000 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data.   
83 Directive-95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
privacy http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html (viewed on 23/11/2001); 
see also Directive 1997/66/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on 1997 on processing of personal 
data and protecting personal privacy in the telecommunication sector.  
84 Directive-95/46/EC, above n83 
85 Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (UK). 
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Human Rights Act 1998,86 were also all introduced to comply with the European 
Convention on Human Rights—Article 8.1.87  
There is no common law tort of privacy in Canada.  Consequently four 
Canadian provinces – British Columbia,88 Manitoba,89 Saskatchewan,90 Quebec91 and 
Newfoundland and Labrador92 – have enacted statutory causes of action for invasion 
of privacy.93  Basically the legislation provides that ‘it is a tort, actionable without 
proof of damage for a person wilfully and without claim of right to violate the privacy 
of another person.’94   
In Canada various instruments including the Constitution,95 common law,96 
international obligations and legislation97 achieve human rights and privacy 
protection.  Although the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 does not 
                                                 
86 European Parliament, Directive 2006/24/EC (15 March 2006); Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
87 European Convention on Human Rights Article 8.1. 
88 British Columbia Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373  
89 Manitoba Privacy Act, RSM 1987, c P125. 
90 Saskatchewan Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24.  
91 Quebec Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64 ss 3, 35-37. 
92 Newfoundland and Labrador Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22.   
93 Privacy Act 1996 RSBC c 373 (British Columbia); Privacy Act CCSM section P125 (Manitoba); Privacy 
Act 1978 RSS c P-24 (Saskatchewan); Privacy Act 1990 RSNL c P-22 (Newfoundland and Labrador). 
94  See Privacy Act 1978 RSS c P – 24 (Saskatchewan) s2; see also Privacy Act 1996 RSBC c 373 (British 
Columbia) s1(1); Privacy Act CCSM section P125 (Manitoba) s2(1); Privacy Act 1990 RSBC c P – 22 
(Newfoundland and Labrador) s3(1). The British Columbia legislation differs from the statutes in force 
in the other provinces in that it also protects the unauthorized use of the name or portrait of another – 
Privacy Act (British Columbia) s3. See also ALRC, Report 80, above n24.  
95 The Constitution Act 1982 established the Constitution of Canada in 1982. The Constitution of Canada 
contains the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. 
96 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32 [the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Jones v Tsige recognised the 
tort of invasion of privacy in Canada]. 
97 See, eg, Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (1982) Canada Act 1982 (UK), Schedule B: 
Constitution Act 1982, Part 1: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982); see also Human Rights Act 
1985 (Canada); Privacy Act 1983 (Canada); Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
2000 (Canada) (PIPEDA).  PIDEDA sets out ground rules for how private sector may collect, use or 
disclose personal information (there is a Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner (Canadian Government) and Provincial Office of Information and Privacy 
Commissioner’s, this Memorandum of Understanding is current as to 2015). 
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specifically guarantee a right to privacy, the Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted 
the right in section 8 – ‘everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure’ – to include a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to 
governmental acts.  Canada also has a Human Rights Commissioner who administers 
the Human Rights Act 1983 as well as regulating equal opportunity under the 
Employment Equity Act.98  Two federal laws, the Privacy Act 1983 and the Personal 
Information Protection Electronic Documents Act 2000 (PIPEDA) protect privacy.99  The 
Privacy Act 1983 imposes obligations on federal Government departments and 
agencies in respect to privacy rights by limiting the collection, use and disclosure of 
personal information.  The Privacy Act 1983 gives individuals the right to access and 
request correction of personal information about themselves held by these federal 
organisations.100  
Individuals are also protected by the PIPEDA that sets out the rules for how 
private organisations may collect, use or disclose personal information in the course 
of commercial activities.101  Several Canadian provinces have also separately passed 
                                                 
98 Employment Equity Act 1984 (Canada) [provides equal opportunities for four designated groups: 
women, aboriginals, disabled and other visible minority groups]. 
99 Similar to Australian States and Territories legislation in Australia. Each Canadian Province has its 
own version of privacy and healthcare privacy protection, for example, Personal Information Protection 
Act 2003 (British Columbia) [SBC 2003] Chapter 63; Personal Information Privacy Act 2004 (Alberta); An 
Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector 2015 (Quebec); Personal Health 
Information Protection Act 2004 (Ontario); Personal Health Information Privacy and Access Act 2009 (New 
Brunswick); Personal Health Information Act 2008 (Newfoundland and Labrador);  see also ALRC, Report 
80, above n24: at 22-25. 
100 Canadian Government, The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Privacy Legislation in 
Canada (2012); Information & Privacy Commissioner Ontario, Canada, Ann Cavoukian and Richard 
Alvarez, ICD.D, President & CEO Canada Health Infoway, Embedding Privacy into the Design of EHRs to 
Enable Multiple Functionalities – Win/Win (Discussion Paper, Information and Privacy Commissioner, 
Ontario, Canada, 2 March  2012).  
101 Ann Cavoukian, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, above n100; see also Personal 
Information Protected Electronic Documents Act 2000 (Canada) (PIPEDA). 
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legislation to deal specifically with the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information by healthcare providers and other healthcare organisations.102 
In 2012, the Ontario Court of Appeals in a unanimous panel decision 
recognised the tort of invasion of privacy in Jones v Tsige.103  This protection was 
achieved by confirming the existence of a right of action for intrusion upon seclusion.  
It was held in this case that such a cause of action would amount to an incremental 
step that is consistent with the role of the court to develop the common law in a 
manner consistent with the changing needs of society.  These incremental processes 
include accelerating technological change and an individual’s right to privacy.  Legal 
scholar Peter Burns observes that there is ‘a pressing need to preserve privacy, which 
is being threatened by science and technology to the point of surrender.’104 
According to David Fraser, a Canadian privacy lawyer, it is within the capacity 
of the common law to evolve to respond to the problem posed by the routine collection 
and aggregation of highly personal information that is readily accessible in electronic 
form.105  The above observations by Peter Burns and David Fraser resonate in modern 
                                                 
102 See above n99 for reference citation to Canadian provincial information privacy legislation.  
103 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32.   
104 Peter Burns “The Law and Privacy: the Canadian Experience” (2012) 
<http://www.privacylawyer.ca/2012/01/ontario> (viewed on 3/5/2012): at 1. 
105 David Fraser “Canadian Privacy Law: Ontario Recognizes Tort of Invasion of Privacy” (2012) (Blog) 
<http://blog.privacylawyer.ca/2012/01/onario-recognizes-tort-of-invasion-of.html> (viewed on 
20/6/2012): at 1; see also Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Transparency and Privacy in the 
Digital Age (2014).  This report argues that ‘Transparency builds trust’ – overshadowing other privacy 
issues has been the challenge in Canada and other democratic states about conserving the right of 
privacy of individuals in the digital era while also pursuing effective national security.  Public concern 
has been heightened by revelations about state surveillance activities, especially among the so-called 
‘Five Eyes’, which comprise of an intelligence alliance between Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the 
UK and the US: at 3.  The OPC Canada noted that from June 2013 to June 2014, ‘terms like ‘metadata’ 
and ‘Five Eyes’ previously found almost exclusively in blogs read by privacy technologists and policy 
experts, were vaulted into mainstream news headlines and leads’: at 2.‘  And ‘while the revelations 
about state surveillance provided an unprecedented view into the operations of intelligence agencies, 
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Australia and a thesis recommendation is that in order to ensure adequate individual 
privacy protection rights in Australia, there needs to be proactive and visible judicial 
intervention by a progressive Australian court system in order to help evolve privacy 
protection in light of advancing technology.106  
Unlike Australia, which has not developed a separate tort of privacy,107 New 
Zealand common law has recognised this specific action.108  In P v D, the New Zealand 
High Court confirmed the necessary elements of a tort of privacy.109  Later in Hosking 
v Runting, a majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognised a common law 
tort of privacy.110  The court found that there were two fundamental requirements for 
a successful claim for interference with privacy: firstly, ‘the existence of facts in respect 
of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy’; and secondly, the ‘publicity 
given to those facts that would be considered highly offensive to an objective 
reasonable person’.111  There have been relatively few cases in New Zealand dealing 
with the tort of invasion of privacy since developments in this area started in the mid-
1980s.   
                                                 
they also raise important questions calling for greater transparency’ [emphasis added]: at 9.  It was also 
noted that ‘in the end, it’s not a question of “either, or” – it is possible to have both’: at 9.  Furthermore, 
‘Canadians (and the thesis argues that Australians) want greater transparency to see that these 
objectives are being sufficiently respected’: at 9. 
106 See ALRC, Issues Paper 43, above n23; ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n24; ALRC, Final Report 
123, above n24; see also thesis legal discussion and governance recommendations in chapter 5, pp146-
163; chapter 6, pp184-234; chapter 7, pp238-260.  
107 See Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Games Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
108 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 [731-733]; Bradley v Wingnut Films [1993] 1 
NZLR 415, 423; P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591. 
109 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591. 
110 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
111 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1: at 117.  
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The New Zealand Law Commission recommended in 2010 that development 
of the tort recognised in Hosking v Runting112 should be left to the common law,113 
although the Commissioner did acknowledge that a statutory cause of action would 
make the law more certain and accessible.114  In August 2011 the New Zealand Law 
Reform Commission released its fourth and final part of a detailed inquiry into the 
state of New Zealand privacy laws—Review of the Law of Privacy Stage 4: Part 2.115  The 
conclusion and recommendations from this report are still under consideration by the 
New Zealand Government.  
In New Zealand, human rights and privacy protection is located in the 
Constitution,116 international conventions and treaties,117 common law and legislation.  
The main Acts that apply to privacy are the Privacy Act,118 Privacy Amendment Act119 
and later Privacy Amendment Act.120  New Zealand also has a Human Rights Act121 and 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act,122 which also contribute to citizen rights and 
protection by the New Zealand Government. 
                                                 
112 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
113 New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC), Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies, Review of the Law 
of Privacy Stage 3, Report No 113 (2010): at 91. 
114 Ibid 90.  
115 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ); New Zealand Law Reform Commission (NZLRC), A 
Conceptual Approach to Privacy (MP 19, 2007); NZLRC, Review of the Law of Privacy Stage 4: Part 2 NZLRC 
123, (2011); Information & Privacy Commissioner Ontario, Canada, Cavoukian and Alvarez, Embedding 
Privacy into the Design of EHRs to Enable Multiple Functionalities – Win/Win, above n100.   
116 New Zealand Constitution 1986. 
117 For example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified 1978); Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ratified 1972); Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified 
1993), above n76. 
118 Privacy Act 1993 (NZ). 
119 Privacy Amendment Act 1993 (NZ). 
120 Privacy Amendment Act 1993 (NZ). 
121 Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ). 
122 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ). 
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Privacy and security protection has generally featured strongly in all Western 
countries EPR and e-health implementation agendas and reforms.123  However 
because of the uptake of EPR and the obvious advantages of collecting and linking 
personal health records in a single, accessible database, there remain significant 
privacy risks.  Unlike localised, paper-based patient health records, if there is a breach 
of security of electronic records, those records potentially become public property for 
millions of people.  Numerous examples of this type of breach exist, including the 
unauthorised hacking of a confidential computer file containing the names of 4,000 
HIV-positive patients in the United States (US); the deletion of ten years’ worth of 
AIDS research in Italy by computer vandals in 1999;124 the 2011 cyber-attack on 
detailed personal information records held by Sony PlayStation (even more disturbing 
is how long it took Sony to inform its customers that their personal information had 
been stolen); and the late 2012 cyber-terrorist attack on patient health records in 
Queensland, Australia.125   
                                                 
123 With the exception of the U.S. 
124 See Damien McRae, “Telehealth and the Law: If Uncertainty Persists, Please Consult Your Lawyer” 
(1999) 6 Journal of Medicine 270: at 281; Lyria Bennett Moses, “Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to 
Keep up with Technology Changes” [2007] University of New South Wales Review Series 21; David 
Lindsay, “An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the Implications for the Future of 
Australian Privacy Law” (2005) 29(1) Melbourne University Law Review 131; see generally Roger 
Magnusson, “Data Linkage, Health Research and Privacy: Regulating Data Flows in Australia’s Health 
Information System” (2002) 24 Sydney University Law Review 5; Roger Magnusson, “Confidentiality and 
Consent in Medical Research: Some Recurrent, Unresolved Legal Issues Faced by IECs” (1995) 17 
Sydney University Law Review 549. 
125 See Danielle Cesta, ‘Hacking into Health Files’ Medical Observer (Australia), I February 2013, 14-15; 
Kate Newton, ‘GP Clinic Stands Firm Against Extortion Attempt from Hackers’ Australian Doctors 
(Australia), 18 January 2013, 4. 
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Consequently the benefits of creating a national electronic health information 
scheme could be high but so are the risks to individual privacy if sensitive healthcare 
details inadvertently end up in criminal hands, the wrong hands or in the public arena.  
IV.   CONCLUSION 
It is argued that the research undertaken in this thesis demonstrates the value of law 
reform to set up an Independent Council to support and strengthen individual 
healthcare privacy rights in Australia.  It is argued in the thesis that implementation 
by the Australian Government of electronic information technology such as EPR and 
e-health represents the new dominant praxis for future provision and delivery of 
healthcare in Australia.126   Significantly the government policy shift has changed the 
prevailing health-technology paradigm by challenging established methods of 
healthcare delivery systems and altering our understanding of healthcare providers.  
This happens because advances in new technology systems extend the responsibility 
and boundaries of personal healthcare information collection, usage and disclosure to 
include, amongst other requirements, a new class of non-health third party actors not 
normally privy to this information.127   
In addition, the process of EPR mandates that all healthcare providers conform 
and ‘standardise’ clinical healthcare practice and ‘voluntarily share’ their patient 
notes.128  The new requirement of ‘sharing’ digital patient healthcare record 
                                                 
126 See chapter 2, pp38-67 for general discussion of evolving Government policy development of 
electronic records and e-health. 
127 See, for example, Roger Magnusson, “Confidentiality and Consent in Medical Research”, above n124 
[i.e. government, researchers, public health]. 
128 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n1.  
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information means that healthcare providers now occupy a new role as information 
collection agents, irrespective of whether or not they choose to practice in the public 
or private health sector.  
As a consequence of these modern day changes the proposed government 
electronic healthcare delivery system continues to challenge established concept of 
health, technology, and privacy protection — as societies morally and legally ‘grapple’ 
to understand the impact of information economy on privacy and individual privacy 
protection in the new global digital age.  In order to fully appreciate how this shift has 
evolved there is a need to examine the meaning of ‘symbiotic’ health and acknowledge 
the transformational power of modern day technology, which now drives the message 
in healthcare privacy. 
From the chapter analysis of international e-health and health privacy 
protection concerns there is little doubt that EPR and e-health system progress and 
implementation is an  important modern day consideration given its rise in popularity 
in both Australia and internationally.  A major concern for the public in relation to 
EPR and e-health progress is the issue of privacy and security protection.129  New 21st 
century pressures found in the modern information era include: surveillance and the 
‘war on terror’, expanding digital economy, globalisation, creation of mega data 
repositories, and international trade agreements,130 which increasingly dictate the 
                                                 
129 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n1: at 61-65; see also chapter 4, pp98-122 for discussion 
about the conceptual development of privacy. 
130 See Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) signed in 2004; World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), Dispute Settlement Understanding, (2003), Article 8.2; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC); World Trade Organisation (WTO), Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS); see David Morris, ‘Free Trade: The Great Destroyers’ in Edward Goldsmith 
and Jerry Mander (eds) The Case Against the Global Economy (Earthscan Publications, 2001): at 115, TRIPS 
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terms of individual privacy protection in this country.131  In order to progress the 
argument that individual privacy protection and ultimately democracy is threatened 
by expanding technologies, the thesis considers the legal and ethical impact of EPR 
and e-health on privacy and confidentiality from the Australian perspective.132   
However, the thesis contends that how privacy is protected in a world that is 
moving rapidly towards ‘free flow’ global information, creation of unlimited 
individual digital profiles and surveillance mechanisms, using cyberspace 
communication processes remains a serious challenge, specifically in regard to 
individuals’ right to control personal healthcare information collection, use and 
disclosure.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
‘achieving notoriety for its alleged deleterious impact on the provision and affordability of essential 
medicines in developing nations’: at 116. 
131 See Jerry Mander, ‘Technologies of Globalisation’ in Goldsmith and Mander, The Case Against the 
Global Economy, above n130: at 45; see also Agnes Bertrand and Laurence Kalafatides, ‘The World Trade 
Oganization and the Liberalization of Trade in Healthcare and Services’ in Goldsmith and Mander, The 
Case Against the Global Economy, above n131: at 217; Subramanian and Katz, ‘Perspectives on the Global 
Flow of Information’ in Subramanian and Katz, The Global Flow of Information, above n9: at 5.  
132 See Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, above n21; see also Rick 
Sarre and Tim Prenzler, The Law of Private Security in Australia (Thomas Reuters, 2nd ed, 2009); Jeffery 
Rosen, ‘The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy and Security in an Age of Terror’ (Paper Presented at 
Twenty-Fourth Annual Isaac Marks Memorial Lecture, 4 March 2004). 
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CHAPTER 2  
UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND CONTEXT OF HEALTH AND PRIVACY IN 
AUSTRALIA 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the health system and identifies the recent 
electronic health paradigm shift in Australia, extending an appreciation of electronic 
health information data ‘collection and ‘sharing’ concept and its impact on individual 
privacy rights.  It demonstrates that, despite the introduction by the previous 
government of privacy protection mechanisms such as legislation, technical and 
governance measures, privacy rights continue to be threatened in the modern 
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information driven technology age.1  Alongside the expected political and legal 
dimension of health and privacy regulations, are evolving social and government 
policy considerations and the growing influence in Australia of rapidly advancing 
technology and globalisation.2   
This chapter provides an incremental account of healthcare policy 
development including: technology, legal and governance initiatives relating to 
healthcare privacy, exposing the expected outcomes these changes have on privacy 
rights in the emerging computer information era.  The contextual health and privacy 
story establishes a ‘framework’ in which the thesis can locate its proposition that 
privacy and by association democracy is under threat and further supports the 
recommendation that more can be done to further protect and individual advance 
privacy rights.   
I. AUSTRALIAN HEALTH SERVICES 
As a consequence of the unique historical political development of federalism, 
Australian health and healthcare service delivery has never been an area that 
promotes straightforward national policy development nor comprehensive legal 
                                                 
1 See Australian Government, National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA), Concepts of Operations: 
Relating to the Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record System (September 2011); see, 
eg, Rosemary Roberts, Kerin Robinson and Dianne Williamson, ‘Health Information Policy’ in Heather 
Gardiner and Simon Barraclough (eds), Health Policy in Australia (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2002): 
at 100; see also Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem” (November/December 2013) MIT 
Technology Review Vol. 116 Issue 6, 32-43; see generally Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything Click Here 
(books.goggle.com. 2012) [Morozov challenges widespread claims that life will improve dramatically 
once technology makes more decisions for us]. 
2 See, for example, Ramesh Subramanian and Eddan Katz (eds) The Global Flow of Information (New York 
University Press, 2011); Lawton Robert Burns (ed), The Business of Healthcare Innovations (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); see also Lyria Bennett Moses, “Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep 
Up With Technological Change” [2007] University of New South Wales Law Research Series 21; Roger 
Magnusson, “Data Linkage, Health Research and Privacy: Regulating Data Flows in Australia’s Health 
Information System” (2005) 24 Sydney University Law Review 5. 
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solutions.  Unlike other countries not bound by the constitutional federalism,3 
Australia must always consider the numerous legal barriers and geographic state and 
territory limitations in relation to providing a coordinated approach to health and 
privacy regulation.4  This situation often results in complicated law making and 
national fragmentation.5  While it can be evidenced that some of these issues and 
challenges can be resolved, it is also recognised that national, state and territory 
political issues are dynamic, requiring sensitive and often protracted negotiation in an 
attempt to find agreed upon outcomes.6  There are no simple solutions to 
constitutional problems of fragmented federal/state authority, and thus harmonising 
complex and often-conflicting health and privacy regulations across Australia in the 
modern era remains relevant and highly problematic.7   
In practice healthcare delivery in Australia customarily relies on organisations 
including hospitals and personal professional service delivery such as medical 
                                                 
3 See Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitution Law & Theory (The Federation 
Press, 5th ed, 2010): at 146; see also George Williams, Sean Brennan and Andrew Lynch, Blackshield & 
Williams Australian Constitutional Law & Theory (The Federation Press, 6th ed, 2012); see Geoffrey Sawer, 
Federation Under Strain (Melbourne University Press, 1977); see Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act 1900.  
4 See Linda Hancock, ‘Australian Federalism, Politics, and Health’ in Heather Gardiner, Health Policy in 
Australia, above n1: at 49; Carol Grbich, ‘Moving Away from the Welfare State: The Privatisation of the 
Health System’ in Gardiner and Barraclough Health Policy in Australia, above n1: at 79.  
5 See chapter 5 for detailed discussion on federalism and national fragmentation: at pp125-146; see 
Blackshield and Williams, Australian Constitutional Law, above n3. 
6 See Council of Australian Governments (COAG), Joint Communique: New Council a Vital Link to Future 
Health Information Management Australia (28 November 2003). The COAG Communique, outlined the 
establishment of the Australian Information Council (AHIC), its function was to provide advice on long 
term directions and national strategic reform issues for information management and technology in 
health: at 1. 
7 See Carol Grbich, ‘Moving Away from the Welfare State’, in Heather Gardiner, et al, Health Policy in 
Australia, above n4; George Palmer and Stephanie Short, Health Care and Public Policy (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 4th ed, 2010); see also Christopher Arup, Innovation, Policy and Law: Australia and the 
International High Technology Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1993).   
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practitioners and allied health professionals.8  The hospital sector is primarily made-
up of acute-care public hospitals, private hospitals, geriatric and rehabilitation 
hospitals and those for which the defence forces are responsible.9   Generally health 
care distinguishes between primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare services and is 
provided outside institutions to individuals in a variety of settings by a wide range of 
health practitioners, including medical practitioners (doctors or physicians) who are 
responsible for a high proportion of primary healthcare delivery.  Traditionally most 
doctors work in private practice on a fee-for-service basis, which means they are self-
employed.  However there is a growing trend towards doctors moving away from 
sole practice and joining larger corporate run Medical Centres as either employees or 
independent contractors.10    
Beside traditional healthcare professionals such as medical practitioners and 
nurses there are numerous other healthcare providers, these providers predominately 
work in a private setting consisting of pharmacists, dentists, optometrists, 
physiotherapists, psychologists, chiropractors, and other healthcare workers.11  
Additionally there are other growing specialist groups outside mainstream healthcare 
providers influencing healthcare delivery in Australia are health economists, health 
analysts, public sector managers, and health epidemiologist researchers.12  Research 
                                                 
8 Allied healthcare professionals include – physiotherapists, nurses, social workers, psychologists, 
occupational therapists, etc. 
9 Palmer and Short, Health Care and Public Policy, above n7: at 3. 
10 Ibid 7. 
11 See, for example, Complementary Alternative Medicine (CAM) include naturopaths, acupuncture, 
homeopaths, etc; see Michael Weir, Law and Ethics in Complementary Medicine (Allen & Unwin, 4th ed, 
2011); see also Julie Zetler and Rodney Bonello, Essentials of Law, Ethics and Professional Issues for CAM 
(Elsevier, 2012) 95. 
12 Jan Garrard, ‘Evidence and Public Health: Data, Discourse, and Debates’ in Helen Keleher and Colin 
MacDougall (eds), Understanding Health (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012): at 59; see generally 
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and statistical agencies provide the information needed for disease prevention, 
detection, diagnosis, treatment, and care associated policy.13  These specialities are 
extremely influential in supporting evidence based medicine14 research methods in 
health practice and contribute to government health policy planning and resource 
management.15  
II. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRONIC 
HEALTHCARE REGIMES 
 
The necessity for the federal Government to reinvent health and healthcare delivery 
experience in Australia is closely linked to numerous social, political and cultural 
changes affecting not only Australia but also all Western liberal countries over the last 
few centuries.16  As outlined in chapter 1, these events include the rise of modern 
neoliberal economics and globalisation involving rapid advances in computer and 
information technology.17   
                                                 
Roger Magnusson, “Data Linkage, Health, Research and Privacy: Regulating Data Flows in Australia’s 
Health Information System”, above n2. 
13 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), Australia’s Health 2010 (May 2010) 11.  
14 See Ray Pawson, Evidence-Based Policy (Sage Publication, 2006). ‘‘Evidence based medicine’ is founded 
on scientific principles and methods in contrast to information obtained from personal experience, 
intuition, or from anecdotal, traditional, or common sense sources’: at 7.   
15 Ibid 71-72. 
16 See generally Nicholas Terry, “Electronic Health Records: International, Structural and Legal 
Perspectives” (2011) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 26 [the article compares the progress that Europe, 
Australia and the United States have made in the journey towards EHR implementation]. 
17 See chapter 1 for discussion of international electronic health records and e-health perspective: at 
pp16-36; see also Australian Government, National Health Reform Committee, A National Health and 
Hospitals Network for Australia’s Future Delivering the Reforms (2010); National E-Health and Information 
Principal Committee, Deloitte, National E-Health Strategy (30 September, 2008): at 4. 
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Other national and local influences also challenging traditional Australian 
healthcare delivery modalities include: an ageing population, increasing healthcare 
provision costs, remote and indigenous healthcare access and equity issues, increasing 
migration and cultural diversity, impact of workplace gender equality, and 
diminishing national and local employment opportunities.18  As a result of these 
challenges, over the last few decades the Australian Government has adopted a new 
electronic healthcare regime that clearly embraces the transformational power of 
computer technology and information economy technology to take Australian 
healthcare systems into the 21st century.  
In order to capture the impact of the new electronic healthcare regime on 
privacy rights the chapter now turns to providing an overview of EPR and e-health 
system research, development and implementation mechanisms from 2000 to 2014.  
This particular period is significant because this timeline (2000-14) best exemplifies 
the three main stages of EPR and e-health conceptual progression of the system: (i) 
research (2000-05), (ii) development (2003-06), and (iii) implementation and uptake 
(2006-14).  Interwoven throughout this period are architectural system design and 
privacy and security concerns relating to advancing health technology and general 
public privacy protection rights.19 
                                                 
18 National Health Reform Committee, A National Health and Hospitals Network for Australia’s Future 
Delivering the Reforms, above n17: at 8. 
19 See National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA), Concepts of Operations: Relating to the 
Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records System (‘Concepts of Operations’) 
(September 2011); Australian Government, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record System: 
Legislation Issues Paper (2011); see ALRC, Review of Australian Privacy Law: Discussion Paper 72 (2007); 
ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Laws and Practice (August 2008); see also Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth) [which now extends privacy in areas such as public and private sector and credit reporting and 
healthcare information protection]. 
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To fully appreciate the complexity of the Australian digital e-health scheme, its 
development and implementation needs to be recognised as an important ‘revolution 
in healthcare’.20  It is also necessary to understand that the e-health system consists of 
two complementary and equally important parallel functions.21  Firstly it involves 
EPR and e-health architecture, which relates to system process design development 
and building such as interoperability, capabilities and infrastructure design (software, 
hardware).  The second function attaches to the introduction and embedding of 
essential protective tools such as privacy, security and utility mechanisms needed to 
ensure legal protection and community confidence in the new electronic system.22  
These two functions are interdependent processes and deliver the foundational 
framework for the new healthcare regime. 
A key element of Australia’s electronic healthcare system is the ability to 
uniquely identify individuals, the constant collection, exchange and transmission of 
health information within the context of information sharing about a single patient 
being exchanged between multiple providers in a secure environment.23   Given this 
focus, in the late 1990s the federal Government set out to develop and implement EPR 
and e-health systems as a national priority, gaining much needed agreement and 
                                                 
20 See Rhonda Jolly, ‘The E-Health Revolution – Easier Said Than Done’ (Research Paper No 3, 
Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 17 November 2011)  [Jolly observes that e-Health is 
seen by some as possibly the most important ‘revolution in healthcare’ since the advent of modern 
medicine]: at 1. 
21 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19. 
22 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19; see generally Australian Government, HealthConnect, 
HealthConnect Interim Report: Overview and Finding (2003); Australian Government, HealthConnect, 
MediConnect, Lessons Learned from the MediConnect Field Test and HealthConnect Trials (April 2005);  
NEHTA, Healthcare Identifiers Service Implementation Approach (2010); NEHTA, Frontiers in Healthcare 
Delivery (2007); Australian Government, National Health Reform: Progress and Delivery (September 2011).  
23 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19. 
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cooperation from the State and Territory Governments.24  As part of the process of 
introducing EPR and e-health systems, federal Governments25 have commissioned 
reports and research, established advisory councils and statutory authorities, and 
invited public and stakeholder submissions on the viability and impact of e-health 
projects.26  As a consequence the policy of e-health implementation and its many 
benefits has been generally endorsed by governments of all political persuasions and 
at all levels. 
III.  ‘GRAND PLAN’ FOR AUSTRALIA – TOWARDS NATIONAL 
COORDINATION OF E-HEALTH 
 
                                                 
24 See Commonwealth Government, Department of Communication, Information, Technology and the 
Arts, Information Economy: Identifying Priorities of Action (December 1998).  This report identified key 
issues and priorities of action for a national direction of ‘harmonisation’ needed for the modern 
information economy; Commonwealth Government, Health Online: A Health Information Action Plan for 
Australia (November 1999); Commonwealth Government, Health Online (September, 2nd ed, 2001). 
Health online promotes new ways of delivering health services by harnessing the enormous potential 
of new and emerging online technologies, including internet-based communication.  It also commits 
government to the development of an environment in which privacy and dignity of individual health 
consumers is paramount: at 2. Commonwealth Government, National Electronic Health Records 
Taskforce, A Health Information Network for Australia (July 2000).  In June 2000 the National Health 
Information Standards Advisory Committee (NHISAC) was formed.  The NHISAC had a policy role 
that straddled both public and private sectors and gave advice to Health Ministers on health 
information standards; see NHISAC, Setting the Standards: A National Health Information Standards Plan 
for Australia (February 2001). [Please note that elected Government refers to both the Australian federal 
Labor Party and the federal Coalition Liberal Party when they held power]; see Council of Australian 
Government (COAG), National Health Agreement 2011 (2011);  COAG, National Agreement 2012-2013 
(2012); see also COAG, Joint Communique, above n6  [This is an agreement between governments to 
work together in the provision of healthcare delivery between the Commonwealth of Australia and the 
States and Territories, being: NSW, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, 
Tasmania, ACT and the Northern Territory of Australia].  
25 See timeline of Australia’s Prime Ministers: 1972-75, Gough Whitlam (Australian Labor Party); 1975-
83, Malcolm Fraser (Coalition Liberal Party); 1983-91, Robert Hawke (Labor Party); 1991-96 Paul 
Keating (Labor Party); 1996-2007, John Howard (Coalition Liberal Party); 2007-2010, Kevin Rudd (Labor 
Party); 2010-2011, Julia Gillard (Labor Party); 2011-2013, Kevin Rudd (Labor Party); 2013 – Tony Abbott 
(Coalition Liberal Party). 
26 See, for example, NEHTA, HealthConnect, Australian Law Reform Commissioner (ALRC), Office of 
the Australian Privacy Commissioner (OAPC), Australian Privacy Foundation and other stakeholders. 
46 
 
Governmental collaboration commenced in December 1998 when the federal 
Department of Communications, Information and the Arts released — Information 
Economy: Identifying Priorities of Actions on e-health.27  This action plan was later 
endorsed by the National Health Information Management Advisory Council 
(NHIMAC), which was given a number of tasks intended to address the barriers to e-
health.  In response to this challenge NHIMAC conceived a ‘grand plan’ for e-health 
and released a strategy document in 1999, Health Online.28  This document outlined a 
framework for the new information economy, which included a plan for a series of 
wide-ranging National Action Strategies.  These documents were endorsed by the 
Commonwealth and State/Territory Governments through the Online Council (health 
being one area of interest).29 
In 2000 the National Electronic Health Records Taskforce (NEHRT), a sub-
committee of NHIMAC was established.  In July 2000, the NEHR Taskforce30 
proposed the setting-up of a national health information network – HealthConnect.  In 
2001 the project received federal funding of AUD $128.3 million over four years to 
‘develop a secure national health information network.’31 
                                                 
27 Department of Communication, Information, Technology and the Arts, Information Economy, above 
n24; Commonwealth Government, Health Online: A Health Information Action Plan for Australia, above 
n24.  
28 Australian Government, National Health Information Management Advisory Council, Health Online: 
A Health Information Action Plan for Australia, above n24.  
29 Department of Communication, Information, Technology and the Arts, A Strategic Framework for the 
Information Economy: Identifying Priorities for Action, above n24.  
30 National Electronic Health Records Taskforce (NEHR), A Health Information Network for Australia: 
Report to Health Minister by the National Electronic Health Records Taskforce (July 2001); see also National 
Health Information Standards Committee (NHISAC) [established at the same time as the NEHR 
Taskforce, the NHIMAC’s function included policy advice to COAG Health Ministers that straddled 
both public and private sectors].  
31 See National Health Information Management Advisory Council Review Steering Group, Review of 
the National Health Information Management Advisory Council: Issues Paper (2002).  
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A.     Putting the ‘grand plan’ into action  
HealthConnect represented a joint government initiative in partnership with the 
federal, states and territories funded for two years in order to investigate, trial, 
evaluate and recommend a national health information network, drawing on the 
potential of electronic health records as a way of improving the flow of information at 
the point of care.  HealthConnect was conceived as an overarching ‘national change 
management strategy working towards interoperability of electronic health 
information products and services for health care and consumers.’32  
Initially it was intended that the first stage of HealthConnect, the Better 
Medication Management System (BMMS), would commence in July 2001.  It was 
envisaged that under the BMMS, Medicare numbers33 would be used to create a 
personal electronic medical record, which linked prescriptions with medications 
written by different doctors and dispensed by different pharmacies.  The scheme’s 
advantages included the minimisation of medication misadventure and prevention of 
doctor-shopping.34  However there were widespread concerns within the medical 
                                                 
32 See Australian Government, HealthConnect, HealthConnect and the Information Management and 
Information Communications Technology Industry (2003).  
33 Medicare (Australia) is a system of fee-for-service payments provided for by the Commonwealth 
Government for the provision of specified health services by doctors, dentists, optometrists, 
chiropractors, physiotherapists, osteopaths and podiatrists, including diagnostic services such as 
laboratory tests and scans.  Generally only Australian residents are entitled to a Medicare number (card) 
for the provision of these health services.  The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) medications 
include prescription drugs subsidised by the Australian Government.  However, not all prescription 
drugs (and over-the-counter drugs) are available under the PB Scheme.  
34 See Australian Medical Association (AMA), to the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and 
Legal Affairs on Submission to the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care: The Better Medication 
Management System: Draft Exposure Legislation (July 2001).  Medical misadventure can be described as a 
situation where a patient has been prescribed at different time’s drugs, which in combination may have 
an adverse side effect.  Doctor-shopping is when a patient visits a number of doctors generally over a 
short period of time to obtain multiple prescriptions from the different doctors in order to procure 
certain restricted drugs such as sedatives and opiates: at 5.   
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community about the BMMS, especially relating to the inclusion of necessary privacy 
protection.35  As a result, a limited number of field tests to encourage provider and 
consumer participation in MediConnect (BMMS) were conducted at sites in Tasmania 
and Victoria.36 
Further to the BMMS MediConnect field tests, HealthConnect would also be 
involved in a series of live trials to determine how a future health information network 
would function.  The HealthConnect goals were shaped by a set of seven high level 
research questions aimed at ‘testing the value, technical feasibility, preferred 
implementation model, sustainability of HealthConnect as a national approach to 
electronic health records’.37  These questions were: 
1. Can HealthConnect prove its value? 
2. Is HealthConnect technically feasible? 
3. Is there a preferred implementation model? 
4. What role should the private sector play? 
5. What will be necessary to manage privacy? 
6. How should HealthConnect be governed? 
7. What will HealthConnect cost and is it sustainable? 38 
In order to test the effectiveness of these questions, HealthConnect conducted several 
trials in selected areas around Australia.  The trials were run in Queensland, NSW, 
Tasmania and the Katherine region of the Northern Territory.  The Tasmanian trial 
                                                 
35 See Department of Health and Ageing, MediConnect: Linking Medicines Information: Report (January 
2005). 
36 AMA, Submission to the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, The Better Medication 
Management System, above n34. 
37 See Australian Government, HealthConnect Program Office, Consent and Electronic Health Records: A 
Discussion Paper (July 2002); See also Australian Government, HealthConnect, Interim Research Report: 
Overview and Findings (August 2003); Australian Government, HealthConnect, What is HealthConnect? 
(November 2003).  
38 HealthConnect Program Office, Consent and Electronic Health Records: A Discussion Paper, above n37. 
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focused on adults with diabetes and involved a wide range of services.39  The 
Queensland and Katherine region trials focused on Indigenous health issues 
associated with mobile population in a remote region.40 
Both HealthConnect research trials and MediConnect field test represented a 
major priority for progressing EPR – and was instrumental in developing key 
‘building blocks’ needed for the broader e-health agenda such as consent, privacy and 
technical and information standards.41  In July 2002 the HealthConnect Program Office 
released a discussion paper, which set out a number of key concepts and issues in 
relation to the proposal for the HealthConnect project.42  This document highlighted 
the importance of privacy, access, security, and secondary information usage and 
consent requirements.  Strategic recommendations included: building on the consent 
and access control policy by further developing the broader privacy framework, 
including enacting specific legislation for HealthConnect.43  The HealthConnect 
recommendation that there should be specific legislation in the health privacy area is 
further discussed in chapter 5, where it is argued that such legislation would help 
strengthen individual privacy protection in Australia.    
In November 2002 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed to fund 
a further 2 year phase of research and development.  The purpose of this extended 
                                                 
39 HealthConnect, Consent and Electronic Records, above n38.  
40 HealthConnect Program Office, Consent and Electronic Health Records: A Discussion Paper, above n37; 
see also HealthConnect, Interim Research Report: Overview and Findings, above n37; HealthConnect, What 
is HealthConnect? above n37. 
41 HealthConnect Program Office, What is HealthConnect? above n37: at 1.  
42 See HealthConnect, Consent and Electronic Records: A Discussion Paper, above n37: at 42-43.  
43 Ibid 43.  
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phase was to finalise the HealthConnect research and architecture, continue on-going 
trials and begin further testing and evaluation of trials.44  It also agreed to further 
develop the HealthConnect building blocks to provide safe and secure exchange of 
health information for the new proposed EPR regime.45  Notably during this research 
and evaluation period patient informed consent and privacy and its management 
assumed central importance in the overall design of the new system.  This concern is 
reflected in the design of the research questions and features prominently in the 
results and evaluation process. 
B. Lessons learnt — HealthConnect trials and MediConnect field test  
Findings from the trials were used to inform the HealthConnect Implementation 
Strategy document released in July 2005.46  The resulting feedback from the Trials and 
Field Test provided essential evaluation material for HealthConnect to consider.  
Common features of all the trials and field test included opt-in participation, informed 
consent, privacy and consent withdrawal option.  Privacy and consent issues emerged 
as a major concern for all trials and test stakeholders.47  The project endorsed a strong 
                                                 
44 Australian Government, HealthConnect, New South Wales (NSW) and Queensland HealthConnect and 
MediConnect Trials 2004-2005 (2005).  It was noted by researchers that consent represents an important 
aspect of the management of consumer privacy, and that ‘the interrelationship between privacy and 
consent often makes separating out these issues in terms of evaluations very difficult for the Field Test 
and Trials’: at 41; see, eg, MediConnect Field Test Evaluation ─ Launceston Phase 1 (October 2003) (M2); 
MediConnect and HealthConnect, Evaluation of the Field Test of MediConnect: Fourth Evaluation Field 
Visits to Launceston and Ballarat (November 2004) (M7); HealthConnect North Queensland Trial 
Qualitative Feedback (November 2004) (Q2); HealthConnect Northern Territory Interim Report 
(February 2003) (NT2); Tasmanian HealthConnect Trial Phase 1: Final Report (August 2003 (T4); 
Tasmanian HealthConnect Trial Phase 2: Final Report (November 2004) (T8). 
45 HealthConnect, Consent and Electronic Health Records: A Discussion Paper, above n37. 
46 HealthConnect, Consent and Electronic Health Records, above n37.  
47 Ibid.  
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‘consumer centric’ consent model.48  Emphasis was placed on both health consumer 
and healthcare providers to deliver informed consent obligations.  Further, to ensure 
that these obligations were met the trials and field test participants were provided 
with extra practical resources such as access to ongoing education/training, resources 
and time needed to educate healthcare providers and recruit participants.49 
Feedback from health providers to trial organisers reported that the process for 
informed consent was labour intensive and had the potential to confuse rather than 
enlighten participants.50  Obligations in time and cost attached to obtaining informed 
consent from consumers by health providers represented a significant practical and 
economic commitment.  It was noted that some health providers (particularly doctors 
and pharmacists) viewed the requirement for obtaining informed consent prior to 
inclusion of data in e-health as a ‘burden’.51  It was strongly indicated by some health 
providers that at this level of involvement including the responsibility for obtaining 
consent for HealthConnect and MediConnect inclusion should not rest with them.52 
                                                 
48 See HealthConnect, Dr Brian Richards, National Director E-Health Implementation Australia, E-Health 
Implementation Stakeholders Perspective (25 November 2005). 
49 See Australian Government, HealthConnect, New South Wales and Queensland HealthConnect and 
MediConnect Trials 2004-2005, above n44. A feature of the HealthConnect trial and field test was that 
research assistants were able to meet and spend quality time with individuals in their homes (or 
surgery, pharmacy) in order to fully explain the consent process and requirements of the study to 
research participants; see HealthConnect, Consent and Electronic Health Records: A Discussion Paper, above 
n37; see generally Australian Health Information Council (AIHIC), E-Health Future Directions Briefing 
Paper (4 October 2007). 
50 Australian Government, HealthConnect, New South Wales and Queensland HealthConnect and 
MediConnect Trials 2004-2005, above n 44: at 39; see also HealthConnect, Consent and Electronic Health 
Records, above n37. 
51 HealthConnect, Evaluation of the Field Test of MediConnect (January 2005) [It was reported by healthcare 
providers (doctors and pharmacists) in the ‘Lessons Learnt’ report that gaining informed consent added 
up to ‘at least another ten minutes to the standard consultation time’]: at 100. 
52 HealthConnect, New South Wales and Queensland HealthConnect and MediConnect Trials, above n44.  
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What emerged from the trials reinforced the notion that consent and privacy 
concerns in EPR remained an ongoing issue for the community.53  It is important to 
note that secondary use of the HealthConnect repository information (such as research, 
secondary use, health service planning and consumer selection for clinical trials) 
where not explored in these initial trials and field tests.  The adoption of HealthConnect 
represents phases 1 and 2 – research and development of the continuing national e-
health system project. 
C.   Moving one step closer – e-health design and implementation plans  
In 2004 the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), which had been commissioned to 
report/provide advice, advised the federal Government that a further problem in 
implementing a comprehensive e-health program was that there were too many small, 
loosely coordinated e-health initiatives underway across the different state and 
territories in Australia and what was needed was a central collaborative body.54  It 
was partly in response to the BCG report that in July 2005 the National E-Health 
Transition Authority (NEHTA) was formed.55 
During 2003-2005 the federal Government recognised that EPR implementation 
was not progressing quickly enough.  NEHTA was created to help expedite the 
process.  NEHTA is a not-for-profit company with 3 year tenure jointly funded by 
                                                 
53 See Medical Observer Editorial, ‘Your Obligations, for the Records’ Medical Observer (Australia), 28 
September 2007, 43. 
54 See Boston Consulting Group (BCG), National Health Information Management and Information and 
Communications Technology Strategy (August 2004) [The National Health Report prepared for the 
Australian Health Information Council by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG)].  
55 Boston Consulting Group (BCG), National Health Information Management and Information, above n54; 
see also David Moore, ‘HealthConnect is Dead. So Now What?’ New Matilda (Magazine) (Australia), 1 
February 2006, 1. 
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Australian State, Territorial and federal Governments.56  It has responsibility for 
developing national health Information Management (IM) and Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) standards and specifications.57  The Board of 
NEHTA is comprised of chief executives from federal, state and territory health 
departments.  Since its inception NEHTA has attracted COAG funding for three key 
building blocks initiatives:   
1. The HealthCare Provider Identifier; 
2. The Individual Healthcare Identifier; 
3. Shared Electronic Health Records.58 
It was agreed upon by federal, State and Territory Government in 2005 that as part of 
the national coordination plans, NEHTA would focus on accelerating healthcare 
reform and develop national standards, specifications, terminologies and format to 
enable interoperability, identify and fund the ‘missing pieces’ of infra-structure in 
healthcare Identifiers and clinical terminology, develop the national policies required 
                                                 
56 See Review Panel, Richard Royle, Steve Hambleton and Andrew Walduck, Review of the Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (‘Royle Review’) (December 2013) recommended (Rec. 1) that NEHTA 
be abandoned and a new structure be created.  At time of writing the Royle Review recommendations 
had not yet been implemented by the current federal Coalition Government (April 2015).  See chapter 
6, pp184-234 for further discussion of the Royle Review - PCEHR and e-health governance 
recommendations and future plans; see chapter 7, pp250-260.    
57 Information Management (IM) and Information & Communication Technology (ICT) standards refer 
to the standard based-approach existing in Australia and internationally accepted relating to technical 
specifications of standards adopted for computer communication conformity; BCG, Report on the 
NEHTA Review (October 2007).  The standards adopted were SNOMED CT for clinical terminologies 
and HL7 V2x for messaging. 
58 See Australian Health Minister’s Conference, Council of Australian Governments (COAG), $18.2 
million (over three years) (28 January 2005);  Council of Australian Governments (COAG), $130.2 
million (over four years) (10 February 2006); Council of Australian Governments (COAG), $218 million 
(over three years) (29 November 2008); Commonwealth Budget Review 2010-11 Budget the Government 
committed funding of $466.7 million (over two years) to establish key components of a PCEHR system; 
Budget for health record initiatives $233.7 million (over three years); see also NEHTA, Privacy Blueprint 
for Individual Electronic Health Record (3 July 2008); NEHTA, Privacy Blueprint for the Individual Electronic 
Record (February 2006); NEHTA, NEHTA’s Approach to Privacy Version 1.0 (4 July 2006); NEHTA, E-
Health Record: Shaping the Future of Healthcare (September 2008).  
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to protect privacy and patient consent; as well as establish a basis for modelling 
benefits from e-health to assist in assigning investment priorities.59  
NEHTA in 2006 outlined its broad overview of its position on privacy in its 
Approach to Privacy and Privacy Blueprint – Unique Healthcare Identifiers and in its 2008 
Privacy Blueprint for the Individual Electronic Health Record, which set out a systematic 
framework to consider privacy issues raised by the collection and use of information 
involved with the Unique Healthcare Identifiers (UHI) service.  NEHTA committed 
to developing an effective privacy framework for EPR and e-health, acknowledging 
that these must comply with both privacy legislation and community expectations.60  
It also considered that Australian privacy legislation could be navigated but 
recognised that this was both high-risk and highly complex due to the ‘patchwork’ of 
legislative coverage in Australia and the requirement to apply privacy principles to 
specific situations, rather than read them as statutes.61  
 
 
                                                 
59 See NEHTA, Latest News-Software Developers to Engage with National E-Health Records System Ahead of 
July 2012 Launch (July 2012) ; see also BCG, National Health Information and Management, above n54: at 4. 
60 NEHTA, E-Health Healthcare Today (July 2010): at 5, 8; Australian Health Information Council (AHIC), 
E-Health Future Directions Briefing Paper for AHMAC Meeting (4 October 2007): at 9; see also Privacy Act 
1988 (Cth). 
61 NEHTA, E-Health Healthcare Today, above n60; see generally Australian Government (COAG), A 
National Health and Hospitals Network for Australia’s Future: Delivering the Reform (June 2010).  Under the 
National Health and Hospitals Network, the Commonwealth will become the majority funder of the 
Australian public hospital system. Implementation will be built around close cooperation between the 
Australian Government and State and Territory Government: at 6. See also COAG, Australian Health 
Ministers Cooperation towards National Health Care (April 2010).  The National Healthcare Agreement 2011 
establishes principles for the operation of health systems such as: ‘provide timely access to quality 
health services based on need, not ability to pay, regardless of geographic location; adopt an integrated 
approach to health; focus on prevention not just treatment and address the needs of patients, families 
and communities’: at 1.  
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D.   Deloitte Report 
In 2006 the Australian Government commissioned an e-health strategy report from 
Deloitte.62  The Deloitte National E-Health and Information Principal Committee63 
delivered its completed report, National E-Health Strategy (‘Deloitte Report’) in late 2008.  
In 2009 the federal Government wholeheartedly adopted the Deloitte Report 
recommendations, including the creation of a legislative framework to govern the roll 
out of electronic health identifiers.64  However, in response to the Deloitte Report legal 
academic, Danuta Mendelson, observed that the report and the Government’s new 
strategy ‘painted a picture of electronic health care utopia, in contrast to the miserable 
present state of not-sufficiently IT driven medical practice.’65  Mendelson was not 
convinced that Deloitte made a sufficiently compelling case to the Government to 
prompt spending billions of dollars to implement the e-health recommendations and 
strategy outlined in the report.66 
E. Australian Law Reform Commission 
In 2008, during the EPR research and development period, the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) completed a 28 month inquiry into the effectiveness of 
Australian privacy law.67  The report provided an overview of privacy law and 
                                                 
62 Deloitte, National E-Health Strategy, above n17. Deloitte is a professional service firm, providing audit, 
tax, consulting, and financial advisory services: at 3. 
63 The committee is not listed by name. 
64 See Danuta Mendelson, “Healthcare Identifiers Legislation: A Whiff of Fourberie” [2010] 17 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 664. 
65 Deloitte, National E-Health Strategy, above n17. 
66 See Rhonda Jolly, ‘The E-Health Revolution – Easier Said than Done’, above n20 cites Danuta 
Mendelson, “Healthcare Identifiers Legislation”, above n64: at 29. 
67 ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Laws and Practice (August 2008); ALRC, Executive 
Summary, Extensive Public Engagement: Report 108 (11 August 2008); see generally ALRC, Serious 
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regulations in Australia and made 295 recommendations for improving general 
privacy protection in public and private sectors, noting ‘Australians do care about 
privacy, and they want a simple, workable system to provide effective solutions and 
protections.’68  A later ALRC report published in 2009 ─ For Your Information: 
Australian Privacy Law and Practice and 2014 ─ Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital 
Era ─ also highlights the importance of privacy protection for Australian.69 
Of these 297 ALRC general recommendations, 197 elicited a response by the 
Australian Government.70  The main healthcare privacy recommendations included: 
enhancing the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), name, structure, objects, definition and scope;71 
developing unified national privacy principles; and reviewing the powers of the 
Office of the Australian Privacy Commissioner.72  In 2009 the Australian Government 
released its first stage response report to the ALRC– Enhancing National Privacy 
Protection: Australian Government First Stage Response to the ALRC Report 10873 – in 
                                                 
Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Discussion Paper 80 (31 March 2014); ALRC, Serious Invasions of 
Privacy in the Digital Era: Final Report (September 2014)  [this Report set out Terms of Reference for an 
inquiry into the protection of privacy]; ALRC, Privacy Law and Practice (25 June 2006) [this 28-months 
inquiry looked at the extent to which the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and related laws continue to provide 
an effective framework for Australian privacy]; ALRC, Review of Australian privacy Law: Discussion 
Paper 72 (September 2007) [this Discussion Paper 72 provides a comprehensive background to the 
rights of privacy in Australia]; see also New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC), 
Consultation Paper 1: Invasion of Privacy (May 2007).  
68 ALRC, Review of Australian Privacy Law: Discussion Paper 72, above n67: at 97.   
69 ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Laws and Practice: Report No 32, above n67. 
70 Australian Government, Enhancing National Privacy Protection: Australian Government’s First Stage 
Response to the ALRC: Report 108 (October 2009).  The ALRC made 295 recommendations, the Australian 
Governments first stage response addressed 197: the Government accepted 141 of the ALRC 
recommendations, either fully or in principle, 34 recommendations are accepted without qualification, 
20 recommendations were not accepted and a further 2 recommendations are noted for further 
consideration. 
71 ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n67:  Rec. 3-1, 8-3. 
72 ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n67:  Rec. 15-1 – 16-1, Rec. 18-1 -44-1, Rec. 46-1 – 50-4. 
73 Australian Government, Enhancing National Privacy Protection, above n70. 
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which it committed to establishing ‘a clear and simple framework for privacy rights 
and obligations and build on its commitment to trust and integrity in Government.’74 
The outcome of the federal Governments’ first stage response to the ALRC 
recommendations resulted in legislation such as the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing 
Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth) and the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record 
Act 2012 (Cth) (PCEHR Act); as well as its subsequent 12 March 2014 introduction of a 
single set of National Privacy Principles (13 Australian Privacy Principles (APPs)).75 
F. Office of Australian Information Commissioner 
On 1 November 2011 the Office of the Australian Privacy Commissioner was 
integrated into the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC).  A 
function of the OAIC is to protect information rights and advance information policy.  
This function is further clarified and strengthened with new Privacy Act amendment 
laws.76  The OAIC regulates the handling of personal information under the e-health 
record system by individuals, Commonwealth Government agencies, private sector 
organisations and some State and Territory agencies.77  The OAIC’s role also includes 
investigating complaints about mishandling of health information in an individual’s 
e-health record.  The OAIC is able to conduct its ‘own motion investigations’ and the 
functions and enforceable powers available to the OAIC include the right to seek a 
civil penalty from the Courts, seek an injunction to prohibit or require particular 
                                                 
74 Australian Government, Enhancing National Privacy Protection, above n70: at 6.  
75 See chapter 5, pp174-182 for discussion of e-health and privacy legislation. 
76 See, for example, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth) 
77 Office of Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), The E-Health Record System (2011): at  
1. 
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behaviour.  It is also able to accept enforceable undertakings and use existing Privacy 
Act investigative and enforcement mechanisms including conciliation of complaints 
and formal determinations and accepting data breach notifications from the System 
Operator, Repository Operators and Portal Operators.78 
However recent policy strategies by the current Coalition Liberal Government 
contained in the 2014 federal Budget has resulted in rationalisation of services for the 
Office of the Australian Information Commission (OAIC) and the partial disbandment 
of COAG functions.  This ‘rationalisation’ objective has the potential to severely affect 
the funding and governance resources of the Information Commissioner, particularly 
in its extended role under the current legislation in maintaining electronic health 
records privacy compliance, complaints handling and guidance.79  
 
G.   National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission Report 
                                                 
78 OAIC, The E-Health Record System, above n77: at 1-2; see, for example, OAIC, Privacy Impact Assessment 
Guide (2006). The OAIC released a document outlining Privacy Impact Assessment Guide (PIA).  The 
OAIC claims that a PIA is important because it ‘tells the story’ from the privacy perspective and helps 
manage privacy impacts.  It is recognised that if privacy issues are not handled properly that this can 
have detrimental consequences on the community trust and undermine the project’s success.  The PIA 
Report is designed to help identify what needs to be done to ensure that a project such as PCEHR and 
e-health complies with privacy laws and other legislative requirements.  The main healthcare 
legislation PIA Reports over a three year period (2006-2009) include: Galexia, Preliminary PIA Healthcare 
Identifiers and Individual Healthcare Provider Final Report v19 (7 May 2006) Clayton Utz, National E-Health 
Transition Authority Unique Healthcare Identifier Program Privacy Impact Statement (3 March 2008) and 
Mallesons, Stephens, Jacques, Privacy Impact Assessment Individual Healthcare Identifiers (July 2009) - PIA 
Government Commissioned Reports.  
79 See Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth) and Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record Act 2012 (Cth) 
(PCEHR Act).  Both the Healthcare Identifiers Act and PCEHR Act extend the privacy protection role and 
function of the Australian Privacy Commissioner.  In 2000 the then federal Coalition Government 
engaged in rationalising resources to the Australian Privacy Commissioner, which impacted negatively 
on its ability to effectively implement privacy law changes brought about under the Privacy Amendment 
(Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth).  Under the private sector amendment changes the Privacy Commissioner 
was now required to overview and provide guidelines for not just the public sector but also for the 
private sector.  
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The ongoing task of developing a long-term health plan and reform platform for 
Australia was entrusted by Government to the National Health and Hospitals Reform 
Commission (NHHRC) – A Healthier Future for all Australians.80  Despite ongoing 
concerns about the Deloitte Report expressed by Mendelson,81 the Government 
endorsed the NHHRC’s proposed directions for PCEHR and e-health, which were in 
line with the National Health Strategy report.  The Commission also set a July 2012 
deadline for NEHTA in relation to the introduction of a consumer PCEHR system and 
implementation of e-health in Australia by 2015.82 
Included in the 2010-11 federal Budget the Commonwealth Government 
announced it would spend AUD $466.7 million over two years to create a PCEHR for 
every Australian.  The funding was intended to establish a secure system of PCEHR 
that would provide: summaries of patient’s health information; secure access for 
patients and healthcare providers to their e-health records; and rigorous governance 
and oversight to maintain privacy.  It would also establish Lead implementation sites 
comprised of health sector organisations.  These health and community partnerships 
would focus on implementing PCEHR components that support sharing or 
aggregation of electronic health information at a geographic or sector functional level, 
such as health record repositories, discharge summary capabilities or medications 
management capabilities.83   
                                                 
80 See NHHRC, A Healthier Future for all Australians: Final Report (June 2009). 
81 See Danuta Mendelson, “Healthcare Identifiers Legislation”, above n64. 
82 NHHRC, A Healthier Future for all Australians, above n80; Australian Government, A Health Information 
Network for Australia, above n24. 
83 NEHTA, PCEHR Lead Sites (2012).  The nine organisations selected to develop a Project 
Implementation Plan were: Accoras, NSW Department of Health, Cradle Coast Electronic Health 
Information Exchange (Tasmania), Calvary Health Care ACT Limited, A consortium of Government, 
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In August 2010 NEHTA selected three organisations as lead sites to deploy and 
test national e-health infrastructure and standards, demonstrate tangible outcomes 
and benefits from funded e-health projects, and build stakeholder support and 
momentum behind the PCEHR program.84  These three sites were part of the first 
wave lead sites and the second lead sites were selected later in March 2011.85  
H.   McKinsey and Company – adoption partner 
As part of the PCEHR system implementation process the then federal Health 
Minister, Nicola Roxon, announced the Government would invest part86 of its $466.7 
million in PCEHR project money in contracting a change and adoption partner.  This 
it rationalised would help take EPR and e-health to the next level of functionality, 
interoperability, implementation and uptake.  The appointment of McKinsey and 
Company to lead a consortium to input into the proposed PCEHR legislation and help 
support, educate and change manage health workers using the system at 12 lead 
implementation sites was contracted.87  
                                                 
GP Networks and Aboriginal run health services from the NT, SA and far north WA, St Vincent and 
Mater Health Sydney Limited, Fred IT Group Pty Limited, Medibank Private Limited, and Mater 
Shared Electronic Health Record. 
84 Ibid [these Lead Sites are: Hunter Urban Division of General Practice, GP Partners Limited, and 
Melbourne East General Partners Network Limited to work with NEHTA to prepare implementation 
plan proposals for lead implementation project. Wave 1-Commonwealth has provided funding to 
Hunter Urban Division of General Practitioners, GP Partners Limited, and Melbourne East GP Network 
Limited to prepare implementation plan proposals for lead implementation project. Wave 2- the key 
objectives of these e-health sites are to achieve national demographic coverage, widespread coverage 
across healthcare sectors, deliver early benefits and demonstrate new and innovative concepts].   
85 Ibid.  
86 See Australian Government, Healthbase Australia, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records, Change 
and Adoption Partner -$29.9 Million (2012).  The adoption partner contract is worth $29.9 million. 
87 Fran Foo, ‘Team McKinsey Bags Major E-Health Deal’ The Australian (Australia), 7 July 2011, 10.   
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NEHTA considered that the change and adoption partner, McKinsey and 
Company would leverage health sector and ICT industry knowledge and capability 
to inform the roll out of the PCEHR Program, develop a national change and adoption 
strategy for the rollout of the PCEHR Program encouraging adoption and uptake by 
healthcare providers and citizens of the System.  It would also help utilise and 
leverage existing stakeholder engagement forums and networks, and lead the delivery 
of the PCEHR program marketing and communications campaign in line with the 
marketing and communication strategy provided by the Department of Health and 
Ageing (DoHA) and NEHTA.88 
Further in March 2011 NEHTA selected nine organisations as part of the second 
wave of lead sites.89  A key objective of the second wave was to achieve national 
demographic coverage.  Consequently in April 2011 NEHTA released the Draft 
Concept of Operations for the PCEHR System for public comment and later in September 
2011 the Concept of Operations PCEHR was published.  The system architecture, 
legislative proposals and governance-operating model to support the PCEHR System 
were laid out in these documents.90 
 
IV. MARCHING FORWARD - NEHTA’s ‘CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS’  
                                                 
88 Australian Government, Healthbase Australia, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records, above n86: 
at 1.  
89 See NEHTA, PCEHR Lead Sites, above n83.  
90 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19 [the Concepts of Operations document sets out the legislation 
reform discussion]: at 63-65; and the governance operating model discussion: at 102-103. 
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The PCEHR system enables the collection of information from participating 
organisations, individuals and the Department of Human Services Medicare program 
within a series of conformant repositories.91  NEHTA’s response regarding privacy 
and security issues was set out in the draft and final 2011 Concept of Operations: PCEHR 
System relating to the introduction of a PCEHR system and its addendum.92  The report 
was designed to provide an overview of the PCEHR system and how it would look 
and work.  It envisaged that the document would be periodically updated as the 
development of the PCEHR system progressed.93  The scope of the concept report 
covers aspects of requirements and design, legislation and governance, change and 
adoption, and benefits and evaluation.94  
A foundational component of PCEHR implementation is the allocation of 
healthcare identifiers.  In 2009 COAG agreed to establish and fund the PCEHR Service 
Operator responsible for the set-up and maintenance of the Identifier Health System, 
a position that was awarded to Medicare Australia.  This role forms part of the 
infrastructure for the introduction of patient-controlled individual healthcare records.  
Under Part 2, s9 of the Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 the ‘Service Operator’ is 
authorised to assign a number (HI) to uniquely identify healthcare providers and 
healthcare recipients.95 
                                                 
91 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19: at 43.  
92 Ibid 43-44. 
93 Ibid 9. 
94 Ibid.  
95 See chapter 5, pp174-182; pp175-178 for discussion of the Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth); pp174-
178 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) (PCEHR Act); and pp174-180 the role of 
PCEHR Service Operator. 
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Consistent with healthcare record management practice, clinical documents 
within the PCEHR are not to be edited or deleted.  Any changes to records will require 
a new version of the clinical document to be issued.96  The PCEHR system treats the 
originating source system as the ‘source of truth’ and holder of the primary copy of 
the information.97  If a clinical document contains incorrect information, there is a 
correction process that can be implemented; however the level of computer skills 
needed by a consumer in order to access this function is quite sophisticated and may 
be out of reach for some groups such as elderly patients or those patients who do not 
own a computer.98  Consequently a clinical document that has been ‘effectively 
removed’ from an individual’s PCEHR is not deleted.99 
The PCEHR permits authorised users to access, download and/or print any 
clinical documents.  The information can also be downloaded to the organisation’s 
local electronic health record system.  It is assumed by NEHTA that the downloading 
and/or printing of PCEHR information will be in compliance with present medico-
legal integrity requirements.100  Once information has been downloaded and/or 
printed it becomes subject to the organisation’s local health information management 
policies and laws applicable to the organisation.101 
                                                 
96 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19: at 34-35. 
97 Ibid 47. 
98 NEHTA Clinical Lead, Dr Kean-Seng Lim, The PCEHR and the General Practitioner (3 April 2013): at 
10. 
99 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19: at 48. 
100 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19.  
101 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19, 48-49. 
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The PCEHR is primarily about shared information and as a result is populated 
by sites dealing with shared health summaries, event summaries, discharge 
summaries, specialist letters, referrals, prescribing and dispensing information 
amongst other things.102  One source of PCEHR documentation is information 
currently held by Medicare.  There is continuing controversy as to why Medicare 
information held separately will be included in PCEHR.  For its part, NEHTA states 
that there is an opportunity to leverage the information collected by the Department 
of Human Services Medicare program.103  It is acknowledged by NEHTA that while 
this information lacks the clinical relevance and richness of other information sources, 
such as discharge summaries, included with patient consent,104 the Medicare 
information provides a longitudinal source of information about an individual’s 
healthcare events.105  However, given that healthcare identifiers are mandatory and 
will include Medicare information that has already been collected before the system 
commenced, it is hard to imagine how consent requirements will operate in relation 
to health information collection and use.  
The provision of this level of information will mean that the PCEHR will be a 
very rich source of personal data containing not just health information but also 
specific activity information (such as individual, family members and health provider 
                                                 
102 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19 [for full details of what is included in the PCEHR]: at 50-
60. 
103 Medicare Australia operates 2 data information systems – the CDMS is the Consumer Directory 
Maintenance System and the PDS is the Provider Directory System; see also chapter 2, fn33, p47.   
104 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19, there is no definition or explanation of the meaning of 
‘with consent’ in the NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19: at 55.   
105 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19. 
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information).106  It is also envisaged that the PCEHR will provide very detailed 
information about individuals that may also be of interest to organisations such as 
national security and law enforcement agencies on the basis of national security issues.  
The thesis argues that there will be a temptation (known as ‘drag-net fishing’)107 to use 
this rich source of information for hungry health and non- health organisations in 
search of information (including identified and yet to be identified ‘healthcare 
providers’108) and that the temptation to collect information is real and presents a 
threat to individual privacy rights.109  This point is discussed further in chapter 6 in 
relation to e-health governance issues.110  
NEHTA envisaged that a combination of legislation, technical and governance 
safeguards would be capable of preventing unauthorised and inappropriate access 
and use of healthcare information.111  A vital feature of the PCEHR system security 
and privacy is an online audit record available to individual PCEHR users.  Additional 
safeguards underpinning the PCEHR system include: technical security measures, 
training, effective and transparent governance arrangements, legal protections and 
penalties, and regulatory oversight.112 
                                                 
106 See Daniel Solove, The Digital Person (New York University Press, 2004) [where  Solove argues that 
the collection of health and other personal information will allow individual ‘dossiers’ to be created]: 
at 3; see also Daniel Solove, Marc Rotenberg and Paul Schwartz, Privacy, Information, and Technology 
(Aspen Publication,2006); David Brin, The Transparent Society (Perseus Books, 1998): at 32. 
107 Daniel Solove, The Digital Person, above n106.  
108 See chapter 5, pp178-182 and chapter 6, pp231-234. 
109 See chapter 5, pp178-182 for discussion on ‘function creep’ and ‘data mining’. 
110 See chapter 6, pp231-234.  
111 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19: at 61. 
112 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n19.  
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As later highlighted in chapter 6, the main problem with the stated safeguard 
system is that the PCEHR system’s governance arrangements, regulatory framework, 
including complaints management and sanctions are still in the process of 
development and are not fully operational despite the July 2012 PCEHR 
commencement date having come and gone.113  This lack of long-term governance and 
complaints arrangements has been strongly criticised by groups such as the 
Community Health Forum (CHF) as being unacceptable for the community.114 
Progressing forward from 2005-14 the implementation and roll out of the 
PCEHR by NEHTA continues with allocation of individual-provider healthcare 
identifiers numbers and enactment of Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth) and 
Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record Act 2012 (Cth).  However since late 2013, 
which saw a change of federal Government, the PCEHR and e-health system 
implementation has been under review by the new Government.115 
Further 2013-14 NEHTA roll out initiatives include:  
 Upgrades to consumer registration process; 
 Introduction of the first four ePIP requirements. Medicare Locals continue to support 
practices with ePIP requirements and e-health registration workshop packages; 
 New ePIP requirements for General Practices.  
 PCEHR compliant software now represents 90% of GP software market and can be 
downloaded; 
 Promotion of e-health consumer registration by direct mailing to general public and local 
advertising; 
 The assisted registration tool is now available on the e-health website; 
 In readiness for increased capability all primary healthcare providers, including practice 
nurses and allied healthcare providers are encouraged to register for a Healthcare Identifier 
                                                 
113 See Kate Newton, ‘PCEHR Deadline Chaos’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 25 January 2013, 1; see also 
Danielle Cesta, ‘More E-Health Tech Drama’ Medical Observer (Australia), 12 April 2013, 11. 
114 See Consumer Health Forum (CHF), CHF Response to the Concept of Operations Relating to the 
Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record System (October 2011): at 11-12. 
115 See Royle Review, above n56 [This commissioned review is outlined and discussed in chapter 7, 
pp250-255]. 
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number. Accredited Practicing Dieticians and Accredited Nutritionists need only supply the 
HI Service with proof of membership in order to evidence their identity; 
 New e-health record link for your website.116 
Alongside the physical development and implementation of e-health architectural 
and design schemes such as healthcare identifiers and PCEHR programs, the 
increasingly thorny issue of privacy, security law and e-health system governance 
continues to dominate the federal Government’s health reform agenda.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Much has been achieved by different Australian Governments over the last twenty 
and more years in the e-health area.  The narrative outline of introduction of a new 
electronic health regime analysis in Australia started with the recognition by 
government that in a modern economic and information digital era, electronic health 
records would represent the best solution to ensuring ongoing healthcare for all 
Australian citizens in an increasingly globalised world.  Once this political decision 
had been reached, research, development, implementation and roll-out of the PCEHR 
and e-health Systems was initiated.  Considerable financial support via federal 
funding was also made available, as well as federal/State/Territory cooperation in 
order to progress the e-health vision into a reality.117  Particularly in the past ten years 
                                                 
116 NEHTA, Roll out of the PCEHR (February 2013 Bulletin); see Fact Sheet homepage 
http://www.nehta.gov.au/ehealth-implementation/roll-out-pcehr (viewed on 16/9/2012); NEHTA, 
Next Steps After You Receive Identity Verification Code (IVC) (2013) http://e-
health.gov.au/internet/ehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/brochure-ivc (viewed on 23/7/2013); see 
also NEHTA, E-Health Fact Sheet – Prescribed and Dispensed Medication (2013) ‘Your Medications Online’ 
NEHTA Homepage (online) Fact Sheet; Chloe Herrick, ‘Federal Government Sheds Light on Next 
Round of E-Health Record Funding’ Computerworld (Australia), 7 October 2011, 2. 
117 See, for example, federal Budget 2010-2012 (committed $466.7 million over 2 years); federal Budget 
2012-2014 (committed $233.7 million over 3 years); federal Budget 2014-2015 (committed $140.6 million 
for 1 year). See also COAG, Australian Health Ministers’ Conference, Joint Communique, above n6 
[Where it is recognised that new health council a vital link to future health information management in 
Australia].  
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(since NEHTA) the PCEHR has gone from a ‘virtual’ concept to a physical one, even 
though there is still much to do in relation to system governance and privacy 
protection.118 
However further political and economic change is on the horizon following the 
September 2013 change of federal Government in Australia ─ and the full impact of 
its health, PCEHR and e-health policy is yet to be fully revealed and its impact felt.119  
Even so, it can be predicted that this political change will alter the ongoing story of 
health, EPR, e-health and privacy, since there are already some early disturbing trends 
emerging.120  The Abbott Coalition Liberal Government is committed to re-evaluating 
and rationalising current healthcare spending and policy in Australia.121  The 
Coalition Liberal Government is wedded to progressing neoliberal pluralistic ideals 
of ‘decentralisation’, privatisation and commercialisation of health’ and globalisation 
─ a focus which continues to challenge the very foundations and future of Australian 
public healthcare delivery.122  This policy shift is evidenced in the 2013-14 federal 
Budget released in May 2014.  
                                                 
118 See NEHTA, Strategic Plan Refresh 2011/2012 (2011).  The NEHTA’s strategic plan describes the 
COAG funded milestones achieved to date, the work planned to progress the key e-health foundations 
and initiatives for the remaining period of NEHTA’s current COAG funding, the targets and activities 
required to deliver components of the PCEHR, and NEHTA’s role in accelerating the adoption and 
further progression of e-health in Australia into the future: at 2. 
119 Federal Australian Government elections held September 2013. 
120 See Royle Review, above n56; see also chapter 6: at pp190-203.  The review makes 38 recommendations 
to the federal Government on PCEHR governance such as dissolving NEHTA (Rec. 1): at 16-18; see also 
Federal Coalition Government, The Coalition’s Policy for E-Government and the Digital Economy 
(September 2013). 
121 See Australian Government, federal Budget 2014-2015 Health (13 May 2014). See, for example, the 
case for change - the introduction of a new Medicare Safety Net (similar to the safety net used in Fair 
Work Act 2009): at 3, 9-10; a new federal Budget 2015 is now released (after completion of the thesis).  
122 See federal Budget 2013-14; see also Ben Grubb, ‘Abbott Government ‘Uncomfortable with Freedom 
of Information’ Sydney Morning Herald (Australia), 14 May 2014, 28; Andrew Bracey, ‘Rich Should 
Cough Up: Dutton’ Medical Observer (Australia), 28 February 2014, 1. 
69 
 
The following chapter 3 continues to focus upon and analyse the changing 
political, social and economic environment that impact on Australian healthcare 
delivery systems.  It does this by providing a detailed historical and theoretical 
analysis of technology in the modern knowledge and information driven age.  It also 
explores the proposition that healthcare privacy is compromised by developing 
technologies: a situation which if confirmed presents further evidence that an 
Independent Council might contribute to a feasible solution in order to address this 
looming imbalance.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ELECTRONIC 
HEALTHCARE REGIME 
 
This chapter details the nature and scale of the challenges to privacy and democratic 
policy-making posed by the technologies implicated in an electronic healthcare 
regime.  It provides a deeper conceptual analysis of the transformational power of 
technology on lives by exploring its impact on society, tracing its historical beginnings 
through to its present day conception.  It also highlights concerns about electronic 
healthcare privacy and its potential capacity to subsume individual and community 
rights in favour of collective government and economic interests.  Finally, the chapter 
argues that there is a need to reconsider our present concept of both technology and 
privacy in light of new forces that impact on contemporary healthcare technology 
privacy debate.  
I.   RISE OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Developments in technologies continue to influence the debate about privacy and the 
evolution of information privacy laws in Australia.1  As early as 1890 in their famous 
article on “The Right to Privacy”, Warren and Brandeis identified the social impact 
                                                 
1 See Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: 
Discussion Paper 80 (March 2014): at 21; see also ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: 
Issues Paper 43 (October 2013). 
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that new photographic, printing and media technologies had on individual privacy 
rights and articulated the need for a legal response to new technologies.2  Although 
historically distinct, Warren and Brandeis’ anxieties about advancing technology and 
privacy concerns still strongly resonate in the 21st century, as people continue to 
grapple with legal and ethical implications of rapidly advancing technologies and its 
impact on individual privacy rights.3  
The evolution of technology, particularly computer and information 
technology has contributed to social, economic and political theoretical discourse 
including healthcare technology dialogue.  Every culture must negotiate with 
technology and the uses made by technology are largely determined by the structure 
of technology itself – that is function follows form: 
Once technology is admitted, it plays out its hand; it does what it is designed to do. Our task is 
to understand what that design is – that is to say when we admit a new technology to the 
culture, we must do so with our eyes wide open.4 
New technologies give rise to new definitions of old terms, as well as introduce new 
terms and words and that this happens without being fully conscious of it.5  The 
language of computers and technology is now part of our everyday language, with 
words such as Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter and Google almost universally 
understood.6  However the ultimate power of technology is that it eliminates 
alternatives to itself, not by making it illegal, nor immoral, or even unpopular but by 
                                                 
2 See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193. 
3 Australian Government, National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA), Concepts of Operations: 
Relating to the Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record System (September 2011): at 
11. 
4 See Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology  (Vintage Book, 1993) 7. 
5 Ibid 8. 
6 See Cheryl Tang, Microsoft First Generation (John Wiley & Sons, 2000) 2. 
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making them invisible and therefore irrelevant.7  It does this by redefining what is 
meant by art, religion, politics, family, health, truth, education, intelligence, 
surveillance and privacy, so that definitions of such terms fit technology’s new 
requirement.8  Technology lays the foundation of human beings as objects and is 
capable of depriving people of the social, political, historical, metaphysical, logical or 
spiritual bases for what is beyond belief.9 
The information age is also known as the computer era.  The revolutionary 
aspect of this era is the freedom and ability of governments, businesses and 
individuals to transfer information and gain instant access to knowledge.  This ability 
is linked to the digital revolution and implies a shift from the traditional notion of 
industry that the industrial revolution brought through industrialisation to an 
economy founded on the gathering and manipulation of ideas.10  What has made this 
transition from an industrialised world to an information economy possible is the 
ability to capitalise on advances in computer microminiaturisation, the advent of 
personal computer in the late 1970s and internet developments in the 1990s bringing 
the development of technology to a critical point.11  
                                                 
7 See Neil Postman, Technopoly, above n4. 
8 Ibid 48.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Don Ihde, Philosophy of Technology (Paragon House, 1993) 45. 
11 Michael Hobart and Zachary Schiffman, Information Ages: Literacy, Numeracy, and the Computer 
Revolution (John Hopkins University Press, 2000); see generally Christopher Arup, Innovation, Policy and 
Law: Australia and the International High Technology Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1993) [Arup 
examines the nature of innovation and the transformation of the economy, influencing the distribution 
of power and wealth]; see also Brian Galligan, Winsome Roberts and Gabriella Trifiletti, Australians and 
Globalisation: The Experience of Two Centuries (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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The advantages for government and business interests in communication 
technology is that digital technology enables rapid, cheap and efficient collection, 
storage and retrieval of personal information instantly available from all corners of 
the globe.  Progression of technologies such as computers, cyber-space, internet, cloud 
computing and social networking has developed at a phenomenal rate, often resulting 
in society adjusting to the demands of technology rather than controlling the process.  
The significance of the development of IT over the last few decades relates to 
the functionality of ‘tools’ such as computers and overall capacity and availability.  
The ‘seduction’ and rising popularity of computers (and recently smart phones and 
tablets) has meant that there is an ever-increasing capacity to generate, link and store 
more and more information.12  This may occur even to the detriment of an individual’s 
right to privacy.  As Scott McNealy, CEO, Sun Microsystems, Inc. states, ‘You already 
have zero privacy.  Get over it’.13 
It is within this fast moving dynamic digital information economy environment 
that healthcare EPR and e-health systems will be located.  It can be envisaged that the 
emergence of electronic health regimes represents a crucial shift away from traditional 
healthcare delivery thinking in that it physically and symbolically changes the 
expectations and mindset that people hold about their health experience.  For instance, 
                                                 
12 See Hobart and Schiffman, Information Ages, above n11; see Roger Magnusson, “Data Linkage, Health, 
Research and Privacy: Regulating Data Flows in Australia’s Health Information System” (2002) 24 
Sydney Law Review 5; see also Danuta Mendelson, “HealthConnect and the Duty of Care: A Dilemma for 
Medical Practitioners” (2004) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 69.  Both Magnusson and Mendelson 
recognise the rising popularity of computers and their ever-increasing ability to generate, link and store 
information such as healthcare information. 
13 Scott McNealy, CEO, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (March 1999) quoted in Stuart Biegel, Beyond Our 
Control? Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace (The MIT Press, 2003): at 50. 
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the introduction of healthcare identifier numbers in Australia opens a major gap 
between the physical and the ‘virtual’ identity.  This virtual digital identity affects 
how consumers, healthcare providers and other stakeholders view healthcare 
delivery expectations and privacy rights in the future.14  
A. Computer technology 
Computer technology has undergone rapid significant changes in a relatively short 
period of time.15  The evolutionary leap of computers from simple utility calculating 
machines to hi tech computation tools capable of both information collection and 
intrusive data analysis is evident in the modern information era.  As computers 
become more than ‘tools’ of utility and convenience in our community we need to 
further understand the long-term outcomes of our modern technology.16  The 
adoption by the Australian Government of EPR and e-health technology is premised 
on the continuing progress and availability of ‘networking’ communication 
technology and its tools such as computers, tablets, smart phones and internet 
systems.17 
                                                 
14 See Tal Zarsky, “Mine Your Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of Data Mining of 
Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion” (2003) 5 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 1; see 
also Jaron Lanier, Who Owns the Future (Penguin Books, 2013); Jaron Lanier, You Are Not A Gadget 
(Alfred A. Knopf, 2010) [Lanier offers a view of the revolutionary changes since Silicon Valley and the 
World Wide Web (WWW) has and will bring to commerce and culture]. See also Department of 
Parliamentary Services (Cth), Rhonda Jolly, Healthcare Identifiers Bill 2010 Bills Digest, No 116 of 2010, 
24 February 2010. 
15 See Don Ihde, Philosophy of Technology, above n10 [Don Ihde identifies the different phases of 
computer development, which according to Ihde broadly reflect other advances involving evolution of 
mainframe, minicomputers and microcomputers].  Computer technology development generally refers 
to 3 distinct generations of computer technology – the first generation (1950-1958); the second 
generation (1959-1964); and the third generation (1964 onwards): at 45-46. 
16 See Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem” (November/December 2013) 116(6) MIT 
Technology Review 32. 
17 See, for example, Australian Government, Council of Australian Government (COAG), Joint 
Communique: New Council a Vital Link to Future Health Information Management Australia (28 November 
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B    Internet and Cyber-Space 
Alongside advancing computer technology the growth of the internet, its connectivity 
and ‘networking’ ability has contributed to the advancement of IT as a dominant 
communication player.  A major feature of the Internet is its ‘end-to-end design and 
instantaneous transnational dimension’.18  Once the internet world is entered, users 
enter a transnational state that flows beyond the normal static borders of any one state 
resulting in the movement of information through space in most instances is rapid, 
cheap and ubiquitous.19  According to Perritt, ‘the internet has firmly established itself 
as the model for global information.’20 
The High Court of Australia has described the internet and cyber-space as a 
‘decentralised, self-maintained telecommunication network.  It is made up of 
interlinking small networks from all parts of the world.’21  It has also been described 
as ‘an international network of interconnected computers…which now enable tens of 
millions of people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of 
information from around the world.’22 
                                                 
2003); Australian Government, A National Health and Hospitals Network for Australia’s Future Health 
Strategy (2010); Deloitte, National E-Health and Information Principal Committee, National E-Health 
Strategy (30 September, 2008). 
18 Brian Fitzgerald, Anne Fitzgerald, Gaye Middelton, Eugene Clark and Yee Fen Lim, Internet and E-
Commerce Law, Business and Policy (Thomas Reuters, 2011) 6-7. 
19 Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald, Middelton, Clark and Lim, Internet and E-Commerce Law, above n18: at 7. 
20 See H Perritt, ‘Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Role of the Intermediaries’ in Brian Fitzgerald and 
Anne Fitzgerald, Cyberlaw (LexisNexis, 2002): at 122-123; see Fitzgerald, et al, Internet and E-Commerce 
Law, above n18: at 12-13. 
21 Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 per Kirby J: at Para 80. 
22 Reno v American Civil Liberties Union (1997) 521 US 844.  
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Cyber-space is an illusion because it has no physical presence.  Yet its users 
visit it, send messages and transact business through it.  Electrical optical and 
magnetic forces with storage facilities allow users to carry out steps that produce a 
result in real space.23  As noted by John Perry Barlow, Co-Founder, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, Cyber-space is the new frontier for gathering personal information and 
its power has only begun to be exploited: 
Cyberspace, the new home of mind…We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have 
one…I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the 
tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral to rule us nor do you possess any 
methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear… Cyberspace does not lie within your 
boundaries…Your legal concerns of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do 
not apply to us. They are based on matter. There is no matter here.24 
The importance of the internet in the new electronic healthcare regime is that it 
provides the essential medium in which EPR information data can be collected, stored, 
accessed and shared in the digital environment. 
C.  Cloud Computing 
A further technological advancement that impact of healthcare delivery and privacy 
protection is Cloud computing.25  What Cloud computing does is link computers in a 
                                                 
23 See Alan Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce (Cambridge University Press, 2009): at 12; see 
generally Olujoke Akindemowo, Information Technology Law in Australia (Thomas Reuters, 1999). 
24 See John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’ (1996) cited in Alan 
Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce, above n23: at 14.  
25 See Fitzgerald, et al, Internet and E-Commerce Law, above n18 describes ‘Cloud Computing’ and its 
impact on consumers and businesses, he identifies that government is already using this type of 
technology system as a way of cutting administration costs.  However, the majority of individuals may 
not be fully aware of nor appreciate this situation: at 12-13; see also Caroline Klein, “Cloudy 
Confidentiality: Clinical and Legal Implications of Cloud Computing in Health Care” (2011) 39 Journal 
of American Academic Psychiatry Law 39; see also Australian Institute of Criminology, Raymond Kim-
Kwang Choo, Cloud Computing: Challenges and Future Directions (October 2010);  Australian 
Government, Department of Finance and Deregulation, Government 2.0 Taskforce (Chair Nicolas 
Gruen), Engage – Getting on with Government 2.0 (December 2009).  
 
77 
 
networked grid, thus enabling on-demand access to a shared pool of computing 
resources that are readily available with minimal management effort or service 
provider interaction.26  Cloud computing involves storing digital content on servers 
maintained by large technology companies, instead of on a local hard drive.  This 
enables consumers and businesses to have documents and programs delivered 
directly from a communications provider, rather than having to run desktop 
computers.  Users can access data and software stored on the grid from any PC, laptop 
or mobile device, anywhere in the world.27   
Although Cloud computing offers real benefits for consumers, business and 
governments it also introduces risks, notably threats to the privacy and security of 
stored data.28  This is because the increasing use of Cloud computing with greater 
amounts of data being collected and stored for longer periods of time raises issues 
about privacy and security of remotely stored and/or offshore data.  The absence of 
effective legislative protection of privacy and the international cooperation to ensure 
the security of data that crosses national borders also contributes to privacy and 
security concerns.  Although Cloud computing was not specifically considered by the 
ALRC in its 2008 review of privacy law, the Federal Government has recognised its 
                                                 
26 L Martin, Australian Government, Awareness, Trust and Security to Shape Government Cloud Adoption: 
A White Paper (April 2010).  
27 J Bajkowski, ‘Future is Fixed, Thank God’ Australian Financial Review (Australia), 11 November 2010, 
66.   
28 See NEHTA, The Best and Worst of Cloud Contracts (8 March 2013). 
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increasing influence and identified good practice guidelines on privacy and security 
as an important component of its Cloud Framework.29 
D.   Social Networking 
Since mid-2000s there has been a rapid uptake of internet-connected smartphones 
(mobile phones with embedded computer power) and tablet devices such as iPad, 
iPod, Galaxy Tablets.  The widespread adoption of this type of technology, which runs 
applications (apps) in addition to the kind of software programs loaded onto 
computers, has brought about a fundamental shift in user experience of the internet.30   
This situation has resulted in a significant increase, especially in the 15-17 year 
age group of the number of smartphone owners, who routinely use the Internet, send 
and receive email and communicate using programs such as Instagram.31  Social 
networking sites like YouTube provide great entertainment; opportunities as well as 
many benefits.  But equally there can be downsides to these opportunities and 
benefits.32  The YouTube story of the Korean ‘dog poop girl’ provides a sobering 
                                                 
29 Australian Government, Department of Finance and Deregulation, Cloud Computing Strategic 
Direction Paper – Draft Consultation (January 2011) [This Strategic Direction Paper considered Cloud 
computing and its possible impact on society was considered by the Australian Government]. 
30 See Fitzgerald, et al, Internet and E-Commerce Law, above n18: at 10. 
31 Australian Government, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 8153.0 – Internet Activity, Australia June 2014 
12,483,000 internet subscribers in Australia at the end of June 2014 representing an increase of 1% from 
June 2013; Patterns of Home Internet Use 2014, Online banking 72%, Social networking 66%, listening to 
music, watching video 58%, accessing Government services 58%; Personal Internet Use 2012-13, 83% of 
persons were internet users.  The 15-17 age group had the highest proportion of internet use 97% with 
the lowest being 65 and over age group 46%; Australian Population Clock as on 23 January 2015 23,720,067 
people; see Australian Historical Statistic’s, 2014, 3105.065.001 (2014) sets out statistics of geographic, 
health status and other important statistical material such as Australian ageing and migration trends. 
See also ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Issues Paper 43 (October 2013); ALRC, 
Review of Privacy: Issues Paper 31 (October 2006): at 513-544 (Developing Technology).   
32 See, for example, ‘dog poop girl’ (viewed on June 2005) (online) see Youtube; see also Daniel Solove, 
The Future of Reputation (Yale University Press, 2007) [when poop goes primetime]: at 1-4; see also 
Hassan Masum and Mark Tovey (eds), The Reputation Society: How Online Opinions Are Reshaping the 
Offline World (The MIT Press, 2011); Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy 
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example of the power of information technology and its ability to destroy reputations 
and lives across international boundaries.33  
E. Surveillance  
The ensuing ‘war on terror’ resulted from the attack on the World Trade Centre in 
New York and later the bombings in Bali and London.34  This term ‘war on terror’ was 
coined by the President of the United States George W Bush.35  From 2001 western 
societies have experienced an increase in legal measures and national security 
concerns, which has further accelerated the development and use of surveillance 
technology to a new level in all areas of citizens’ lives.36  These include ensuring that 
‘terrorist acts’ are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and 
regulations.37  
                                                 
and Security (Yale University Press, 2011); Stuart Biegel, Beyond Our Control, above n13 ; Jeffrey Rosen, 
The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (Vintage Books, 2001). 
33 See Daniel Solove, The Future of Reputation, above n32: at 1-4; Jonathan Krim, ‘Subway Fracus 
Escalates into Test of Internet’s Power to Shame’ Washington Post (United States), 7 July 2005, 1; Daniel 
Solove, The Digital Person (New York University, 2004); see also Masum and Toovey, The Reputation 
Society, above n32. 
34 Helen Duffy, The War on Terror and the Framework of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2005) [The World Trade Centre was attacked on 11 September 2001; see also Bali terrorist bomb attack 
in 2003, the London terrorist bomb attack in 2005]; see also December 2014, attack by gunman at Lindt 
café, Martin Place, Sydney, Australia. 
35 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’, above n34: at 17. 
36 See Jeffery Rosen, “The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy and Security in an Age of Terror” (2004) 46 
Arizona Law Review 607; see Jeffery Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an 
Anxious Age (Random House, 2004); see also Jeffery Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze, above n32. . 
37 See Christopher Michaelson, “Antiterrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to 
the Terrorist Threat?” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Routledge, 2005); see European Council 
Framework on Combating Terrorism, 13 June 2002, [2000] OJL 164/3 33, 34, 37, 132, 350; Preamble, 
Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on 11 July 2002; The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) “terrorist act” defined in Criminal 
Code subsection 100.1(1), Part 5.3 or 5.5; see also Charter of the United Nations Act 1945. 
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As a culture obsessed with surveillance of people often privacy rights are 
overridden by perceived needs of national security and law enforcement agencies 
(both public and private).  For instance, this is evidenced by the number of CCTV 
cameras now found throughout the UK, which now averages one camera for every 
four citizens in London and every 34 people in the country.38  
F. Biometrics 
The growing need for surveillance at a national and international level is further 
supported by advances in technology such as biometrics and DNA-Profiling.  
Biometrics is the study of methods for uniquely identifying humans based upon one 
or more intrinsic physical or behavioural traits.  In information technology, biometric 
authentication refers to technologies that measure and analyse human physical and 
behavioural characteristics for identification purposes.  This includes fingerprints, eye 
retinas and irises, facial patterns and hand measurement, while examples of 
behavioural traits include electronic signature, gait and typing patterns.39  
                                                 
38 See Olivia Goldhill, ‘Britons Embrace CCTV Cameras’ The Telegraph (UK), 6 November 2014, 1 
[London Councils London has the highest number of CCTV cameras in the world (approximately 7,000 
cameras)];  see also Paul Lewis, ‘You’re Being Watched: There’s One CCTV Camera for Every 32 People 
in UK’], The Guardian (UK), 3 March 2011 (online); see Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s6F; Freedom of Information 
Act 1982 (Cth) s43(1) [provides that a document is exempt if its disclosure under the Act would disclose 
one or more prohibited situations outlined in the Act]; Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth) s5 and 
Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) (PCEHR) s16 [which specifically exclude 
operation of the Act in relation to defence forces and national security requirements].  The ‘System 
Operator’ (Medicare) is obliged to make available to authorised national security bodies (without the 
knowledge or consent of the person to whom the file relates. 
39 See ALRC, Review of Australian Privacy Law: Discussion Paper 72 (December 2007) [this discussion 
paper describes ‘biometric technologies as enabling the identification of unique behavioural and 
physical attributes of people to be used for identification and authentication purpose’]: at 330.  A typical 
biometric device is finger and iris scanners.  Biometric technologies have existed for decades.  However, 
with the increase of globalisation and developments in technology the use of biometric technologies is 
on the rise because of the need to identify individuals and manage security threats such as terrorism: 
at 330.  The ALRC, Discussion Paper 72 [distinguishes between ‘biometric technologies from DNA-
based technologies - observing that DNA- based technologies require actual physical samples to be 
taken from a person, as opposed to the taking of an image or scan of the person’ (biometrics)].  This 
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The significance of biometric advancements is that identification and 
authentication is foundational (key) to the operation of the new electronic healthcare 
regime.40  The ‘right information about the right person’ is the mantra often quoted by 
the Australian Government in relation to EPR development and implementation.41  
This is because it is easy to assume another person’s identity or hide your true identity 
using information technology such as internet.  The possibility of cybercrime such as 
identity fraud and identity theft using technology is a major problem not just for 
healthcare privacy and security but also individuals and business operations.42 
II. LIMITATIONS OF RAPIDLY DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGY – SECURITY 
AND PRIVACY 
A. Security 
Information security is high on the priority and anxiety list for all healthcare 
stakeholders, particularly consumers.43  This is due to the nature of electronic data 
creation and collection and the ease in which it can be collected, changes, accessed and 
stolen all contributing to ongoing privacy issues.  A major challenge for the creators 
of EPR is security in relation to unauthorised access, identity theft, control of 
                                                 
physical sample process raises a number of privacy issues including possibilities of discrimination: at 
333-334.  For example, see ALRC and the Australian Health Ethics Committee (AHEC), Essentially 
Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic Information in Australia (2003).  This report was a product of a 
two-year inquiry into the legal and ethical issues surrounding human genetic information. See also, 
Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
Laurie provides a detailed analysis of the medico-legal and ethical issues in this area of the law; see 
Australian Government, ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Discussion Paper 80, above 
n1: at 40.  
40 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n3: at 61.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Peter Grabosky, Russell Smith and Gillian Dempsey, Electronic Theft Unlawful Acquisition in Cyberspace 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001); see also Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide, above n32.  
43 ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n39: at 1503. 
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information and unsanctioned data changes.  Cybercrime and computer security 
breaches represent a worrying and rising problem in technology.  Statistically most 
cybercrime and security breaches occur within particular organisations by current or 
ex members of those organisations; although outside people such as hackers and 
crackers contribute significantly to the problem.44  There are no system or software 
programs that can guarantee that digital data is 100% protected and secure from 
unauthorised or criminal elements.  There are controls that can be used to add 
protection to the system or encode information itself, but none of this software is fool 
proof against determined hackers.   
At present it can be asserted that with the main government regulatory focus 
on EPR cyber security, rather than local data security many smaller healthcare entities 
(i.e. medical centres, sole practices) remain vulnerable to computer hackers and 
international criminals because their management and administrative systems are not 
inadequately protected against attacks.  This situation is evidenced by the recent rise 
of organised criminal cyber — extortion attacks on local computer systems containing 
business records (as well as sensitive patient information) in Queensland.45   
Despite the push by government and professional associations encouraging 
upgraded business security software and technology measures compliance at the 
                                                 
44 See Russell Smith, Peter Grabosky and Gregor Urbas, Cyber Criminals on Trial (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 9.  
45 See Smith, Grabosky and Urbas, Cyber Criminals on Trial, above n44: at 5; see Kate Newton, ‘GP Clinic 
Stands Firm Against Extortion Attempt from Hackers’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 18 January 2013, 4; 
see also Neil Bramwell, ‘Privacy Minefield’ Medical Observer (Australia), 11 April 2014, 14; see, for 
example, David Watkins, ‘Sony Apologies for PlayStation Privacy Breach and Boosts Security’ Herald 
Sun (Australia), 2 May 2011 (online) http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/sony-apologies-
for-playstation-privacy-breach (viewed on 1/8/2011). 
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medical coalface is expected but voluntary.  The e-health system allows and indeed 
caters for healthcare providers and associated organisations to upload patient medical 
records from the PCEHR it seems only logical that if digital records are kept locally as 
electronic records there must be clear and strong regulations to force all providers — 
whether business big or small — to install and technically maintain more than adequate 
computer security protection of all records.  
EPR and e-health computer protection and security consists of a combination 
of passwords, review processes, audit trails, consumer access to one’s own records 
and other security measures would prevent unauthorised people from accessing and 
browsing through records.46  As a national network it was recognised in 2001 at the 
beginning by HealthConnect that the rules and measures relating to privacy and e-
security would need to be the same across Australia.  The development of security is 
recognised as a fundamental requirement for an organisation’s survival in the 
changing, frenetic world of electronic information and commerce.47  The meaning of 
the term e-security is wide ranging and covers the protection of online electronic data 
as well as the prevention of impairment to any system that provides communication 
functionality.  Vulnerability to greater risks by organisations in relation to 
unauthorised access, misuse, modification and misappropriation of data is significant.  
                                                 
46 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n3: at 61-73; The Royal Australian College of General 
Practitioners (RACGPs), Computer and Information Security Standards (October 2011) 
http://www.racgp.org.au/download/Documents/Standards/2011computerinformationse (viewed 
on 15/4/2013) 16; HealthConnect, HealthConnect, Consent and Electronic Health Records – A Discussion 
Paper (July 2002): at 12-13. 
47 Leif Gamertsfelder, E-Security (Thomas Reuters, 2002) 3. 
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There can be enormous costs to an organisation’s reputation, image and finances when 
its network security is compromised.  
B. Privacy protection 
The PCEHR system recognises that privacy is of critical importance.48  Successful 
delivery of privacy will ensure ongoing confidence and trust in the new electronic 
healthcare regime and increase its uptake by consumers and healthcare providers.  It 
is acknowledged by the National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) that there 
is no single solution to addressing privacy issues.49  The protection of privacy is a 
priority for the PCEHR design, using a combination of technical, policy, governance 
and legislative safeguards.  
As later explained, the thesis proposal for the introduction of a Council would 
ensure that individual privacy protection remains a priority for the government in 
light of rapid developments in intrusive technologies. 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
There are three major broad theories of technology that require consideration when 
examining the impact of EPR technology on issues of privacy and security.  The first 
concept can be termed the instrumental theory the second is the substantive theory 
and the third is ‘critical theory’.  Instrumental theory represents the dominant view 
                                                 
48 Australian Government, National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA), Concepts of Operations: 
Relating to the Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records System (September 2011) 
61. 
49 Ibid.  
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taken by government and policy sciences and treats technology as subservient to 
values in other social spheres, for example, politics and culture.  On the other hand 
substantive theory attributes to technology an autonomous force that overrides all 
traditional or competing values.  Substantive theory claims that what the very 
employment of technology does to humanity and nature is far more consequential 
than its ostensible goals.50  Critical theory for its part rejects the concept of neutrality 
of technology, arguing its political rationality. 
Instrumental theory is the most widely accepted view of technology, 
supporting the notion that technologies are ‘tools’ that are ready to serve the purpose 
of their users.  This theory believes that technology is neutral, without valuable content 
of its own.  The theory posits four main ‘neutrality’ arguments.  Firstly, that 
technology represents pure instrumentality and it is thus indifferent to the variety of 
ends it can be employed to achieve.  Secondly, the transfer of technology in a modern 
world is indifferent to politics, especially in relation to capitalist and socialists 
societies.  Thirdly the socio-political neutrality of technology is attributed to its 
‘rational’ character and the universality of the truth it embodies.  Finally, the 
universality of technology also means that the same standards of measurements can 
be applied in different settings.  Thus technology is routinely said to increase the 
productivity of labour in different countries, different eras and different civilisations.  
                                                 
50 See Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (books.google.com. 2002); 
see also Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology (Oxford University Press, 1991) 5-6; Richard 
Coyne, Designing Information Technology in the Postmodern Age: From Method to Metaphor (The MIT Press, 
1995). 
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Therefore technologies are neutral because they stand essentially under the very same 
norm of efficiency in any and every context.51 
Given the above understanding of technology, it is logical to argue that there 
should be unreserved commitment to its employment.  Nevertheless, there are some 
objections to this stance, including certain deference to moral values.  A case in point 
is reproductive technology.  Andrew Feenberg states that even if one believes that 
abortion and test tube babies are valuable in themselves and technically available, one 
can only judge these actions in terms of efficiency and respect for beliefs such as the 
sacredness of life.52 
The instrumental approach places ‘trade-off’ at the centre of the debate.  The 
belief that ‘you cannot optimise two variables’ is the fundamental law of the theory.  
What this implies is that there is a price for the achievement of environmental, ethical 
or religious goals and that price must be paid in reduced efficiency.  Based upon this 
account the technical sphere can be limited by nontechnical values but cannot be 
transformed by them.53 
Substantive theory denies that technology is neutral.  The main exponents of 
this theory are Jacques Ellul and Martin Heidegger, who believe that technology 
constitutes a new type of cultural system that restructures the entire social world as 
                                                 
51 Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology, above n50: at 6; Andrew Feenberg, Transforming 
Technology, above n50. 
52 Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology, above n50; Andrew Feenberg, Transforming 
Technology, above n50; Richard Coyne, Designing Information Technology in the Postmodern Age, above 
n50. 
53 Nicholas Rescher, ‘What is Value Change? A Framework for Research’ in K Baier and N Rescher 
(eds), Value and the Future (The Free Press, 1969): at 48-57; see generally Peter Beilharz (ed), Social Theory 
(Allen & Unwin, 1991); Judy Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology (Allen & Unwin, 1991). 
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an object of control.54  This system is characterised by an expansive dynamic which 
ultimately is capable of shaping the whole of social life.  Heidegger argues that the 
technological restructuring of modern societies results in a degradation of man and 
being to the level of mere objects.55 
According to Feenberg, ‘the pessimism of this technological restructuring 
assertion is clearly apocalyptic.’56  Regardless the basic claims are potentially 
believable.  A situation that can serve as a humble reminder of the unintended cultural 
consequences of underestimating technology is the traditional family dinner.  Take for 
example the substitution of ‘fast food’ for that traditional family dinner.  The unity of 
the family, ‘ritually confirmed every night, ‘no longer has a comparable locus of 
expression.  It cannot be claimed that the rise of fast food ‘causes’ the decline of the 
family but the correlation can be seen as significant.’57  
Instrumentalists may argue that fast food supplies a nourishing meal without 
the need for complicated social interactions but this position is blind to the cultural 
implications of technology.  Eating can be viewed as merely an ingestion of calories 
with the ritualistic aspects of food consumption being secondary to this biological 
need.  Indeed by adopting a strictly functional approach it is possible to determine 
that eating (ergo healthcare delivery) is a technical operation that may be carried out 
with more or less efficiency.  The transition ‘from traditional to modernity is judged 
                                                 
54 See Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology (Oxford University Press, 1991) 6; Richard Coyne, 
Designing Information Technology in the Postmodern Age, above n50.  
55 See Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology, above n50: at 7. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Don Ihde, Philosophy of Technology, above n10; see Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology, 
above n50; Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology, above n50. 
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as progress by the standards of efficiency intrinsic to modernity but alien to 
tradition.’58  
There are differences and similarities between the instrumental and substantive 
theories.  They both share a ‘take it or leave it’ approach to technology.  What this 
means is that even if you view technology as a mere instrumentality, indifferent to 
values, or a vehicle of cultural domination, ‘in neither case can we change it.’59  There 
is an overwhelming sense of technology as ‘destiny’ in both theories, ultimately 
embracing the position of technological form as beyond human intervention or repair.  
This is why most proposals for the reform of the regulation of technology seek only to 
place ‘boundaries around it, not transform it.’60 
Another perspective that has challenged the substantive and instrumental 
theorists is Critical Theory of technology.  Critical Theory (CT) is appealing because it 
rejects the concept of neutrality of technology, arguing instead that ‘technological 
rationality has become political rationality.’61  In relation to EPR and e-health this view 
─ political rationality ─ is supported.  However it is further contended that the 
technological rationality can be extended to include both political and economic 
marketplace imperatives.  Critical Theory also states that the values and interests of 
the elite are installed in the very design of rational procedures and machines, even 
before they are assigned a goal.  This is an interesting argument that takes into account 
                                                 
58 Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology, above n50: at 8. 
59 Langton Winner, Autonomous Technology, above n54; see Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of 
Technology, above n50: at 7. 
60 See Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology, above n50; Andrew Feenberg, Transforming 
Technology, above n50. 
61 See Langton Winner, Autonomous Technology, above n54; Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of 
Technology, above n50; Richard Coyne, Designing Technology in the Postmodern Age, above n50.  
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the emergence of politics (and by association economics) as a main driver and 
supporter of information technology. 
According to Critical Theory, the dominant form of technological rationality 
can be seen as neither an ideology nor neutral requirement determined by the nature 
of the technique.  Rather it is capable of standing at the intersection between ideology 
and technique, where the two come together to control human beings and resources 
in conformity with what is called ‘technical codes’.  These technical codes are invisible 
and their invisibility sediment values, rules and procedures that routinise the pursuit 
of power and advantage by the dominant hegemony.62 
The importance and relevance of these theories for the electronic healthcare 
regime debate is that these past insights about information technology and its appeal 
to neutrality, efficiency, human progress and inevitability provide fertile grounds for 
modern day challenges.  In the 21st century a new contemporary debate about the 
power and desire of technology to dictate the message is emerging.  The technology 
privacy debate includes a new breed of techno savvy scholars; and, it progresses the 
earlier technology theories by extending local and worldwide understanding of the 
threats to humanity posed by modern communication technology.  What some of 
these later scholars argue is that information technology now poses significant threats 
not just too individual human rights such as individual privacy control and protection 
but also to democracy and democratic processes.63 
                                                 
62 Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology, above n50: at 14.  
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IV. CONTEMPORARY TECHNOLOGY PRIVACY DEBATE 
There are numerous contemporary privacy theorists contributing to the ongoing 
debate about advancing technology and its impact upon privacy rights in the modern 
millennium.64  
In 1985 Spiros Simitis, Germany’s leading privacy scholar and practitioner who 
is also considered ‘the father of modern European information privacy law,’65 
addressed the University of Pennsylvania Law School on the subject of automation of 
data processing technology (algorithmic regulations).  His lecture on developing 
technology did not lose sight of the history of capitalism and democracy and saw 
technological changes in a far more ambiguous light.66  In 1985 and later in 2010 he 
contended67 that whatever the original incentive for computerisation may have been, 
processing increasingly appears as the ideal means to adapt an individual to a 
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64 See, for example, Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press, 2008); Daniel 
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65 See Spiros Simitis, ‘Privacy Lecture’ (Paper Presented at Berkeley University Law School, Berkeley 
California, USA, April 2010) cited in Evengy Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n16: at 39.  
66 Spiros Simitis, “The Real Privacy Problem: Technology Review” (1985) in Evgeny Morozov, “The 
Real Privacy Problem”, above n16: at 35; Spiros Simitis, “Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society” 
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predetermined, standardised behaviour that aims at the highest possible degree of 
compliance with the model patient, consumer, employee, taxpayer and citizen.68   
Simitis also recognised that privacy is not an end in itself.  He argues instead 
that it is a means of achieving a certain ideal of democratic politics, where citizens are 
trusted to be more than just self-contented suppliers of information to all seeing, all-
knowing technocrats.  Three technological trends underpin Simitis’s analysis.  First, 
he warned, even back then, of ‘the intensive retrieval of personal data of virtually 
every employee, taxpayer, patient, bank customer, welfare recipient, or car driver’, 
which means that privacy is no longer solely a problem of some unlucky citizen 
caught off-guard in an awkward situation; it has become everyone’s problem.69  
Second, new technologies like smart cards and videotex are making it possible to 
‘record and reconstruct individual activities in minute detail’ but also normalise 
surveillance by weaving it into everyday life.70  Third, the personal information 
recorded by new technologies is allowing institutions to enforce standards of 
behaviour, triggering ‘long-term strategies of manipulation intended to mould and 
adjust individual conduct.’71   
Modern institutions including governments and businesses are set to gain from 
this situation.  For example, insurance companies can tailor cost-saving programs to 
the needs and demand of patients, hospitals and the pharmaceutical industry.  Law 
                                                 
68 See Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n16: at 36. 
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71 Ibid 
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enforcement can use newly available databases to identify potential criminals and 
locate suspects.  Welfare agencies unearth fraudulent behaviour through data 
matching.  Nevertheless according to Simitis instead of establishing greater context 
for decisions people would stand to lose as society becomes more automated, 
resulting in no one actually knowing how the algorithms work and consequently just 
accepting the convenient state of affairs.72  The central problem is not necessarily the 
ability to personally understand the intrinsic details of technologies (like the 
mechanics of a car or computer algorithms) it is really about the transformational 
power of technology to manipulate individual desires and choices to suit its own 
purposes – hence ‘the medium dictates the message.’  Thus the balance between 
privacy and transparency is especially in need of adjustment in times of rapid 
technological change.  As observed by Simitis: ‘Far from being considered a 
constitutive element of a democratic society, privacy appears as a tolerated 
contradiction, the implications of which must be continuously reconsidered.’73  It is 
from a democratic model of promoting and enhancing public citizen trust to be more 
than the recipients of technocratic ‘nanny state’ ideal that the thesis notion of a Council 
emerges as a significant step for ongoing healthcare privacy protection. 
In 1999 Jan van Dijk, a Dutch professor of communication science, noted the 
rise of the networked society.  He foresaw the tensions that such networked global 
flows of information would cause by identifying main actors designing and 
introducing this advanced technology ‘to strengthen their own central control, be it in 
                                                 
72 Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n16: at 39 
73 Ibid; Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion, above n63.  
93 
 
flexible form, and limit personal autonomy and free choices at the bottom of the 
organisation not matching their interests.’74  
Simitis and van Dijk’s insights into the transformational power of technology 
to create two classes of citizens was predicted in 1963 by the German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas who stated that ‘an exclusively technical civilisation…is 
threatened…by splitting of human beings into two classes – the social engineers and 
the inmates of closed social institutions.’75  In the 21st century this argument about the 
inevitability of technological progress and its impact of citizens is taken up by a new 
breed of academics and practitioners.  These techno savvy scholars have a unique 
understanding of the complexity of technology and appreciate the broader political 
and economic dimension in the modern era information technology debate.76  
We now live in a hyper-connected society that continues to be inanimate with 
free global flow of information where it is argued by technology advocates that ‘free 
resources have been crucial to innovation and creativity; that without them creativity 
is crippled.’77  This is especially relevant in that ‘the central question becomes not 
whether government or the market should control a resource but whether a resource 
should be controlled at all.’78  Advances in cyber-space and internet technology have 
                                                 
74 Jan van Dijk, The Network Society (Sage Publications, 2012); Jan van Dijk, The Deepening Divide: 
Inequality in the Information Society (books.google.com. 2005); Jan van Dijk and Kenneth Hacker, ‘The 
Digital Divide as a Complex and Dynamic Phenomenon’ (2003) in Jan van Dijk, The Information Society 
(Taylor & Francis, 2003); Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (Penguin 
Books, 2012), cites Jan van Dijk, The Network Society, above n63: at 220. 
75 Jurgen Habermas quoted in Evgeny Morovoz, The Net Delusion, above n63: at 37.   
76 See Tal Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business”, above n14; Jaron Lanier, You Are Not A Gadget, above 
n14; see generally Clay Shirky,  Tim Wu, Sacha Lobo and Ethan Zuckerman. 
77 Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n16: at 37.   
78 Ibid. 
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resulted in a proliferation of social networking sites such as YouTube, Twitter, 
Facebook and Instagram.  As previously noted, social networking transforms how 
people communicate and socialise with each other.  These sites provide great 
entertainment opportunities and many benefits but there can be numerous downsides 
to these benefits, including the seduction of a new generation of people to voluntarily 
release their ‘sensitive’ personal information which ultimately diminishes their 
ongoing rights to privacy.79 
Our culture is shedding traditional experts and creating new ones80 and 
overwhelming those institutions that have provided mechanisms of information 
control such as families, health services, education institutions and law courts with 
increasing information requirements.81  According to Zarsky and Mayer-Schonberger, 
technology has moved beyond mere recording and surveillance of personal 
information to include the development of sophisticated programs that allow analysis 
of this data.82  Recording is easy and in the world of high technology where memory 
                                                 
79 See Fitzgerald, et al, Internet and E-Commerce Law, above n18 [Fitzgerald identifies that in order to 
participate in social network sites, it is often necessary to provide ‘voluntary’ detailed personal 
information to the network]: at 39. 
80 See, for example, technology experts, designers of technology, etc. 
81 See, for example, Neil Postman, Technopoly, above n4. ‘The rule of law is an oversimplification’ and 
Postman argues that therein lays the power of theories, ‘to oversimplify and assist believers in 
organising, weighting and excluding information’: at 77 also noting that ‘The weakness is that it is an 
oversimplification that is vulnerable by attack by new information’ and arguing that ‘When there is too 
much information to sustain any theory, information becomes essentially meaningless’: at 77.  
82 See Tal Zarsky,”Mine Your Own Business”, above n14: at 1; Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Delete: The 
Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, above n63; see generally European Union Commission, ‘Right to 
be Forgotten Ruling’ (c-131/12)  [this ruling resulted from a citizen complaint].  In 2010 a Spanish citizen 
lodged a complaint against a Spanish newspaper with the National Data Protection Agency & against 
Google Spain and Google Inc.  He requested that the newspaper is required either to remove or alter 
personal data relating to him. In its ruling of 13 May 2014 the EU Court held ‘that there is a ‘right to be 
forgotten’ – individuals have a right – under certain conditions – to ask search engine to remove links 
with personal information about them (this applies if information is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant 
or excessive for the purposes of the data processing’ (Para 93 of the ruling).  It held that ‘a case by case 
assessment is needed to consider the type of information in question’ (balanced against freedom of 
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is cheap and nothing is forgotten or lost in oblivion, governments and corporations 
invest in storage of trivial information hoping to reap the benefits in the future.  
It is possible to analyse databases using simple statistical ‘query’ and that 
specific information can be retrieved using various types of information about the 
database as a whole.  Advanced practices include segmenting the database into 
groups and analysing each sub-database on its own or as a comparative analysis.  The 
limitation with this type of query is that unless one knows what questions to ask 
present applications may be inadequate for prediction or marketing purposes.83  
In the competitive environment, tools that allow governments and 
organisations to reveal deeper and unknown connections about individuals, families 
and society are now required.  In light of advancing sophisticated mega data-analysis 
and data-mining possibilities conducted by both government and industry the issue 
of individual privacy protection rights to exercise any ‘control’ over personal 
information is further diminished and takes on a new urgency, particularly in relation 
to the collection and ‘sharing’ of EPR and e-health records.84  According to Zarsky, the 
latest advances in information research technology such as data-analysis and data-
mining include not just an ability to collect and access personal information but the 
capacity to generate detailed profiles about a person.  This form of analysis is available 
through hi-tech data-mining opportunities.  
                                                 
expression and the media).  European Commission, 1995 Data Protective Directive, Article 12 and 
Article 17 [includes ‘the right to be forgotten and to erase’ and the ‘right to erase’].  
83 Tal Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business”, above n14.  
84 See the College of Australian Healthcare Informatics and the Asia Pacific Healthcare Informatics 
Agreement to share healthcare information between China, New Zealand and Australia (signed in 
1994). 
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Ann Cavoukian, Canadian Privacy Commissioner, as well as other privacy 
scholars85 believe that the only way that adequate privacy and security protection 
mechanisms will form part of system design is if the time is taken to firmly embed 
privacy and security protection as part of the system in the first instance.86  Morozov 
warns that if adequate privacy and security mechanisms are not included there is a 
very real risk of not being able to fix this problem later.  As recognised by NEHTA, 
embedding adequate privacy and security protection mechanisms in EPR and e-health 
will take time, require resources and is contingent on learning from other countries 
experiences in this area.  
V. NEW CHALLENGES FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS AND 
PRIVACY PROTECTION RIGHTS 
It can be observed that the growing effects of computer and information revolution 
now surpass any previously held notions of technologies potential impact on 
individual identity and cultural practices.  As a result of rapidly developing 
technology over the past decade, new challenges have arisen that were not envisaged 
by the Australian Government’s original e-health and privacy protection strategies.87   
                                                 
85 See Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n16. 
86 See Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design: Strong Privacy Protection – Now, and Well into the Future (2011) 
(A Report on the State of PbD to the 33rd International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners, 2011).  The Report argues that privacy and security default must be embedded into 
technology; see also Ann Cavoukian, Angus Fisher, Scott Killen and David Hoffman, “Remote Home 
Health Care Technologies: How to Ensure Privacy? Build it in: Privacy by Design” (22 May 2010) 
Springerlink.com (online). 
87 See, for example, Australian Government, COAG, Healthcare Identifiers and Privacy: Discussion Paper 
on Proposals for Legislative Support (July 2009); Australian Government, PCEHR System: Legislation Issues 
Paper (April 2011); NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n3.  
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These challenges include the development of highly intrusive and extremely 
sophisticated technical improvements such as data-linkage capabilities, data-mining, 
informatics, biometrics and surveillance opportunities.  The considerable bearing of 
these advanced technologies on everyday human interaction clearly indicate that 
government has gravely underestimated the degree of privacy protection intervention 
necessary in the new digital economy.  Consequently existing legal and governance 
EPR and e-health privacy measures are seriously compromised and do not go far 
enough to provide long-term solutions to emerging modern day technology privacy 
and security risks.88 
Indeed the thesis contends that privacy protection is no longer just about 
protecting an individual’s privacy rights in the new information economy.  The 
contemporary debate reflects the growing influence and extending reach of modern 
communication technology, capturing its enduring ability to construct social reality 
by seducing and dominating citizens, by insisting upon total unquestioning 
dedication to its continuing progress and determining our identity by simultaneously 
shaping desires to fit our new digital identities.  The emerging privacy technology 
debate demands consideration of the broader political and economic agenda, 
including identifying the ideology that underpins and drives modern technology.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is within this wider contemporary framework that technology privacy as a dynamic 
work in progress and not just a static process or legal solution must be conceived.  
                                                 
88 See chapter 6, pp186-234 on PCEHR and e-health governance; chapter 7, pp238-261 for details and 
further discussion of the Council.  
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Consequently there is an urgent need to reconceptualise both technology and privacy 
and reinforce current understanding of technology privacy to include the introduction 
of a Council.  This would represent a preliminary but significant first positive step 
towards localising and recapturing not only our individual identity which relies on 
privacy as a human right but also broader democratic rights currently under threat by 
expanding information economy and intrusive and demanding ‘tools’ utilised by 
technology. 
In summary, this chapter in combination with other thesis chapters provides 
significant historical and theoretical background information about technology 
development and healthcare privacy protection issues.  Chapter 4 extends this 
contextual understanding of the impact of healthcare privacy protection rights by 
exploring the theoretical development of the concept of privacy and its ongoing 
relevance to healthcare in Australia. 
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CHAPTER 4 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 
 
This chapter argues that in the modern information era there is an urgent need to 
reconceptualise privacy and privacy rights.  Further, it is contended  that the new 
electronic healthcare regime challenges long standing expectations of individual 
healthcare privacy protection by adopting digital information sharing and that this is 
problematic for both healthcare providers and consumers in relation to long-
established professional privacy expectations and obligations and that this impacts on 
individual privacy rights.  
I. EVOLVING CONCEPTUAL THEORIES IN PRIVACY  
Privacy discourse in Australia and internationally is widely premised upon Western 
liberal democratic ideology with an emphasis on advancing international economic 
imperatives.1  Over the last few decades, privacy, its relationship with technology and 
                                                 
1 See David Lindsay, “An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the Implications for the 
Future of Australian Privacy Law” [2005] Monash University Law Review 4; see also Simon Davies, ‘Re-
Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity’ 
in Philip Agre and Marc Rotenberg (eds), Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape (The MIT Press, 
2001); see Fredrick Abbott, ‘Emerging Market Pharmaceutical Supply: A Prescription for Sharing the 
Benefits of Global Information Flow’ in Ramesh Subramania and Eddan Katz (eds), The Global Flow of 
Information (New York University Press, 2011); Graham Greenleaf, ‘APEC’s Privacy Framework Sets a 
New Low Standard for the Asia-Pacific’ in Andrew Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New 
Dimensions in Privacy Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006): at 91.  It can also be noted, that given the 
prominence of Western Liberation, the largest body of privacy materials emanates from North America; 
although this trend is being challenged by a new breed of contemporary international and European 
savvy techno theorists (for example, Tal Zarsky and Viktor Mayer-Schonberger); see also Evgeny 
Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem” (22 October 2013) 116(6) MIT Technology Review 32-43. 
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its impact on society has occupied the minds of eminent scholars, particularly in 
relation to the continuing convergence of computer and communication technology 
in the modern information economy.2  Similar to Australia, international privacy 
scholarship is robust and there is vast literature that attempts to address the question 
‘what is privacy?’3  
Legal and privacy scholars, philosophers and practitioners persist in their 
search for a fundamental, distinctive and internally consistent core to defining 
privacy.  However, privacy is considered a multifarious concept that influences 
manifold areas of physical and psychological existence and the social environment.  
Accordingly, legal privacy theorist, Daniel Solove observes that finding an all-
encompassing definition can be likened to finding the ‘holy grail.’4  Regardless of these 
barriers, he notes that the search for privacy’s essence, character and the meaning 
should not be abandoned because privacy analysis supports continuing 
understandings of its importance and relevance in a constantly changing world.5   
II. MORAL THEORIES 
                                                 
2 See Daniel Solove, The Digital Person (New York University Press, 2004); see also Kathy Bowrey, Law 
and Internet Culture (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff 
Between Privacy and Security (Stanford University Press, 2011). 
3 See, eg, Meredith Carter, “Integrated Electronic Health Records and Patient Privacy: Possible Benefits 
but Real Dangers” (2002) 172 Medical Journal of Australia; Lyria Bennett-Moses, “Recurring Dilemmas: 
The Law’s Race to Keep up with Technology Changes” [2007] University of New South Wales Law Review 
Series 21; Adam McBeth, “Privatising Human Rights: What Happens to State’s Human Rights Duties 
When Services are Privatised?” (2004) 5(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 133; Megan Richardson, 
“Wither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy for Australians” [2002] Melbourne University Law 
Review 20. 
4 Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press, 2008) 12-13. 
5 See Daniel Solove, The Digital Person, above n2. 
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Normative moral theories such as Consequentialists and Non-consequentialists 
theories continue to occupy a prominent role in Australian and international privacy 
debate, as does the private-public dichotomy view of privacy.6  Historically the public-
private dichotomy remains a popular division in privacy analysis discourse.7  This 
convenient conceptual division distinguishes between public and private existence by 
determining whether any definable spheres exist and if the boundaries of the private 
sphere are traditionally defined by public agents.8  The term public and private are 
used to provide structure to the activities of lives and the law.  The liberal concept of 
the private typically refers to behaviour and activities not regulated by law.  In 
contrast, the public sphere consists of the world of politics and state activities.9 
                                                 
6 See Brett Mason, Privacy without Principle (Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2006).  Mason states that 
‘the public/private divide has operated, and continues to operate, as an ‘ideological tool’ and that 
‘liberal democracies demonstrate a preoccupation with the public/private dichotomy’: at 10-21; see also 
David Lindsay, “An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the Implications for the Future 
of Australian Privacy Law”, above n1; Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Review of 
Australian Privacy Law: Discussion Paper 72 (September 2007).  In Discussion Paper 72, the ALRC 
reviewed international and Australian privacy conceptual scholarship and law in the area: at 114-124; 
see Carolyn Doyle and Mirko Bagaric, Privacy Law in Australia (The Federation Press, 2005).  Doyle and 
Bagaric observe that normative moral theories have proliferated over the last two or three decades; 
Doyle and Bagaric discusses the development of consequentialist moral theories and non-
consequentialist (or deontological) theories such as human rights: at  20-24;  see Danuta Mendelson, 
“Electronic Medical Records: Perils of Outsourcing and the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)” (2004) 12 Journal of 
Law and Medicine 8; see also Bernadette McSherry, “Ethical Issues in HealthConnect’s Shared Electronic 
Health Record System” (2004) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 60; Graham Greenleaf, Nigel Waters and 
Lee Bygrave, “Implementing Privacy Principles: After 20 Years, It’s Time to Enforce the Privacy Act” 
[2007] University of New South Wales Law Review Series 31; Margaret Otlowski and Robert Williamson, 
“Ethical and Legal Issues and the “New Genetics”” (2003) 178 Medical Journal of Australia 582; Donald 
Lindberg and Betsy Humphreys, “Medicine and Health on the Internet” (1998) 280 Medical Journal of 
Australia 1303. 
7 Doyle and Bagaric, Privacy Law in Australia, above n6; see Brett Mason, Privacy without Principle, above 
n6; see also S Benn and G Gaus (eds), Public and Private in Social Life (St Martin’s Press, 1983); Hannah 
Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1958); see Jurgen Habermas, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (The MIT Press, 1989); 
Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (Touchstone Books, 1994). 
8 Brett Mason, Privacy without Principle, above n6: at 10-11. 
9 Ibid; see also Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 28. 
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Although extensive scholarly and judicial writing on privacy has produced 
many different conceptions of privacy, it is generally agreed by theorists that within 
privacy discourse there are a number of common denominators that transcend 
national and international boundaries.  These denominators provide a basis upon 
which privacy as a utility, value or right can be further conceptualised.  Common 
denominators include ‘the right to be let alone’, ‘limited access to self’, ‘secrecy’, 
‘personhood’, ‘control-over-personal-information’ and ‘intimacy and isolation’.10  
These conceptions often overlap, but each has a distinctive perspective on capturing 
the essence of privacy, particularly from an individual privacy rights approach.  
A. The right to be let alone 
The ‘right to be let alone’ is Warren and Brandeis’s famous formulation in their article 
“The Right to Privacy.”11  Its significance to the privacy debate is that it provides the 
basis for further privacy analysis and is often referred to as the most ‘influential law 
review article of all.’12  Warren and Brandeis began the article by describing new 
technological developments that were posing a potential threat to privacy such as the 
                                                 
10 See Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy, above n4: at 12-13; see also Daniel Solove, The Future of 
Reputation (Yale University Press, 2007); Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide, above n2. 
11 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193. 
12 See Richard Turkington, “Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered 
Constitutional Right to Privacy” (1990) 10 Northern Illinois University Law Review 479; see also Ruth 
Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of the Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421; Charles Fried, “Privacy” 
(1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475; Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy” (1977) 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 233; Irwin Kramer, “The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and 
Brandeis” (1990) 39 Catholic University Law Review 703; D McCormick, “Privacy: A Problem of 
Definition” (1974) 1 British Journal of Law and Society 75; W A Parent, “New Definition for Privacy for 
the Law” (1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 305; W Prosser, “Privacy: A Legal Analysis” (1960) 48 California 
Law Review 338. 
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newspaper press and instantaneous photographs.  They were also concerned not only 
with the new technology but at the time with how it would intersect with the media.13  
According to Warren and Brandeis, ‘the-right-to-be-let-alone’ further 
highlights a general right of the ‘immunity of the person to one’s personality’.14  The 
authors’ point out various limitations of established legal actions such as defamation 
law as about protecting ‘reputation’ and explain that privacy as involving ‘injury to 
feelings’ can also be captured by the law.  The impact of the article on U.S. 
jurisprudence cannot be questioned because it brought significant attention to 
privacy, resulting in a number of common law tort actions to protect privacy.15  The 
article also framed further scholarly and practitioner discussion of privacy in the U.S. 
throughout the 20th century.16  
B. Limited access to self 
A subset of ‘right to be let alone’ is ‘limited access to self’.  The conceptual view of 
privacy as relying on ‘limited access to the self’ emphasised the individual’s desire for 
concealment and for being apart from others.  In the late 19th century, Godkin 
advanced an early version of the limited access theory, observing that ‘nothing is 
                                                 
13 Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”, above n11: at 196. 
14 Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”, above n11.  
15 See Ruth Gavison, “Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis were Right on Privacy v Free 
Speech” (1992) 43 South Carolina Law Review 437: at 438; see also Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits 
of the Law”, above n12: at 441; Harry Kalven, “Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis 
Wrong?” (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 326; Benjamin Bateman, “Brandeis and Warren’s 
“The Right to Privacy” and the Birth of the Right to Privacy” (2002) 69 Tennessee Law Review 623.  
16 Olmstead v United States 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) [in Olmstead, the Court held that wiretapping was 
not a violation under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ‘because it was not a physical 
trespass into the home’]: at 442; see also Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  In its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, as well as its protection of the right to privacy, the Supreme Court invoked 
Brandeis’s formulation of privacy, as “the right to be let alone”: at 350; Elbridge Adams, “The Right of 
Privacy, and its Relation to the Law of Libel” (1905) 39 American Law Review 37. 
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better worthy of legal protection than private life, in other words, the right of every 
man to keep his affairs to himself.’17 
Despite similarities ‘limited access to self’ is not equivalent to solitude.  Solitude 
is a form of seclusion, of withdrawal from other individuals, of being alone.  Solitude 
is a component of ‘limited access’ as well as the ‘right-to-be-let-alone’ conception.  
These theories extend more broadly than solitude, embracing freedom from 
government interference, including intrusions by the media and others.  ‘Limited 
access’ conceptions recognise that privacy extends beyond merely being apart from 
others.18  
Contemporary privacy theorist, Sissela Bok, has advanced a more sophisticated 
version of ‘limited access’ conception; he considers that privacy is ‘the conditions of 
being protected from unwanted access by others – of physical access, personal 
information, or attention.’19  According to Ernest Van Den Haag, ‘Privacy is the 
exclusive access of a person (or other legal entity) to a realm of his own.’20  
Consequently the right to privacy entitles one to exclude others from watching, 
utilizing, or invading his private realm.21  Legal theorist, Anita Allen asserts that ‘a 
                                                 
17 E L Godkin, “The Rights of the Citizen - To His Own Reputation” (July-December 1890) Scribner’s 
Magazine, 65; E L Godkin, “Libel and its Legal Remedies” (1880) 12 Journal of Social Science 69. 
18 See Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy, above n4: at 19; Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide, above n2.  
19 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (Random House, 1983) 10-11; Hyman 
Gross, “The Concept of Privacy” (1967) 43 New York University Law Review 34; see also Braxton Graven, 
“Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone” (1976) Duke Law Journal 699. 
20 Van Den Haag, ‘On Privacy’ in Roland Pennock and J Chapman (eds),  Nomos XIII: Privacy (Roland 
Pennock & J Chapman, 1971): at 149. 
21 Ibid. 
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degree of inaccessibility is an important necessary condition for the apt application of 
privacy.’22 
In common with other critics of this theory, the thesis rejects ‘limited access’ to 
the self as too limited.  It is an inadequate privacy definition because without a notion 
of what matters are private, limited access conceptions do not identify the substantive 
matters for which access would implicate privacy.  In addition the theory provides no 
understanding as to the question of degree of access necessary to constitute privacy 
violations thus limiting its value as an all-encompassing privacy definition.23 
C. Secrecy 
One of the most common understandings of privacy is that it constitutes the ‘secrecy’ 
of certain matters.24  ‘Secrecy’ of personal information is a way to ‘limit access to self’.25  
Under this view privacy is violated by public discourse of previously concealed 
information.26  Richard Posner, a law and economics scholar is critical of this 
                                                 
22 Anita Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Allen Rowman & Littlefields 
Publication, 1988) 10.  For additional information and argument on limited-access conceptions; see 
Edward Shils, “Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes” (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 281 
[where privacy ‘is constituted by the absence of interaction or communication or perception within 
contexts in which such interaction, communication, or perception is practicable’]: at 281. 
23 Anita Allen, Uneasy Access, above n22: at 7; see Sidney Jourard, “Some Psychological Aspects of 
Privacy” (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 307; Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of the 
Law”, above n12; see also Daniel Solove, The Digital Person, above n2: at 20-21; Daniel Solove, 
Understanding Privacy, above n4. 
24 See Edward Richard Parker, “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review 275 [where Parker 
seeks to articulate some characteristics common to all or identify some of different personal interests]; 
Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of the Law”, above n12; Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to 
Privacy”, above n11.  
25 See Edward Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity” 39 New York University Law Review 
962 [where Bloustein proposes a general theory of individual privacy, which will reconcile the 
divergent strands of legal development]; Edward Richard Parker, “A Definition of Privacy”, above n24; 
see also Thomas Scanlon, “Thomson on Privacy” 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 315. 
26 See Charles Fried, “Privacy”, above n12 [in Privacy Fried defines privacy as ‘control over knowledge 
about oneself’ that is necessary to ‘protect fundamental relations of respect, love, friendship and trust 
based upon values of autonomy’]: at 477, 483; see also Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy”, above n12; 
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conception, seeing privacy protection as a form of ‘interested economic behaviour, 
aimed at concealing true but harmful facts about oneself for one’s own gain.’27  Posner 
asserts that people ‘want to manipulate the world around them by selective disclosure 
of facts about themselves.’28  Sidney Jourard supports Posner’s concept of privacy; 
according to him it is ’an outcome of a person’s wish to withhold from others certain 
knowledge as to his past and present experience.’29  Posner and Jourard’s ‘secrecy’ 
view of privacy suggests that having ‘secrets’ is somehow deceptive because it is about 
hiding something that may define the person.  
The conception of privacy as concealing information about the ‘self’ continues 
to underpin the U.S. constitutional right to information privacy cases such as Griswold 
v Connecticut30 and Roe v Wade.31  Critics of the theory have claimed that understanding 
privacy as ‘secrecy’ conceptualises privacy too narrowly.32  For instance, Edward 
Bloustein contends that this conception of privacy fails to recognise group privacy.33  
Judith DeCrew is also critical of ‘secrecy’ arguing that the harm caused by an invasion 
of privacy and understanding privacy violation involves more than avoiding 
                                                 
W A Parent, “New Definition for Privacy for the Law”, above n12; W A Parent, “Recent Work on the 
Concept of Privacy” (1993) 20 American Philosophical Quarterly 341. 
27 Richard Posner, Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1981) 272-273; see also Richard Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1998) [Posner’s conception of privacy is infused 
with his own normative assessment of privacy as a form of deception]. According to Posner, the 
‘economist sees a parallel to the efforts of sellers to conceal defects in their products’: at 46.   
28 Richard Posner, Economics of Justice, above n27: at 273. 
29 Sidney Jourard, “Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy” (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 
307: at 307. 
30 Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479. 
31 Roe v Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113. 
32 See Edward Shils, “Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes” (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 281: at 305. 
33 Edward Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”, above n25: at 123. 
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disclosure.  She argues that it involves the individual’s ability to ensure that personal 
information is used for the purposes he or she desires.34  
The ‘secrecy’ view is rejected by the thesis because it provides a very limited 
view of privacy.  It mainly conceives privacy as a narrow individualistic self-serving 
interest that operates within an economic context.  This limited perception suggests 
that people who have secrets have something to hide.  Rather than recognising 
‘secrecy’ as a positive human option, which can give people the necessary freedom to 
limit the effects of embarrassing information and awkward moments that make no 
difference to who or what they are now, this narrow focus defines secrecy as a 
negative trait in all circumstances.  
A common retort to ‘secrecy’ as a viable option is the ‘nothing to hide’ 
argument.35  The ‘nothing to hide’ debate relates to the false trade-off between privacy 
and security in the digital era.36  Advocates of this notion contend that privacy must 
be sacrificed for security.  Pro-security proponents argue that if you have ‘nothing to 
hide’ you should not worry about laws that favour promoting government 
surveillance security at the expense of individual privacy protection rights.37  If you 
have ‘nothing to hide’ you have nothing to fear about surveillance, and security and 
decreasing privacy rights.  Solove argues that the ensuing debate between privacy and 
                                                 
34 See Judith Wagner DeCrew, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology (Cornell 
University Press, 1997) 48; Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘The Right to Privacy’ in Ferdinand D Schoeman 
(ed),  Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (books.google.com. 1984): at 272. 
35 Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide, above n10. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide, above n10 [Solove questions what we understand by the term ‘national 
security’ and observes that ‘national security’ has often been abused as a justification not only for 
surveillance but also for maintaining the secrecy of government records as well as violating the civil 
liberties of citizens]: at 66. 
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security has been framed incorrectly as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which people are forced 
to choose between one value and the other.38  He observes that protecting privacy is 
not fatal to security measures; it merely involves adequate oversight and regulations.39 
D. Control-over-personal-information 
A popular theory of privacy is that it enables a person ‘control-over-personal-
information’40 it can be viewed as a sub-set of the ‘limited access’ conception.  This 
particular denominator is appealing as a way of protecting privacy in the area of 
digital information such as found in new EPR and e-health systems.41  The theory 
focus is on information; however it excludes those aspects of privacy that are not 
informational such as the right to make some fundamental decisions about one’s body 
or reproduction.  According to Alan Westin, ‘Privacy is the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.’42  Therefore ‘privacy is not simply 
an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we 
have over information about ourselves.’43  
Critics of the theory have argued that the ‘control-over-information’ conception 
focuses on all information over which individuals want to retain control, but privacy 
is not simply a subjective matter of individual prerogative, it is also an issue of what 
                                                 
38 Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide, above n10. 
39 Ibid 1.  
40 See Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head, 1967). 
41 See ALRC, Discussion Paper No 72, above n6: at 112.  
42 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, above n40, 7; ALRC, Discussion Paper No 72, above n6; Charles 
Fried, “Privacy”, above n12: at 482. 
43 Charles Fried, “Privacy”, above n12: at 483 
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society deems appropriate to protect.44  Some theorists attempt to define the scope of 
what constitutes personal information over which individuals have control.  For 
instance, Richard Parker defines the scope of personal information extremely broadly: 
‘Control over who sees us, hears us, smells us, and tastes us, in sum, control over who 
can sense us, is the core to privacy.’45  This definition is limited because it would 
preclude most interpersonal contact in society as constituting a privacy invasion.  We 
are frequently seen and heard by others in circumstances that would not suggest even 
the slightest invasion of privacy.  Other scholars limit the scope of personal 
information to that which relates to the individual.46 
In addition to falling short of adequately defining the scope of information, 
‘control-over-information’ conception fails to define what is meant by control.  
Theorists provide very little insight on what control really entails and it is often 
conceived as too broad or too narrow.  Frequently control is understood as a form of 
‘ownership’ of information.  For instance Westin concludes that ‘personal information 
should be defined as a property right.’47  This notion is partly embodied in tort law 
                                                 
44 Ferdinand Schoeman, ‘Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature’ in Ferdinand Schoeman 
(ed), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, above n34.  Schoeman, for example, observes that 
‘regarding privacy as a claim or entitlement to determine what information about oneself is available 
to others … [wrongly] presumes privacy is something to be protected at the discretion of the individual 
to whom the information relates’: at 3; see Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, above n40. 
45 See Richard Parker, “A Definition of Privacy”, above n24: at 280 
46 See, for example, Richard Murphy, “Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense 
of Privacy” (1996) 84 Georgetown Law Journal 2381 {Murphy defines the scope of personal information 
as consisting of ‘any data about an individual that is identifiable to that individual’: at 2383.  Murphy’s 
definition is far too broad because there is a significant amount of information identifiable to us that 
we do not deem as private’, thus this theory provides no reasonable limitation in scope]: at 2382 
47 See Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, above n40. 
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such as doctrines of appropriation and passing off, which protects people against 
other’s using their image or likeness for commercial gain.48  
Extending property rights to personal information has difficulties because 
information can be easily transmitted and once known by others cannot be eradicated 
from their minds.  Unlike physical objects, information can be possessed 
simultaneously within the minds of millions.  This accounts for why intellectual-
property law protects particular tangible expressions of ideas rather than the 
underlying ideas themselves.49  Further there is a problem of viewing personal 
information as equivalent to any other commodity this is because it is often formed in 
relationships with others.  All parties to that relationship have some claim to the 
information.  For instance, EPR information is the result of the interaction between the 
healthcare provider and patient and it may also contain detailed personal information 
about the patient’s family.50 
Theorists such as Paul Schwartz and Charles Fried51 consider the ‘control-over-
information’ conception as being too narrow because it focuses too heavily on 
individual choice.  The assumption that individuals have autonomy to exercise control 
over their personal information in all situations fails to realise ‘that individual self-
determination is itself shaped by the processing of personal data.’52  Schwartz argues 
                                                 
48 See Bruce Clarke, Brendan Sweeney and Mark Bender, Marketing and the Law (LexisNexis, 2011) 175. 
49 Clarke, Sweeney and Bender, Marketing and the Law, above n48; see also Daniel Solove, Understanding 
Privacy, above n4: at 27. 
50 See Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (Cambridge University Press, 
2002) [Laurie examines the question of genetic information and the ‘right to know’ from the perspective 
of individuals, family and employees]. 
51 Charles Fried, “Privacy”, above n12: at 475. 
52 See Paul Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace” (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1609: at 
1661. 
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that the assumption that individuals are able to exercise meaningful choice with 
regards to their information must be questioned, given the disparities in knowledge 
and power in bargaining over the transfer of their information is limited.53  The 
implication is that privacy involves not only individual control, but also the social 
regulation of information.  In other words, privacy is an aspect of social structure, 
architecture of information regulation and not just a matter for the exercise of 
individual control.  
The thesis agrees with the proposition that conceptualising privacy as ‘control-
over-information’ is limited because it is too vague, too broad and often too narrow.  
It is too vague or broad because it fails to define what ‘control’ entails.  It is too narrow 
because it reduces privacy to just informational concerns, omits decisional freedom 
from the realm of privacy and focuses too much on autonomy and individual choice.  
As a result of these shortcomings the thesis proclaims that healthcare privacy 
protection involves more than just putting in place pragmatic information privacy 
legislation and regulations, it necessitates not only recognition of privacy but also 
combining such recognition with statutory regulations and governance-extending 
privacy-protection mechanisms such as the proposed addition of a Council as part of 
the governance long term solution.54  
E. Personhood 
Another prevalent privacy theory is that it refers to ‘personhood’.  This theory, unlike 
other privacy theories is constructed around the protection of the integrity of 
                                                 
53 Pauls Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, above n52. 
54 See chapter 6, pp186-234 for discussion on PCEHR and e-health governance. 
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personality and thus protects individuality and dignity.  This theory builds upon 
Warren and Brandeis’s notion of ‘inviolate personality’.55  The theory of privacy as 
personhood differs from other theories because it is constructed around a normative 
end of privacy, that is, the protection of the integrity of personality.  It is a popular 
theory because it appeals to privacy concerns beyond mere physical protections.  It 
acknowledges both the physical and psychological dimensions of privacy rights. 
According to Edward Bloustein, the concept of personhood privacy protects 
the individual against conduct that is ‘demeaning to individuality’ or ‘an affront to 
personal dignity’.56  Philosopher Jeffrey Reiman also recognises a personhood 
component of privacy.57   Stanley Benn developed a concept of ‘personhood’ privacy, 
which is based on ‘respect for someone as a person, as a chooser, implies respect for 
him as one engaged in a kind of self-creative enterprise, which could be disrupted, 
distorted, or frustrated even by so limited intrusion as watching.’58  This ‘personhood’ 
concept of privacy is appealing in the current privacy debate because of the growth of 
surveillance technology in society.59  
Jeffrey Rosen’s notion of the ‘unwanted gaze,’ which examines the legal, 
technological and cultural changes that have undermined the ability to control how 
much information about ourselves, is communicated to others represents the notion 
                                                 
55 See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”, above n11. 
56 Edward Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”, above n25.   
57 Jeffrey Reiman, ‘Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood’ in Ferdinand Schoeman, Philosophical Dimensions 
of Privacy: An Anthology, above n44: at 314. 
58 See Stanley Benn, ‘Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons’ in Pennock and Chapman (eds), Nomas 
XIII: Privacy, above n20: at 149. 
59 See Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy, above n4. 
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of being ‘watched.’60  Rosen’s view of being constantly watched and the effects this 
has on individuals (and personhood) provides a useful critique of fear factors such as 
terrorism, globalisation, information economy and advancing surveillance technology 
concerns.61  Respect for someone as a person, as a chooser, implies respect for that 
person as one engaged in a kind of self-creative enterprise, which can be disrupted, 
distorted or frustrated by an intrusion such as watching.  As Benn explains that ‘being 
an object of scrutiny, as the focus of another’s attention, brings one to a new 
consciousness of oneself, as something seen through another’s eyes.’62  He contends 
that surveillance restricts an individual’s range of choices and thus limits freedom.63  
Accordingly, privacy is about respect for personhood, with personhood defined in 
terms of the individual’s capacity to choose.64  
However theories of personhood fail to elucidate what privacy is because they 
often do not articulate an adequate definition of personhood.  Freund’s notion of 
attributes irreducible in one’s selfhood is far too vague and merely substitutes 
‘selfhood’ for ‘personhood.’65 Bloustein’s examination of personhood as 
‘individuality’ fails to define the scope or nature of individuality.66  Personhood 
                                                 
60 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (Vintage Books, 2000) 4.   
61 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze, above n60; see also Jeffrey Rosen, “The Naked Crowd: Balancing 
Privacy and Security in an Age of Terror” (2004) 46 Arizona Law Review 607. 
62 Stanley Benn, ‘Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons’ in Pennock and Chapman, Nomas XIII: 
Privacy, above n20: at 150.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide, above n10: at 29. 
65 Paul Freund, ‘Address to the American Law Institute’ (Address to the 52nd Annual American Law 
Institute Meeting, 1975): at 42; see also Braxton Graven, “Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone”, above 
n19 cites Freund’s formulation of personhood in the ‘Address to the American Law Institute’: at 702. 
66 Edward Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”, above n25: at 971. 
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theories, while appealing, are consequently too broad or too vague.  Personhood is 
often defined as a type of autonomy.67  
Jed Rubenfeld offers an alternative conception that defines the right to privacy 
through a sophisticated account of the problems of ‘personhood’ theory of privacy in 
his article ─ The Right to Privacy.68  He identifies his personhood thesis as: ‘where our 
identity or self-determination is at stake, there the state may not interfere.’  He offers 
an alternative conception that defines the right to privacy as conduct that personhood 
purports to protect as ‘essential to the individual’s identity.’  Unfortunately it 
‘inadvertently reintroduces into the privacy analysis the very premise of the invidious 
uses of state power it seeks to overcome.’  Thus when the state endeavours to protect 
personhood, it must adopt and enforce its own conception of individual identity, 
impinging upon the freedom of individuals to define for themselves what is central to 
their identities.69  
F. Intimacy and Isolation 
The final common denominator understands privacy as a form of intimacy and 
isolation. This theory, which is closer to the one embraced for the purpose of this thesis, 
appropriately recognises that privacy is essential not just to self-creation but also for 
                                                 
67 Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, above n25.  
68 Jed Rubenfeld, “The Right to Privacy” (1989) 102 Harvard Law Review 801 [Rubenfeld identifies the 
‘creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed occupation of individual’s lives’ of the ‘progressively more 
normalising state as a major consideration for understanding privacy’]: at 802.  Privacy is invoked ‘only 
where the government threatens to take over or occupy our lives – to exert its power in some way over 
the totality of our lives.’  This conception of privacy as a right against totalitarianism appeals to the 
ongoing privacy debate in Australia, especially in light of the federal Coalition Liberal Government’s 
privatisation policy and actions relating to the downgrading of freedom of information services and 
rationalisation of Australian Information Commission; see federal Budget 2013-2014.  
69 Jed Rubenfeld, “The Right to Privacy”, above n68; see also Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide, above n10: 
at 32. 
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human relationships.  In Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation, Julie Innes advances an 
intimacy conception of privacy ‘the content of privacy cannot be captured if we focus 
exclusively on information, access, or intimate decisions because privacy involves all 
three areas.’70  In contrast with many proponents of privacy as intimacy, Innes 
recognised the need to define ‘intimacy’.  According to Innes ‘intimacy stems from 
something prior to behaviour’ it is an individual’s motives that matter.71  However, 
she notes the difficulty of adequately defining intimacy and this limits the value of 
this theory as an all-encompassing definition of privacy.72 
Privacy theorist Charles Fried also advances ‘intimacy’ as a concept that locates 
the value of privacy and circumscribes the scope of information over which we should 
have control.73  He positions ‘intimacy’ as ‘sharing of information about one’s actions, 
beliefs or emotions which one does not share with all, and which one has the right not 
to share with anyone.’74  He contends that by conferring this right ‘privacy creates the 
moral capital which we spend in friendship and love.’75  Along similar lines, James 
Rachels asserts that privacy is valuable because ‘there is a close connection between 
our ability to control who has access to us and the information about us, and our 
ability to create and maintain different sorts of social relationships with different 
people.’76  For theorists such as Fried and Rachels – intimate information is that which 
                                                 
70 Julie Innes, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation (Oxford University Press, 1992) 56. 
71 Ibid.   
72 Ibid 76, 77. 
73 Charles Fried, “Privacy”, above n12. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 James Rachel, ‘Why is Privacy Important?’ in Ferdinand Schoeman, Philosophical Dimensions of 
Privacy: An Anthology, above n34: at 292. 
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individuals want to reveal only to a few people.  Because healthcare information may 
include ‘sensitive’ and ‘intimate’ information, the e-health concept of ‘sharing’ health 
information with an ever expanding group of healthcare providers and yet 
unidentified third parties is likely to preclude, despite consumer-control focus, 
individual choice about what information is collected and with whom it is ultimately 
shared.77  
Given the above analysis of privacy denominators and in combination with 
other scholarly insight into a new way of understanding privacy,78 the thesis suggests 
that privacy be conceived as: an enabling and positive value – because it nurtures 
people (individuals and groups).  Thus conceived, it occupies both spatial and 
informational spheres of our lives and allows individuals to obtain a sense of real 
and/or imagined freedom (rights) to socially construct private and public spheres and 
allows limited control of: personal information, spatial integrity, reputation, 
relationships (intimacy), identity (sense of self, self-worth and esteem), and other 
important human activities within a particular society.  Thus privacy also provides 
the legitimising force behind the issue of personal control, whether or not the force is 
                                                 
77 See Review Panel,  Richard Royle, Steve Hambelton and Andrew Walduck, Review of the Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (‘Royle Review’) (December 2013).  This review recommends that as 
from 1 January 2015 that PCEHR enrolment by consumers should be changed from ‘opt-in’ to ‘opt-out’ 
(Rec.13) and from consumer-control to private sector/industry control (amongst other changes).  
However, at time of writing the date recommended for implementation of these changes (1 January 
2015) has passed without these recommendations being embraced by the federal Coalition Liberal 
Government; see also chapter 7, pp250-255 for discussion of Royle Review recommendations.  
78 See, for example, Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy, above n50 [Laurie contributes to the international 
genetic privacy debate through analysis of privacy concepts].  His theoretical analysis focuses on the 
problem of defining privacy, evaluating privacy law discourse, as well as highlighting legal and ethical 
challenges associated with genetic information in a digital world.  Laurie contends that individual 
human rights focus is inadequate in light of advancing familial genetic information possibilities: at 4.  
Laurie concludes his analysis by outlining a new privacy paradigm and proposing a definition that 
would support privacy and public interests: at 245. 
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expressed as a legal or ethical obligation, or as a ‘constructed process’.  A ‘constructed 
process’ is conceived as capturing those current and future forces that are outside 
mainstream considerations and are yet to be defined in our society as a force 
influencing privacy.  For example, a ‘constructed process’ would include the 
introduction of a Council that enhances democratic and individual privacy rights, as 
well as something (innovative or novel) that is yet to be recognised (invented) such as 
smart privacy software or systems programs.  
III. PRIVACY ─ A NEW UNDERSTANDING 
The 21st century has witnessed the emergence of a new breed of international techno 
savvy privacy scholars.79  These scholars capture the broader theories associated with 
global technology, information economy and privacy.80  For instance the impact of 
modern technology on privacy is examined in Technology and Privacy: The New 
Landscape,81 where the authors entertain the question of privacy and its continuing 
relevance to the modern digital information era.82  In Delete and Big Data Mayer-
Schonberger explores the phenomenon of data collection and linkage and perfect 
remembering in the digital age and its relationship with privacy he reveals why we 
                                                 
79 See, eg, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Tal Zarsky, Daniel Solove, Jaron Lanier, Marc Rotenberg, Philip 
Agre, and Evgeny Morozov. 
80 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton University 
Press, 2009); Evgeny Morozov, The Real Privacy Problem, above n1; Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: 
How Not to Liberate the World (book.google.com. 2011); Tal Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making 
the Case for the Implications of Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion” 
(2013) 5 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 1; Jaron Lanier, Who Owns the Future? (Penguin Books, 2013); 
Spiros Simitis, ‘Privacy Lecture’ (Paper Presented at Berkeley University Law School, Berkeley 
California USA, April 2010); Spiros Simitis, “Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society” (1987) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review; Spiros Simitis, “From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive 
on the Protection of Personal Data” (1994) Iowa Law Review.  
81 Agre and Rotenberg, Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, above n1. 
82 See also Subramanian and Katz, The Global Flow of Information, above n1. 
118 
 
must reintroduce our capacity to forget.83  He argues that the digital realm remembers 
what is sometimes better forgotten and this has profound implications, noting that 
humiliating content on Facebook is enshrined in cyber-space and potentially in 
longitudinal EPR profiles for future employers and others to see.84  
Morozov and Zarsky contend that the concept of privacy needs to be 
considered in a very different light in the modern global technological environment, 
embracing a wider political agenda.  They argue that the modern day concept of 
privacy in a global world is far more complex than originally conceived by earlier 20th 
century privacy theorists and has moved beyond the narrow individual information 
control question to encompass political questions such as public participation and 
democracy.  Both theorists articulate the notion that in order to evolve socially humans 
require a certain amount of disorder in their lives and that removing the need to 
exercise individual choice and responsibility will result in citizen political 
complacency that potentially threatens the very essence of democratic government.85   
The overarching question that emerges from the above privacy analysis is 
whether privacy can be conceptualised in light of new technological advances?  Any 
attempt to locate a common denominator for all the manifest things that fall under the 
                                                 
83 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Delete, above n80; Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big 
Data (Harcourt, 2013). 
84 See Bridie Jabour, ‘Australian Authors Join Call for UN Bill of Digital Rights to Protect Privacy’ The 
Guardian (UK), 10 December 2013, 1; Daily Telegraph, ‘Threat to Privacy in E-Health Records’ The Daily 
Telegraph (Australia), 28 August 2012, 12; see Danuta Mendelson, “Electronic Medical Records: Perils 
of Outsourcing and the Privacy Act 1988” (2004) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 8; Graham Greenleaf, 
‘APEC’s Privacy Framework Sets a New Low Standard for Asia-Pacific’ in Kenyon and Richardson, 
New Dimensions in Privacy Law, above n1: at 91; see generally Anne Mainsbridge, ”Employers and 
Genetic Information: A New Frontier for Discrimination” (2002) 2 Macquarie Law Journal 61. 
85 See Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n1: at 33; see also Kenyon and Richardson, 
New Dimensions in Privacy Law, above n1.  ,  
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rubric of privacy is an onerous task given the changing social, economic and political 
environment that exists.  Because of these difficulties, some theorists argue that 
privacy is ‘reducible’ to other conceptions and rights.86  
However the thesis argues that privacy issues are far too multifarious to be 
reduced to rights over the person or property; for example, much insight can be gained 
from electronic surveillance or conflicts between considerations of privacy and free 
press rights.87  It is contended that privacy must be understood as a broader and 
increasingly essential human right that not only protects human identity but more 
importantly democratic ideals.  Additionally there is a danger of being seduced by 
outmoded concepts that represent computer utility and neutrality as benign tools of 
human utility and convenience in light of mounting evidence that technologies are 
increasingly concerned with economic and social control by governments and 
information technology organisations such as Google and Facebook.88  Information 
technology is essential to bureaucratic government programs such as delivery systems 
for  primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare because the information collected is 
capable of reporting upon, motivating and shaping individual reactions and 
controlling behaviour of individuals and  communities.89  
                                                 
86 See Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy, above n4: at 37; Judith Thompson, ‘The Right to Privacy’ in 
Ferdinand Schoeman, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, above n44: at 272.  Judith 
Thompson argues that the ‘right to privacy is not a distinct cluster of rights but itself intersects with the 
cluster of rights which the right over the person consists in and also with the cluster of rights which 
owning property consists in’: at 280.   
87 See chapter 1, pp1-37; chapter 7, pp238-261.   
88 See ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Discussion Paper 80 (31 March 2014); see also 
The Coalition’s Policy on E-Government for the Digital Economy (September 2013). 
89 Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n1; Lyria Bennett Moses, “Recurring 
Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep-up with Technology Changes”, above n3; see also Carol Grbich, 
‘Moving Away from the Welfare State: The Privatisation of the Health System’ in Heather Gardiner 
and Simon Barraclough (eds), Health Policy in Australia (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2002). 
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The disadvantage for individuals in this situation is the danger of becoming 
complacent in the privacy debate and no longer questioning the motives of 
governments and architects of social technologies as society moves to embrace 
constructed cyber-space reality and the digital person.  Thus it is imperative in the 
EPR and e-health implementation privacy debate to conceptualise privacy as not just 
an individual’s right to control personal information in the new information age but 
see privacy as a right that is increasingly essential to protecting broader democratic 
rights.  The introduction of a Council as proposed by the thesis is a significant step 
towards inclusively engaging the general public in the healthcare privacy protection 
debate.  Also a Council represents a participatory social mechanism that further 
supports the government’s legal, governance and technological privacy protection 
schemes.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
In summary, the above exploration of privacy discourse does provide valuable insight 
into the ‘evolving’ modern day concept of privacy.  Nevertheless, these stand-alone 
theories still fail to adequately explain the multidimensional character of privacy in 
the modern technology information era.  Prior to 1990s, privacy violations had been 
understood in a particular manner90 and it was only when these more customary ways 
of understanding privacy did not account for key aspects of the unique problems 
associated with the digital age that privacy theory moved beyond individual rights 
                                                 
90 See Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”, above n11; see also Brett Mason, Privacy without 
Principle, above n6 [according to Mason ‘before electronic information became common place-privacy 
was traditionally considered to include a person’s private personal details such as name, occupation, 
address and date of birth’]: at 10. 
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concerns.  Particularly evident during this period is the rise of computers, which made 
privacy erupt into a frontline issue around the world.91  Consequently privacy rights 
no longer focus on an individual’s right to control information at a community level 
or maybe even at the national level, the digital age demands that the world is now 
viewed through global eyes: 
The proliferation of communication technology has advanced at an unprecedented speed.  
In the first decade of the 21st century the number of people connected to the Internet 
increased from 350 million to more than 2 billion…By 2015, the majority of the world’s 
population will, in one generation, have gone from having no access to unfiltered 
information to accessing all of the world’s information through a device that fits in the 
palm of their hand.  If the current pace of technological innovations is maintained, most of 
the projected eight billion people on Earth will be online.92 
Privacy theory discourse highlights major concerns relating to the problem of 
adequately capturing the multidimensional meaning of privacy.  Privacy scholars in 
Australia and internationally continue to struggle with trying to define privacy and 
protect individual privacy, particularly in the present global context.  However a 
common denominator in privacy discourse includes the transformational power of 
technologies to drive privacy protection, the continuous reliance on ‘free flow’ 
information, and problems such as fear and surveillance associated with the ongoing 
‘war on terror’.93  
A further privacy concern includes the recognition of privacy as a human 
condition that helps develop and sustain the concept of ‘self’ as separate and unique, 
and its role in controlling the ‘unwanted gaze’ of others, particularly in a world that 
seeks to amplify and objectify encounters with it.94  Personal healthcare information 
                                                 
91 See chapter 3, pp70-98 detailing the evolution of technology. 
92 See Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age (John Murray, 2013) 4. 
93 See chapter 3, pp70-98 for discussion on transformational power of modern technologies.  
94 Ibid.  
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no longer enjoys a quasi ‘quarantined’ privacy status, as the ‘value’ of all information 
is fully realised and ‘pursued by capitalism and bureaucratic administration.’95 
In time some of these more pressing privacy questions will be resolved.  
Nevertheless it is how societies like Australia view the true social value of privacy and 
privacy protection that remains important to the continuing privacy debate in the 
modern world.  Because if privacy is a concept that is valued by the majority of citizens 
then it stands to reason that it will be considered important enough and adequately 
protected.  On the other-hand if it is perceived as an impediment of some kind, to say 
economic and technological advancement and progress, privacy rights may be in 
danger of being subsumed by advancing collective interests and maybe even be lost.  
Privacy is ultimately about ‘rights’ and how those rights are advanced, protected or 
compromised.  
The following chapter 5 progresses the thesis argument that the Australian 
Government needs to do more in order to adequately protect individual healthcare 
privacy in light of e-health development.  It does this by exploring the federal 
Government’s plan to introduce new legal, governance and technological measures to 
ensure the protection of Australian privacy rights in the new electronic healthcare 
regime. 
                                                 
95 See Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n1 [Morozov contends that as web 
companies and government respond to ever more information needs, ‘it is tempting to respond by 
passing new privacy laws or creating mechanisms that pay us for data’]: at 1.  Instead of passing new 
privacy laws, Morozov argues that what we need is privacy solutions that recognise the political 
agenda of the privacy debate and do not put democracy at risk: at 1; see also Martha Nussbaum, Not 
for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton University Press, 2010); see also chapters 1, 
pp1-37; chapter 3, pp70-98; chapter 6, pp184-237; , chapter 7, pp238-261- for further thesis details and 
discussion on privacy risks. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SHORTCOMINGS OF COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY 
LAW IN THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 
RIGHTS 
 
Laws which govern all aspects of life in Australia, including health and privacy areas 
are enacted by Parliament (State and Commonwealth) according to the distribution of 
legislative powers in the Commonwealth Constitution.1  In addition to statutes, there 
exists in Australia ‘judge-made’ or ‘common law,’ as well as international obligations, 
which impacts on modern health and privacy law.  This chapter explores the evolution 
of Australian health, e-health and privacy law.  It also highlights the growing 
significance of law in the modern digital economy era, arguing that law, despite its 
deficits, remains a vital mechanism for protecting human rights privacy and directing 
Australian health reform. 
The Australian health system ‘is a product of a diverse range of economic, 
technical, social, legal, constitutional and political factors, some of which are unique 
to Australia.’2  The health system is also a product of the historical evolution from the 
                                                 
1 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 100 (Imp); see John Devereux, Australian Medical Law 
(Routledge-Cavendish, 3rd ed, 2007).  The Commonwealth of Australia was formed in 1901.  The new 
Commonwealth (Federal) Parliament was assigned powers in respect of certain prescribed areas.  
Devereux argues that in order to understand the regulations of the delivery of health services in 
Australia then, recourse must first be had to the Constitution: at 117-119. 
2 K Wheelwright, “Commonwealth and State Powers in Health ─ A Constitutional Diagnosis” (1995) 
21 (1) Monash University Law Review 53: at 53, 55, 82-83. 
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provision of care based on private philanthropy to a system which is largely 
government funded and controlled.  The way health services are organised, funded 
and delivered is affected by the existence of federalism as a major organising principle 
for the distribution of power in Australia.3 
I. FEDERALISM ─ CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
In the late 19th century, the framers of the Constitution chose federalism as the 
preferred model for establishing the new Commonwealth Government.  
Federalism is described as a ‘two-tiered system of government in which the 
power is divided between the central and State or regional Government.’ 4  The 
degree of diversification of powers between State/Territory/Province and 
central Government may vary between different countries, such as the United 
States (U.S.) and Canada.  The Australian experience of federalism closely 
approximated that of the U.S.  Australian federalism was also deeply 
influenced by its British heritage and Westminster tradition of ‘responsible 
government’.5  The main issues facing the framers of the Constitution were how 
to reconcile national unity with the maintenance of ‘state rights’, and how best 
                                                 
3 K Wheelwright, ”Commonwealth and State Powers in Health”, above n2; see John Devereux, 
Australian Medical Law, above n1: at 118.  
4 Greg Taylor, “Federalism in Australia” [2010] Monash University Law Research Series 11; Martin Painter, 
Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reform in Australia in the 1990s (Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
Frank McGrath, Framers of the Australian Constitution: 1891 – 1897 Their Intentions (Frank McGrath 
Publisher, 2003). 
5 Frank McGrath, The Framers of the Australian Constitution, above n4: at 31; Tony Blackshield and George 
Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (The Federation Press, 5th ed, 2010) 35; see also Justice 
John Toohey, “A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?” (1993) 4 Public Law Review 158. 
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to balance the power between the smaller and larger states of the 
Commonwealth.6 
Additionally federation was to ‘harmonise’ a combination of local 
powers with local autonomy — ‘Our Australian concert is not one of unison, 
but of harmony, in which the difference of each part blends together in forming 
the concord as a whole.’7  Nevertheless, despite the founder’s earlier vision, 
over the years since the commencement of the Commonwealth there has been 
a gradual increase in Commonwealth control over the whole Australian 
economy.8  This occurred as a result of constitutional changes validating the 
inter-governmental Financial Agreement resulting from the Great Depression, 
and the Commonwealth take-over of the power to levy income tax from the 
States, as well as centralist interpretations of the Constitution favouring an 
increase in the economic power of the Commonwealth.9  
                                                 
6 See Justice John Toohey, ”A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?”, above n5: at 31; Frank McGrath, 
The Framers of the Australian Constitution, above n4: at 10-51; Clement MacIntyre and John Williams 
(eds), Peace, Order and Good Government (Wakefield Press, 2003); Australia Act 1986, s2(2) [‘It is hereby 
further declared and enacted that the legislative powers of Parliament of each State include all 
legislative powers … for the peace, order and good government of that State’]. 
7 Frank McGrath, The Framers of the Australian Constitution, above n4, cites Dr Cockburn (South 
Australia): at 17. 
8 Martin Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n4.  
9 Martin Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n4; see Blackshield and Williams, Australian 
Constitutional Law and Theory, above n5.  During the World War 11, the Commonwealth passed four 
Acts (Income Tax Act 1942 (Cth); States Grants (Income Tax Reimbursement) Act 1942 (Cth); Income Tax 
(War-time Arrangements) Act 1942 (Cth); Income Tax Assessment Act 1942 (Cth)), which forced the States 
to relinquish their income tax powers: at 205.  The validity of the tax arrangement was upheld in South 
Australia v Commonwealth (First Uniform Tax Case) (1942) 65 CLR 373 and reaffirmed in Victoria v 
Commonwealth (Second Uniform Tax Case) (1957) 99 CLR 575. See also J A La Nauze (ed), Federated 
Australia: Selections from Letters to the Morning Post 1900-1910 (Melbourne University Press, 1968).  The 
Uniform Taxes Cases bore out the prophecy of Alfred Deakin, that the States would find themselves 
‘legally free, but financially bound to the chariot wheels of the Central Government’: at 97.   
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The State governments’ powers to make laws are deemed limited only 
by the narrowly defined powers of the federal government as set out in the 
Constitution.  Section 107 of the Constitution provides that every power the State 
government had prior to Federation was to remain vested in them unless ‘it is 
by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State’.  
Under this arrangement, the Commonwealth can only exercise those 
‘enumerate’ powers conferred upon it by the Constitution – including the 
‘incidental’ power under s51(xxxix), which permits the Commonwealth to 
make laws with respect to matters ‘incidental’ to any ‘enumerate’ powers.  The 
specified, ‘listed’ Commonwealth powers are, with a few exceptions, 
‘concurrent’ powers and are set out in s51.  Because these powers are 
concurrent, the States may make laws in these areas as well as the 
Commonwealth,10 subject to s 109 inconsistency. 
The potential of existence of both federal and State laws on certain issues 
introduces the possibility of conflict between the laws as stated by each piece 
of legislation.  Section 109 of the Constitution provides that where both state 
and federal legislation exits, and there is inconsistency between the laws, 
Commonwealth law applies, and the State law is rendered invalid. 11  If a state 
                                                 
10 By virtue of s122 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth has a broad power to pass laws on any 
subject in relation to the Australian Territories.  
11 Commonwealth Constitution, s51 – there are 39 placita (decrees) in that section.  These include such 
matters as trade and commerce with other countries, for example, ‘external affairs’ (pl xxix); 
nationalisation and aliens (pl xix); corporation (pl xx); quarantine (pl ix); taxation (pl ii); marriage (pl 
xxi); and divorce and matrimonial causes (pl xxii). 
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chooses to refer one of its powers to the federal government, then the federal 
government can legislate on the matter.12  Additionally s128 requires an 
amendment to be passed by a referendum carried by the popular vote in a majority of 
states before the Constitution can be changed or amended.  As a consequence very few 
constitutional referendums have ever been successful; thus the Constitution remains 
relatively unchanged since its inception.13  
Also under s51 (xxix) the Commonwealth has the power to make laws in 
respect of ‘external affairs’.  This power enables the Commonwealth to implement 
obligations under ‘bona fide treaties’.14  However, the question has been robustly 
debated as to whether the mere entry of the Executive into an international Treaty, 
Agreement, or Convention, automatically gives the Commonwealth Parliament the 
power to legislate on the subject matter of such an instrument, in cases where the 
Commonwealth Parliament has otherwise no specific power so to legislate.15  Thus, 
                                                 
12 Commonwealth Constitution s51(xxxvii) provides that  the federal Parliament may validly pass laws 
on any matter referred to it by a State Parliament, even if it would otherwise lack the capacity to legislate 
on that subject.  
13 Section 128 of the Constitution incorporates the referenda mechanism, by which it can be altered.  
Since 1901, 44 proposals have been put to the people, with only eight succeeding.  Thus, the Constitution 
stands largely as it did in 1901.  See also Justice John Toohey, “A Government of Laws, and Not of 
Men?” above n5: at 158. 
14 See, for example, World Health Organisation (‘WHO’), International Health Regulations 2005, Art 2, 
reproduced in International Health Regulations (World Health Organization, 2nd ed, 2008) incorporated 
into Australian law by the National Security Act 2007 (Cth); United Nation (‘UN’), International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) 16 December 1966, [1980] ATS 23 (entered into force on 23 March 
1976).  Article 17 of the ICCPR provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or 
reputation’ ratified in Australia on 13 August 1980. 
15 See Hiliary Charlesworth, Madelaine Chiam, Devika Hovell and George Williams, “Deep Anxieties: 
Australia and the International Legal Order” (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 423; see also Frank McGrath, 
The Framers of the Australian Constitution, above n4: at 249; The Commonwealth v Tasmania (‘Tasmanian 
Dam Case’) (1983) 158 CLR 1.  In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Mason J touched upon the possible effect 
that the wide interpretation of the ‘external affairs’ power (s51 (xxix)) might have on the relationship 
between the Commonwealth and the States. 
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despite the international legal framework of the right to the ‘highest attainable 
standard of health’, which is central to many international conventions to which 
Australia is a signatory, there are no guarantees that the Australian government will 
legislate for compliance domestically, in accordance with its international 
obligations.16 
The Constitution gives no explicit power over health to the Commonwealth 
Parliament.  Some powers over these matters, however, inferentially lead to the 
Commonwealth Parliament having control over health-related matters.  This occurs 
because s51 (xxxix) allows the federal Parliament to pass legislation concerning 
matters ancillary to areas of federal legislative competence, for instance, s51 (xxiii) – 
invalid [disability] and old age pensions.17  In 1943 the federal Government attempted 
to introduce a scheme of pharmaceutical benefits.  The Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 1944 
(Cth) provided for the gratuitous provision of the public of certain medicines, it also 
imposed duties on Medical Practitioners and Pharmacists in relation to the 
prescription and supply of medicines.  In passing the Act the Commonwealth relied 
upon s81 of the Constitution which permits the Commonwealth ‘to make 
                                                 
16 See Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449 per Dixon J: at 478.  In this case Dixon J emphasised 
‘that the executive action of ratifying a treaty, thus committing Australia to it internationally, is effective 
only externally’; see generally Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) (‘Work 
Choices’).  Despite being concerned with Industrial Law this case provides a clear example of how the 
Government failed to protect fundamental workplace human rights standards, including ‘rights of 
association’ and ‘collective bargaining’ obligations: at 9.  At the time the federal Liberal Coalition 
Government chose to ignore international criticism about breaches of ‘standards’ and also refused to 
remedy the situation. 
17 See generally, National Health Act 1953 (Cth) ss85-105; National Health (Pharmaceutical Benefits) 
Regulations 1960 (Cth); Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 1947 (Cth) - the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) 
is a federal Government scheme operated under s51 (xxiiiA) of the Constitution, this scheme allows the 
Australian population to access a large range of prescription drugs at low cost.  It originally formed 
part of general social welfare legislation that followed World War II; see also Financial and Analysis 
Branch Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, The Australian Health Care System: An 
Outline (September 2000). 
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appropriations for the purposes of the Commonwealth’.18  The absence of clear 
legislative authority residing in the Constitution resulted in the State of Victoria 
opposing the legislation and claiming that s81 should be construed as only meaning 
purposes for which the Commonwealth Parliament has power to make laws under 
the numerous subsections of s51 of the Constitution.  
The majority of the High Court in Attorney General for Victoria (ex rel Dale and 
Ors) v Commonwealth and Ors (1945) (Pharmaceutical Benefits Case)19 held that the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 1944 (Cth), which provided for specified pharmaceutical 
benefits to be payable out of the trust account established under the National Welfare 
Fund Act 1943 (Cth), was ultra vires and therefore invalid. 20  Mr Justice Williams’ 
decision clearly articulated his condemnation of the federal Government’s 
interference with health issues:  
[The Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 1944] contains provisions affecting the relationship, contractual 
or under the laws of the State, of medical practitioners and patients, of customers and chemists 
… There is no express power under the Constitution for the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
to legislate upon this subject matter except to make laws with respect to quarantine and as 
incidental to the execution of any powers vested in the Commonwealth by the Constitution.21 
                                                 
18 See, Williams v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 23 (20 June 2012) (No 1); Williams v 
Commonwealth of Australia [2014] HCA 23 (19 June 2014) (No 2).  The questions of Executive power of 
the Commonwealth under funding and appropriation remains a current issue in Australia.  The 
William’s case examined whether the law providing for payments in circumstances identical to the 
Funding Agreement would be law with respect to s51 (xx) and s51 (xxiiiA) of the Constitution.   It was 
held by the Court that the making of payments by the Commonwealth was beyond the executive power 
in s61 of the Commonwealth.   
19 Attorney General for Victoria (ex rel Dale and Ors) v Commonwealth and Ors (1945) 71 CLR 237 (The 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Case); see also Gerard Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States 
and Territories (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 393; McIntyre and Williams, Peace, Order and Good 
Government, above n6: at 10. 
20 See particularly, the challenge on the meaning of ‘the purposes of the Commonwealth’ in the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Case (1945) 71 CLR 237; [1945] HCA 30.  However, the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Case yielded no majority view on the constitutional ‘limits’ of ‘the purpose’ of this meaning.  McTiernan 
J agreed with Latham CJ, holding that ‘the purposes of the Commonwealth are … as Parliament 
determines’: at 273.  Dixon J, with whom Rich J agreed, took a narrower view, but held the Act was 
invalid: at 268.  Starke and Williams JJ adopted a narrower view and held the Act invalid: at 282.  
21 The Pharmaceutical Benefits Case (1945) 71 CLR 237 per Mr Justice Williams: at 280. 
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As a result the scope of the Social Security power the Constitution was enlarged by 
way of Constitutional Referendum in 1946.  By adding the new s51 (xxiiiA) to the 
Constitution this gave the Parliament power to legislate with respect to:  
The provision of maternity allowances, widows’ pensions, child endowment, unemployment, 
pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefit, medical and dental services (but not so as to 
authorize any form of civil conscription), benefits to students and family allowances. 
The federal Government again enacted a Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 1947 (Cth) along 
similar lines to the 1944 Act.  Section 7A of the new 1947 Act provided that a Medical 
Practitioner could not provide medicines or appliances in the formulary or addendum 
except by using a form prescribed by the Commonwealth.  A penalty was provided 
for non-compliance.  The British Medical Association in Australia challenged the 
legislation on the basis it contravened the express words of s51 (xxiiiA) of the 
Constitution:22 
[W]henever medical or dental services are provided pursuant to a law with respect to the 
provision of some benefit, eg, sickness or hospital benefits, ‘the law must not authorise any 
form of civil conscription of such services …..’23 
 
The extent of the protection which these words gave to healthcare professionals was 
illustrated by the High Court’s decision in British Medical Association v Commonwealth 
(1949).24  In this case a majority of the court decided that s7A of the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Act 1946 (Cth) infringed the prohibition on civil conscription in that it obliged 
a medical practitioner to use a form supplied by the Commonwealth.25  However, in 
                                                 
22 Federal Council of the British Medical Association in Australia and Ors v The Commonwealth and Ors (1949) 
79 CLR 201. 
23 British Medical Association v Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201 per Williams J: at 286-287. See also 
Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1987) 162 CLR 271, 279. 
24 British Medical Association v Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201. 
25 Latham CJ, Rich, Williams and Webb JJ; Dixon and McTiernan JJ dissenting. 
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1980 the High Court qualified this expansive reading of the prohibition on civil 
conscription.  In General Practitioners Society of Australia v Commonwealth (1980),26 the 
court said that the clause prohibited:  
Any sort of compulsion to engage in practice as a doctor or dentist or to perform particular 
medical or dental services.  However, in its natural meaning it does not refer to compulsion to 
do, in a particular way, some act in the course of carrying on practice or performing a service, 
when there is no compulsion to carry on this practice or perform the service.27 
 
It held that Commonwealth legislation could compel any Medical Practitioner, who 
delivered a medical service, which was to be financed by the Commonwealth to 
deliver that service in accordance with a government specified procedure.  
As long ago observed by Hanks, ‘while this approach favours more scope for 
Commonwealth regulations of incidents of medical and dental practice, the extent of 
that regulation remains constrained’28 by a number of other propositions such as that 
it does not give the Commonwealth direct power to regulate the delivery of health 
services through the private sector.  Dixon J made the observation in British Medical 
Association v Commonwealth,29 that ‘[t]he purpose of the constitutional amendment was 
to enable the Commonwealth to provide the … services which para (xxiiiA) 
mentions.’30  Despite these limits it seems that the Commonwealth Parliament can 
                                                 
26 General Practitioners Society of Australia v Commonwealth (1980) 145 CLR 532 per Latham CJ and Webb 
J ‘[F]or all the above reasons, none of the provisions in question imposes any form of conscription 
contrary to s51 (xxiiiA) of the Constitution’: at 532. See also Danuta Mendelson, “Devaluation of a 
Constitutional Guarantee: The History of Section 51 (xxiiiA) of the Commonwealth Constitution” [1999] 
Melbourne University Law Review 14 [this article describes constitutional and socio-historical background 
to the referendum that led to the insertion of s51 (xxiiiA) into the Commonwealth Constitution]. 
27 General Practitioners Society of Australia v Commonwealth (1980) 145 CLR 532, per Gibbs J: at 557. 
28 P J Hanks, Constitutional Law in Australia (Butterworths, 1991) 372; see also Jennifer Clarke, Patrick 
Keyzer, James Stellios and John Trone, Hanks Australian Constitution Law: Material and Commentary 
(LexisNexis, 9th ed, 2012). 
29 British Medical Association v Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201. 
30 British Medical Association v Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201 per Dixon J: at 260. 
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impose regulations on those healthcare providers who choose to participate in 
Commonwealth-funded healthcare programs.  For example, it appears that Medical 
Practitioners who deliver Commonwealth funded services can be required to furnish 
accurate information to the Commonwealth’s Health Insurance Commission; they can 
be required to charge consumers in accordance with a schedule of prescribed fees; and 
they can be prohibited from using pathology services in which they hold financial 
interest.’31 
The appropriation and grants powers found in s81 and s96 has provided the 
constitutional foundation for welfare services programs extending beyond the area of 
healthcare provision.  For instance, the Australian Assistance Plan provided 
Commonwealth funds to support the development of community-based welfare 
programs across a diverse range of activities.  The Australian Assistance Plan (AAP) 
and its validity was considered in Victoria v Commonwealth (1975).32  Thus the broad 
interpretation of the case to the Commonwealth’s use of s81, confirmed by Mason CJ, 
Deane and Gauldron JJ in Davies v Commonwealth (1988), implies ‘that the 
Commonwealth Parliament could rely on the section to provide the constitutional 
basis for welfare service delivery programs in areas such as child care, legal aid and 
public housing.’ 33  It is also possible for the Commonwealth Parliament with the 
cooperation of the States (s96) ‘to support tied grants of “financial assistance” to the 
                                                 
31 See Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) ss10, 11; s20B; Pt 11A; see generally Private Health Insurance Act 
2007 (Cth); see also P J Hanks, Constitutional Law in Australia, above n28: at 371-372. 
32 Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338. 
33 Davies v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79: at 96. 
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States—grants which tied to specific purposes are nominated by the Commonwealth 
Parliament.’34 
The National Health Act 1953 (Cth) and the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) 
represent the two most significant pieces of Commonwealth legislation in the health 
care field.  The Health Care Act, in addition to allowing for the provision of a wide 
range of health services, provides conditions for receipt for health care in nursing 
homes, regulates the establishment of business of organisations providing medical 
and hospital benefits and provides for and regulates the payment of benefits for 
pharmaceuticals prescribed by Medical Practitioners.  Pursuant to s51 (xxiiiA) and s96 
of the Constitution, in 1984 the Commonwealth introduced Medibank, a universal 
scheme of health insurance now known as Medicare.35 
As outlined by the above analysis of Commonwealth Parliament regulatory 
powers in respect of healthcare, the balance of powers repose in the State 
Governments in Australia.  Under s96 of the Constitution, the federal Government is 
empowered to make grants to the States ‘on such terms as it sees fit’.  In practice, since 
the federal Government collects all the income tax in Australia, this gives the federal 
Government enormous leverage power to determine the scope of healthcare.  This 
practice can be evidenced by the federal Government funding the provision of 
                                                 
34 See Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (No 1) [2012] HCA 23 and Williams v Commonwealth of 
Australia (No 2) [2014] HCA 23. 
35 See Health Services (Medicare) Act 1973 (Cth).  The earlier Medibank program is now known as the 
Medicare program (see fn33, chapter 2).  Funding for Medicare and other healthcare projects is 
negotiated between the Commonwealth and the States under the States (Tax Sharing and Health Grants) 
Act 1981 (Cth).  Agreements between the Commonwealth and the States are incorporated in the Health 
Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), schedule 2; Health (Amendment) Act 1994 (ACT); Private Health Insurance Act 
2007 (Cth); Health Administration Act 1982 (NSW); Medicare Principles and Commitments Act 1994 (Qld); 
Health (Regional Boards) Amendment (Medicare Agreement) Act 1993 (Tas); Health Services Act 1988 (Vic).  
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hospitals in the States in return for certain undertakings by the States (e.g. Medicare 
agreements).  Consequently, Australian States have regulated by means of legislation, 
various aspects of health including access to patient records and patient complaints 
mechanisms, discussed later in the chapter. 
II. LIMITATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
A. Bill of Rights 
Despite embracing the U.S. constitutional model, the Constitution does not 
include a constitutional Bill of Rights and does not have an expressed ‘rights’ 
guarantee within the Constitution.36  This situation potentially complicates the 
question of human rights protection, such as privacy protection in 
contemporary society, because having a ‘written’ guarantee of rights 
embedded within the Constitution would provide an extra specific layer of 
important human rights protection mechanisms (such as privacy) that would 
be harder for any government in power to dismiss, ignore or override. 37 
                                                 
36 See Martin Flynn, Sam Garkawa and Yvette Holt, Human Rights: Treaties, Statutes and Cases 
(LexisNexis, 2011).  The Constitution of the United States (1789), Bill of Rights (1791) model undermines 
the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. ‘The conventions of a number of the States having at the time 
of their adopting the Constitution, expressed desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of 
powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added’: at 500; see also Bill of Rights 
Amendment I, II, III.  
37 See George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 1999): 
at 46.  For example, the model used for Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), the 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and other common law models can be overridden by Parliament, unlike 
the U.S. model; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Training Manual on Human Rights 
Monitoring (2001).  The Training Manual refers to human rights as: ‘Human Rights are universal legal 
guarantees protecting individuals and groups against actions by governments which interfere with 
fundamental freedoms and human dignity.  Human rights law obliges governments to do some things, 
and prevents them from doing others’: at Chapter 1 (extract) full text published at University of 
Minnesota Human Rights Library http://humanrights.law.monash.edu.au/monitoring-training.html 
(viewed 12/11/2012). 
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The absence of a ‘written’ guarantee of rights (outside the jurisdictions 
of Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory discussed below) does not 
imply that the common law (and any international treaty protections enacted 
in domestic law) does not provide important protections in addition to 
statutory protections in the area.  What it suggests is that modern-day reliance 
on ‘honourable men in a civilised society’,38 adherence to Parliamentary 
Sovereignty, common law, administrative law and international instruments 
in Australia may not prove robust enough, and thus may fail to fully deliver 
the necessary protection of individual privacy rights and protection required 
in the modern information economy.39   
Since the 1970s, alongside judicial considerations, other areas of review, 
such as in the context of administrative law, have developed in an attempt to 
deal with the absence of constitutional guarantees in human rights claims. 40  It 
is recognised that public officials and government agencies possess wide and 
often discretionary powers which profoundly affect the rights and liberties of 
                                                 
38 Geoffrey de Q Walker, “Dicey’s Dubious Dogma of Parliamentary Sovereignty” (1985) 59 Australian 
Law Journal 276 in Blackshield and Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory, above n5: at 102.  
According to Walker, the picture of British constitutionalism presented in the late 19th century by A V 
Dicey (1835-1922) proved extremely influential in Australia: at 102.  Dicey argued that the fundamental 
principles of British constitutional law were representative democracy, parliamentary sovereignty and 
the rule of law: at 100; see George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution, above n38.  
Williams’ provides an analysis of common law and international law human rights development, also 
asks is statute law a de facto Bill of Rights?: at 10-23. 
39 See Lyria Bennett Moses, “Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up With Technological 
Change” [2007] University of New South Wales Law Research Series 21: at 1; see also George Williams, 
Human Rights under the Australian Constitution, above n38: at 47; Mathias Klang and Andrew Murray 
(eds), Human Rights in the Digital Age (Routledge, 2006); see also Dan Jerker B Svantesson, “Privacy, The 
Internet and Transborder Data Flows: An Australian Perspective” (2007) 19 Bond Law Review 1.  
40 Ben Saul, ‘Australian Administrative Law: The Human Rights Dimension’ in Matthew Groves and 
H P Lee (eds), Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007): at 50. 
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people in Australia.41  On an abstract level, some consonance exists in 
fundamental values underpinning human rights law and administrative law, 
as both systems of law aim to restrain arbitrary or unreasonable government 
action and help to protect the rights of individuals. 42  Similarly, they share a 
concern for fair and transparent process, the availability of review of certain 
decisions and the provision of effective remedies for breaches of the law. 43   
A defining feature of Australian administrative law is the important role 
played by non-judicial bodies, such as tribunals and the Commonwealth and 
various state and territory ombudsman, in relation to complaints about the 
actions of agencies of the executive government (ministers, departments, 
agencies and individual officials who work within these bodies). 44  However, 
the limitations of human rights and administrative law have traditionally been 
primarily directed towards controlling ‘public’ power rather than interfering 
in the ‘private’ realm.45  
                                                 
41 Groves and Lee, ‘Australian Administrative Law: The Constitutional Matrix’ in Matthew Groves, 
Australian Administrative Law, above n40: at 1.   
42 Greg Weeks, ‘The Use and Enforcement of Soft Law by Australian Public Authorities’ (Paper 
Presented at the Practice and Theory of Soft Law Academic Symposium, Peking University, 9 July 
2011).  
43 Ben Saul, ‘Australian Administrative Law: The Human Rights Dimension’ in Groves and Lee, 
Australian Administrative Law, above n40: at 51. 
44 See Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of Government Action (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2012) 22; Roger 
Douglas, Administrative Law (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2004): at 2, 279. 
45 See Ben Saul, ‘Australian Administrative Law’ in Groves and Lee, Australian Administrative Law, 
above n40: at 55; Andrew Murray, ‘Should States have a Right to Information Privacy?’ in Klang and 
Murray, Human Rights in the Digital Age, above n39: at 191; see also Roger Brownsword, ‘Biotechnology 
and Rights: Where are we Coming From and Where are we Going?’ in Klang and Lee, Human Rights in 
the Digital Age, above n39: at 219; see generally Huw Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of 
Personality (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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In the new digital information economy, given the rapidity of 
technological change, this privileged view towards the private realm does not 
necessarily take into account the ever-shifting boundary between the public 
and private spheres.46  As the ALRC pointed out in Serious Invasions of Privacy 
in the Digital Era and Copyright and the Digital Economy , there is an urgent need 
for reform in this area.47  An additional concern is that, under international 
human rights treaties, only ‘states parties’ expressly owe legal obligations to 
protect rights.48  As a consequence private persons are not parties to human 
rights treaties, which do not have ‘direct horizontal effects’ in international 
law and are not regarded as substitutes for domestic law. 49  
According to Carney, ‘Australia is a parched landscape so far as 
purchase for a legal form of any right to health is concerned,’ which results in 
                                                 
46 ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Discussion Paper 80 (March 2014).  According to 
the ALRC, Discussion Paper 80 particular attention has been directed to ‘the rapidly expanded 
technological capacity of organisations not only to collect, store and use personal information’: at 21-22 
and 37-41, but also ‘to track the physical location of individuals, to keep activities of individuals under 
surveillance’: at 41-42, ‘to collect and use information posted on social media, to intercept and interpret 
the details of telecommunications and emails’: at 40-41, and ‘to aggregate, analyse and sell data from 
many sources’: at 21-23; see also ALRC, Review of Australian Privacy Law: Discussion Paper 72 
(September 2007): at 335-337, 599-610, 667-670; see also Brett Mason, Privacy without Principle 
(Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2006) 9-12. 
47 ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Issues Paper 43 (2013): at 14; ALRC, Copyright and 
the Digital Economy: Summary Report 122 (2013): at 6. 
48 Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale and Sarah Williams, International Law (Oxford University Press, 
5th ed, 2014); Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2002) [Cassese recognises 
sovereign states as the legitimate parties to treaty obligations]: at 46. 
49 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, Australian Treaty Series 1945 No 1 
(entered into force 24 October 1945, entered into force for Australia 1 November 1945); the Security 
Council; the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the International Court of Justice Article 92.  The 
UN created the Commission on Human Rights in 1946.  This body was replaced by the Human Rights 
Council in 2006, by General Assembly Resolution 60/251.  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
No 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant UN 
DocCCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13,18 (26 May 2004). 
139 
 
a human rights deficit.50  It has no federal or state Bill of Rights, apart from 
Victoria and Australian Capital Territory51 and even these do not extend to 
socio-economic (so-called ‘positive’) rights.  Adverse rulings can be overridden 
by state and territory Parliaments.52  Recent calls for a national Bill of Rights 
were rejected by government.53  Instead, a Senate Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Human Rights now has power to examine and report on existing 
or proposed legislation and subordinate legislation (such as statutory 
regulations and instruments) for human rights compatibility , and human 
rights assessment must accompany any new Bills or allowable instruments. 54  
While the Senate Joint Committee on Human Rights represents a very positive 
step, it is posited that the lack of an embedded, written, human rights 
guarantee in Australia leaves its citizens in a vulnerable position55 as compared 
                                                 
50 Terry Carney, ‘Human Rights and Health Law’ in Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott 
(eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2014): at 114; see also Terry Carney “Neoliberal 
Welfare Reforms and “Rights” Compliance Under Australian Social Security Law” (2006) 12(1) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 223-255. 
51 See Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT); Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).  
52 Terry Carney, “Neoliberal Welfare Reforms”, above n50.   
53 See Bryan Horrigan, “Reforming Rights-Based Scrutiny and Interpretation of Legislation” (2012) 
37(4) Alternative Law Journal 228-232. 
54 See Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2012 (Cth) s 7(a)-(b).  The purpose of the Human Rights 
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act is to establish a committee on human rights and other related purposes.  
For example, the Australian Government amendments to the Personally Controlled Electronic Health 
Records Act 2012 (Cth) (‘PCEHR Act’) and Personally Controlled Health Records (Consequential 
Amendments) Act 2012 (Cth) ‘are compatible with human rights and freedoms, recognised or declared, 
in the international instruments listed in s 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act’. 
55 See George Williams, A Bill of Rights for Australia (New South Publishing, 2000) [Williams discusses 
s 51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution, in relation to the ability to pass laws on the topic of any race]: 
at 2; see also Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337 (‘Hindmarsh Island Case’) [where the federal 
Government sought to persuade the High Court of Australia that the Commonwealth had power to 
pass laws that discriminated against Australians on the basis of their race, in order to pass the 
Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (Cth) (supported by Northern Territory, South Australia and Western 
Australia)].  This Act would override the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 
(Cth).  The proposition of the Hindmarsh Island Case was that if the federal Parliament wished, it could 
enact racist laws, as the framers of the Constitution allowed ‘the government to do and which Edmund 
Barton did with the creation of ghettos’: at 9.  This proposition ‘is abhorrent to most Australians and is 
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with human rights progress made by other nations around the world, such as 
the UK and Canada.56  
In summary, in the last century Australia’s federal system has 
undergone a fundamental reshaping.  State and Commonwealth Governments 
have found themselves, often against their desires, cooperating ever more 
closely on joint schemes of policy and administration.57  As a consequence there 
has been a shift in the rules of the game of federal politics towards 
collaborative, as distinct from arm’s-length, patterns of intergovernmental 
relations.  While conflict and political disharmony remain commonplace, State 
and Commonwealth Ministers and officials have been more and more ‘to be 
observed sitting around the table and devising joint schemes of policy and 
administration that emphasise national uniformity and the removal of 
interstate barriers and differences.’58 
                                                 
inconsistent with accepted community values, such as equity under the law’: at 9.  The Hindmarsh Island 
Case demonstrates, very clearly, that fundamental freedoms are often solely dependent on the ‘wisdom 
and good sense of our legislators’ and that this can easily be taken for granted: at 9. 
56 See also ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 22, 32; Richard Stone, Civil Liberties and Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2010) [Stone examines the protection of human rights and 
liberties within the British Constitution].  The United Kingdom has recognised a cause of action for 
invasion of privacy in respect of misuse of private information, which some judges have described as a 
tort: Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457; see chapter 1, pp16-34 for a discussion of United Kingdom, 
Canadian and New Zealand human rights law. 
57 See Martin Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n4.  The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
and the Special Premiers Conference (SPC) was formed between 1990 and 1997: at 10-11.  On January 1993 
an agreement was reached under which the states would refer the power to the Commonwealth to 
apply uniform legislation for national competition policy, etc.  It was agreed that the Council of the 
Federation would provide for a ‘permanent, deliberative forum’.  ‘The States and Territories also agreed 
to the promotion of continuing reform and efforts to improve the structural efficiency of both the 
Australian Federation and the economy’: at 42.  
58 See Martin Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n4. Bob Hawke (Prime Minister – 1983-1991), ‘New 
Federalism’ in 1990 ‘was born out pragmatism rather than principle, by offering the states a platform 
on the new national stage’: at 11.  An important stimulus to the agenda of the ‘new federalism was that 
overlap and duplication was futile’: at 11.  The delegates at the Constitutional Conventions ‘failed to 
appreciate that simply naming powers was not tantamount to defining the ambit of those powers and 
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Nevertheless this process of cooperating collaborative change is 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and as such it is not a simple matter of 
a new set of rules, structures or habits of mind supplanting the old. 59  With the 
2013 election of the federal Coalition Government, there is a chance that the 
process of collaborative federalism will be halted as other interests such as 
devolution, commercialisation and privatisation policies are advanced.  The 
federal government’s recent cooperative policy reversal is further highlighted 
by the abolition, in the 2014 federal Budget, of significant intergovernmental 
governing bodies such as COAG’s monitoring body and the plan to cut funding 
and rationalise independent authorities, such as the OAIC.60   
Despite the Budget not specifically targeting previous EPR and e-health 
government commitments, overall funding was drastically reduced and is to 
be revisited over the next two years by a proposed White Paper Report.61  
Media comments by the then federal Health Minister, Peter Dutton,62 to the 
                                                 
that the world had changed and brought new roles and functions for government such as new 
technology’: at 13.  Bob Hawke’s rhetoric in his 1990 speech (see Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (DPMC) (1994), Commonwealth-State Ministerial Councils: A Compendium, ‘focused repeatedly 
on ‘the national interest’ and sharing a commitment to a single national identity’ (‘one nation’): at 13; 
see also James Warden, “Federalism and the Design of the Australian Constitution” (1992) 27 Australian 
Journal of Political Science 143 [According to Warden, ‘Yet within this splendid unity, we have imposed 
on ourselves a burden of different rules and regulations and requirements which needlessly weighs 
against the tremendous advantages we have as a nation-continent’]: at 152.  Hawke’s call for 
intergovernmental cooperation and reduced ‘fragmentation’ supported ‘a fundamentally centralist 
view of government cooperation and harmonisation’: at 152.  The central assumption was ‘that 
uniformity and national standards were desirable national outcomes and that interstate coordination 
and other processes often lead to harmonisation’: at 20-21.  
59 Martin Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n4: at 153. 
60 See Federal Budget 2014 published 13 May 2014; new federal Budget 2015 released (not included). 
61 See Ben Grubb, ‘Abbott Government Uncomfortable with Freedom of Information Laws: Opposition’ 
Sydney Morning Herald (Australia), 14 May 2014, 15; Andrew Bracey, ‘Rich Should Cough Up: Dutton’ 
Medical Observer (Australia) 28 February 2014, 18; see also Federal Health Budget 2012-2013 for health 
services. 
62 Since 2015, the new federal Health Minister is Sussan Ley.  
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Australian Medical Association (AMA) and Australasian College of General 
Practitioners (ACGP) indicate that future e-health funding and the ongoing 
priority of EPR implementation (and by extension, healthcare privacy regimes) 
is not looking particularly favourable at this point in time.63  
The merits and disadvantages of this ideological shift can only be 
guessed at, but a ‘devolution’ policy at this late stage will further complicate 
the unity of Australian health and privacy laws initiated by previous federal 
governments.64  History assures us that state and territory governments will 
respond to this new development by combatively arguing about resource 
allocation.  It is also likely that states and territories will embrace a more 
individual and idiosyncratic legislative approach in an already overly complex 
area.65   
Consequently, ‘the future contours of the federal system remain 
uncertain and contested.’66  The new collaborative institutional forms and 
patterns may or may not take a lasting grip on Australian federal government, 
especially in light of Australian advocates of economic imperatives espousing 
free global market policies.67 
                                                 
63  Andrew Bracey, ‘Rich Should Cough Up’, above n61: at 18.   
64 Martin Painter, ‘The Persistence of Arm’s-Length Federalism’ in Martin Painter, Collaborative 
Federalism, above n4: at 187.  
65 See George Palmer and Stephanie Short, Health Care and Public Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 4th ed, 
2010) 10-11. 
66 Martin Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n4: at 188. 
67 See, for example, Australian Coalition Government, The Coalition’s Policy on E-Government and Digital 
Economy (September 2013); Australian Coalition Government, The Coalition’s Policy to Support Australia’s 
Health System (August 2013); Australian Government, Budget 2014-15 (13 May 2014). 
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Because of the constitutional framework, it is accurate to suggest that Australia 
does not have one national health system, but rather eight state and territorial health 
systems, intersecting with various Commonwealth policy and program objectives.68  
Thus, the legal mechanisms surrounding health (and healthcare privacy) systems 
‘represent a complex array of legislation, regulations and other legal instruments as 
well as health-related intergovernmental agreements.’69  It is within this historical and 
complex (and increasingly global) picture, based upon reliance on ‘fragmented’ 
federalism, that modern privatised and commercialised healthcare and privacy rights 
are developing.70  
In Australia privacy protection is primarily located in legislation rather than 
through common law development.  The ALRC first considered the protection of 
privacy through tort law in 1979—Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy.71  It also 
considered privacy in a later 1983 report, Privacy: ALRC 22, declining to recommend 
the creation of a general tort of invasion of privacy.72  In a much later 2007 Discussion 
Paper 72, the ALRC proposed that a cause of action for ‘a serious invasion of privacy 
                                                 
68 See Palmer and Short, Health Care and Public Policy, above n65: at 17; see White, McDonald and 
Willmott, Health Law in Australia, above n50: at 16.  See also the landmark case of Secretary, Department 
of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (1992) 175 CLR 218 (‘Marion’s Case’), [as to the relevance 
of human rights considerations to a decision about whether to sterilise an intellectually impaired 
minor].  
69 See White, McDonald and Willmott, Health Law in Australia, above n 50: at 73; Janine McIlwraith and 
Bill Madden, Health Care and the Law (Thomas Reuters, 6th ed, 2014);  Bill Madden and Janine McIlwraith, 
Australian Medical Liability (LexisNexis, 2008); see also Sonia Allan and Meredith Blake, The Patient and 
the Practitioner (LexisNexis, 2014). 
70 See Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC), Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18 (2010): at 
149; NSWLRC, The Offices of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, Report No 125 (2009); Office of 
the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
on Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on Serious Invasions of 
Privacy in the Digital Era (9 July 2012).  
71 ALRC, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy: ALRC 11 (1979); see ALRC, For Your Information: 
Australian Privacy Law and Practice: Report 108 (May 2008): at 2537. 
72 ALRC, Privacy: ALRC 22 (1983): at 1081. 
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should be recognised by the legislature in Australia.’73  However the main impetus for 
introducing Commonwealth privacy legislation was originally intended to implement 
Australia’s obligations under the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 17, as well as under the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data (OECD Guidelines).74  Article 17 of the ICCPR states that: 
1. No person shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interferences with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.75 
Further to ratifying the ICCPR on 13 August 1980, the Office of the United Nations 
(UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights in 1988 released General Comment 
Number 16.  This paper discussed how ‘the UN interprets art 17 and how it should be 
promoted through domestic law.’76  As a result, all member State authorities are 
‘required to adopt legislation and other measures to give effect to the prohibition 
against such interferences and attacks as well as to protection of this right.’77  The 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) makes it clear that the legislation was intended to implement 
Australia’s obligations relating to privacy under international obligations.  The Act 
only concerned itself with public sector privacy and was restricted to information 
privacy, ‘therefore [the Act] was not a full implementation in domestic law of the 
                                                 
73 ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n46, Proposals 5-1 to 5-7. 
74 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980); see also ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n46.  [’The OECD 
Guidelines were developed to facilitate the harmonisation of national privacy legislation of OECD 
member countries, while upholding human rights, to prevent interruption in the international flow of 
personal information’]: at 109. 
75 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n15.  
76 ALRC, Report 108, above n71: at 2539. 
77 ALRC, Report 108, above n71 quotes UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: at 2539. 
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meaning of art 17.’78  In addition to the ICCPR and Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy, the Second Reading Speech to the Privacy Bill also referred to complying with 
the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data.79  
The Privacy Act represents ‘the main federal privacy legislation regulating 
Australia’s key information privacy law’.80  The Act provides several paths for 
individuals where there has been a breach of the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs), 
as discussed later in the chapter.  Other Commonwealth legislation such as the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) and Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 (Cth) also prohibits the disclosure of certain information by telecommunications 
providers.81  Likewise, state and territory legislation creates information privacy 
requirements similar to those found under the Privacy Act.82  However, as noted by 
the ALRC in 2013, this level of privacy protection may not be enough—Serious 
Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Discussion Paper 80—stating that ‘[t]he challenge 
for lawmakers is how to ensure that law remains relevant, appropriate and workable 
in the light of technological advances.’83  Additionally, ALRC—Discussion Paper 80—
also reported that:  
The divergence in the recommendations of previous inquiries into privacy law, significant 
developments in other jurisdictions, concerns expressed in the community, continuing gaps in 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 ALRC, Report 108, above n71: at 4; see also Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 28 January 1981, Council of Europe, CETS No 108, (entered into 
force on 1 October 1985). 
80 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46. This proposal is discussed later in the chapter. 
81 Statutory protection such as Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) and self-regulatory bodies (Charter 
of Press Freedom (2003)) through industry codes and guidelines may also help enforce privacy. 
82 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 40-41. 
83 ALRC, Report 108, above n71: at 1.  
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Australian common law and statute law protecting privacy, and new problems raised by the 
use of rapidly developing technologies … require detailed consideration by the ALRC …84 
The following chapter analysis traces the evolution of Australian privacy law and 
practice by exploring common law healthcare privacy and confidentiality evolution, 
Commonwealth statutory privacy development, state/territory privacy regulations, 
as well as recent trends in PCEHR adoption and legislation.  The legal discussion 
concludes by highlighting the ongoing significant role that law occupies in privacy 
protection in the modern digital information era.   
III. COMMON LAW PRIVACY DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
There is no common law right to privacy in Australia,85 though the door has been 
opened for the development of such a right.86  The lack of a common law right in this 
area can be traced back to the 1937 decision of the High Court in Victoria Park Racing 
and Recreational Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (‘Victoria Park’),87 where it was held that a tort 
of breach of privacy should be rejected in Australian law.  Australian courts applied 
this precedent for over 60 years and it was not until 2001 that the High Court, in 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (‘Lenah Game Meats’),88 
                                                 
84 Ibid 1-2; see also ALRC, Serious Invasion of Privacy in the Digital Era: Final Report 123 (3 September 
2014). 
85 See ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n46: at 280-282; ALRC, Report 108, above n71: at 2539; ALRC, 
Discussion Paper 80, above n46: 49-50; chapter 1, pp26-34 [where it is also noted that in the past there 
has been no common law right to privacy in New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom].  
However, in New Zealand, a tort of invasion of privacy has been recognised in P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 
591: at 140 and Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34: at 31-32, 140.  In Canada ‘a tort protecting privacy 
seems to be developing’ ― see Motherwell v Motherwell (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 62; Burnett v The Queen in 
Right of Canada (1979) 94 DLR (3rd) 281; Ontario (Attorney-General) v Dieleman (1994) 117 DLR (4th) 449; 
Aubry v Duclos (1996) 141 DLR (4th) 683. 
86 ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n46: at 280-281; ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 49; see 
also Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Parliament of Australia, Issues Paper: A 
Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of Privacy (2011). 
87 (1937) 58 CLR 479; [1937] ALR 597. 
88 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
147 
 
departed from its earlier decision.  In obiter dicta, the High Court indicated that its 
previous decision in Victoria Park89 did not stand in the path of the development of a 
cause of action for invasion of privacy.90  Although they were provided with the 
opportunity to advance a cause of action for invasion of privacy in Lenah Game Meats, 
Gleeson CJ, along with Kirby J, nevertheless expressed caution about this ‘new’ tort, 
partly because of ‘the lack of precision of the concept of privacy’91 and suggested that: 
Certain kinds of information about a person, such as information relating to health, personal 
relationships, or finances, may be easy to identify as private; as may certain kinds of activity, 
which a reasonable person, applying contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would 
understand to be meant to be unobserved.  The requirement that disclosure of information or 
conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in many 
circumstances a useful practical test of what is private.92 
After examining recent international developments on the tort of invasion of privacy93 
in Lenah Game Meats, Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Caudron J concurred), 
considered that privacy interests94 are located in ‘the fundamental value of personal 
autonomy’ which could only be invoked by a natural person.95  Accordingly, because 
the complainant was an artificial legal person (Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, a limited 
                                                 
89 (1937) 58 CLR 479; see ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n47: at 281.  
90 (2001) 208 CLR 199 per Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whom Gaudron J concurred. 
91 (2001) 208 CLR 199 per Gleeson CJ: at 325-326. 
92 (2001) 208 CLR 199: at 325. 
93 See ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n46: at 282-283; ALRC, Report 108, above n 71: at 2540-2541. 
‘American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) §§ 625B-652E.  Privacy torts have been well-
established in the United States for many decades, although the protection they provide is limited by 
the constitutional protection of free speech in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.’  
‘Some states such as California, have also introduced a statutory tort of invasion of privacy’ (California 
Civil Code § 1708.8): at 2566.  ALRC, Report 108, ibid 2543.  In the United Kingdom, ‘the tort of invasion 
of privacy is well developed’: at 2543; discussed in chapter 1, pp26-34.  ‘The United Kingdom has 
developed extensive legal protection of privacy by extending the equitable action for breach of 
confidence (see Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457), under the influence of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK).’  This Act requires ‘the courts to give effect to the protection of rights and freedoms set out in arts 
8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.’ ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46.  The 
Canadian provinces ‘of British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, Quebec and 
Saskatchewan have enacted statutory torts for invasion of privacy’: at 23.  
94 Such as reputation or commercial interests. 
95 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 256. 
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liability company), it was decided that the case was the wrong vehicle in which to 
explore the creation of a possible new tort based upon invasion of privacy.96  
Since the High Court discussion in Lenah Game Meats,97 the common law has 
remained under-developed.  One of the classic problems with the development of law 
in a common law system is that it must await the arrival of a suitable dispute which 
raises the relevant issue.  In the meantime, two lower Court decisions — Grosse v 
Purvis98 and Jane Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation99 — allowed common law 
recovery for breach of privacy.  Despite these lower court decisions moving towards 
the recognition of the tort of invasion of privacy, ‘no appellate court has confirmed the 
existence of this tort.’100  
                                                 
96 (2001) 208 CLR 199, per Gummow, Hayne and Gaudron JJ: at 256-258. 
97 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
98 [2003] QDC 151  [the Queensland District Court was required to consider the offence of the stalking 
of Alison Grosse (plaintiff) by Robert Purvis (defendant)]; see also ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above 
n46: at 49-50. 
99 [2007] VCC 281 [this case concerned an ABC radio news broadcast that identified, by name and 
suburb, a female victim of rape in marriage, an offence under s4(1A) of the Judicial Proceedings Reports 
Act 1958 (Vic)].   
100 See ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 49-50; see also John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v 
Hitchcock [2007] NSWCA 364, where McColl JA noted that ‘Australian common law does not recognise 
a tort of privacy’: at 364; see Giller v Procopets [2004] VSC 113, 187-189 (Gillard J).  In June 2013, the 
ALRC was given Terms of Reference for an inquiry into the protection of privacy in the digital era 
(ALRC, Discussion Paper 80 (2014)).  The ALRC, New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform 
Commissioners have, at various times, recommended a statutory cause of action for serious invasions 
of privacy.  See ALRC, Report 108, above n71; NSWLRC, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009), where 
this was the major recommendation of the report; Victorian Law Reform Commission (‘VLRC’), 
Surveillance in Public Places: Final Report No 18 (2010), Recommendations 22-24.  The VLRC identified 
and recommended two causes of action, the first dealing with misuse of private information, which 
would be relevant to the health field.  The contents of the recommendations are yet to be considered by 
government; also see George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution, above n38  
[Williams identifies that common law in Australia affords ‘bare protection of fundamental freedoms of 
the Australian people where they have not been abrogated by legislation’]: at 16. 
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In Grosse v Purvis,101 Skoien DCJ, drawing on the dicta of the High Court in 
Lenah Game Meats,102 held that conduct which constituted the offence of stalking under 
s 359B of the Queensland Criminal Code103 would also be actionable as a civil claim for 
invasion of privacy.  Skoien DCJ adopted the view that a civil action for damages, 
based on the actionable right of an individual person to privacy, was a ‘logical and 
desirable’ step104 and held that the defendant’s action in stalking the plaintiff over a 
prolonged period of time constituted an actionable breach of privacy.  His Honour, 
referring to Lenah Game Meats,105 observed: 
The starting point of an analysis of the relevant elements of a possible tort of invasion of privacy 
is the decision of the High Court … The judgment is a very lengthy one which deals with a 
variety of issues … However in my view within the individual judgments certain critical 
propositions can be identified with sufficient clarity to found the existence of a common law 
cause of action for invasion of privacy.106 
In Jane Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,107 the County Court of Victoria also 
accepted the emergence of a tort of invasion of privacy.  Hampel J held that, in 
addition to breaching a statutory duty owed to the plaintiff by virtue of the Judicial 
Proceedings Reports Act 1958 (Vic), the defendant broadcaster and employees were 
liable in equity for breach of confidentiality and in tort, for invasion of privacy for the 
‘unjustified publication of personal information.’108   
                                                 
101 [2003] QDC 151. 
102 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
103 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). 
104 Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151, 442; see also ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 49.  
105 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
106 [2003] QDC 151, 442. 
107 [2007] VCC 281. 
108 [2007] VCC 281; see also ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 49-50. 
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 Since Lenah Game Meats,109 a number of superior and lower courts have rejected 
privacy claims.110  Commenting on Grosse v Purvis,111 Heerey J in Kalaba v 
Commonwealth held that ‘the weight of authority was against the proposition that the 
tort is recognised in common law.’112  Similarly, in Chan v Sellwood; Chan v Calvert, 
Davies J described the position on the existence of the tort at common law as ‘a little 
unclear’.113  In Gee v Burger, McLaughlin J considered the matter ‘arguable’.114 
In Giller v Procopets115 and in Moore-Mcquillan v Work Cover Corporation,116 
neither judgment considered Grosse v Purvis117 in their deliberation and decisions.  
Katzmann J noted, in Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd, ‘that it would be 
inappropriate to deny someone the opportunity to sue for breach of privacy on the 
basis of the current state of common law’.118  In Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority 
(NSW),119 which did not involve issues directly related to privacy, Callinan J of the 
                                                 
109 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
110 See ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 49-50. 
111 [2003] QDC 151; see ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, ibid. 
112 [2004] FCA 763 (8 June 2004) 6. 
113 [2009] NSWSC 1335 (9 December 2009) 34. 
114 [2009] NSWSC 149 (13 March 2009) 53; see ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 50. 
115 (2008) 24 VR 1 [the defendant videotaped his sexual encounters with the plaintiff (his former wife) 
who was unaware of the filming.  The defendant showed the videotapes to some people and distributed 
copies to others, including relatives and friends].  One of the causes of action pleaded by the plaintiff 
was a claim for invasion of privacy.  The Supreme Court of Victoria rejected the claim, stating that ‘the 
law has not yet developed to the point where the law in Australia recognises an action for breach of 
privacy’. See also ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 49-50. 
116 [2007] SASC 55 [the Supreme Court of South Australia considered the appellant’s claim for breach 
of privacy, which was kept under video surveillance by a private investigator engaged by WorkCover].  
In this case, the Court accepted the current law, as stated in Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, that 
‘there is no common law right to privacy in Australia.’ See also ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: 
at 49-50.  
117 [2003] QDC 151. 
118 [2010] FCA 720, 290.  However Katzmann J refused leave to the plaintiff to amend her pleadings to 
include such a claim citing various grounds. See also ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 49-50. 
119 [2006] HCA 27. 
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High Court, in obiter dicta, reiterated his statement in Lenah Game Meats that ‘the time 
was ripe for consideration by the law of a cause of action for invasion of privacy.’120 
Basten J in Maynes v Casey, referring to Lenah Game Meats121 and Giller v 
Procopets,122 stated that ‘these cases may well lay the basis for development of liability 
for unjustified intrusion on personal privacy’.123  In Saad v Chubb Security Australia Pty 
Ltd, Hall J refused to strike out a claim for breach of confidence holding that a ‘cause 
of action for breach of confidence based on invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy would 
be futile or bad law’.124  
Additionally, in Sands v State of South Australia, Kelly J said that ‘the ratio 
decidendi of the decision in Lenah is that it would require a further development in 
the law to acknowledge the existence of a tort of privacy.’125  Further, in the recent case 
of Doe v Yahoo! 7 Pty Ltd, Smith DCJ stated ‘it seems to me there is an arguable case of 
invasion of privacy…I would be very hesitant to strike out a cause of action where the 
law is developing and is unclear.’126 
A Causes of Action at Common Law 
Despite the ‘door’ being left open for a tort of privacy, there are a number of existing 
causes of action at common law127 which may, in some cases, be evoked in order to 
                                                 
120 [2006] HCA 27 cites the decisions in Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967; [2003] 1 All ER 1087; [2006] 
QB 125: at 216; see also HRH Prince of Wales v Association of Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 522 (Ch). 
121 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
122 (2008) 24 VR 1; see ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 50. 
123 [2011] NSWCA 156 (14 June 2011) Allsop P agreed with Basten J: at 35. 
124 [2012] NSWSC 1183, 1183. 
125 [2013] SASC 44 (5 April 2013) 614; see ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 50. 
126 [2013] QDC 181 (9 August 2013), 310-311; see ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, ibid. 
127 See Harold Luntz and David Hambly, Torts: Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 7th ed, 2011).  The 
characteristics that distinguished trespass from the action on the case were, firstly, that the interference 
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indirectly protect personal privacy.128  These actions include: the tort actions for 
trespass to the person,129 trespass to land130 and the tort of nuisance;131 the tort of 
defamation,132 and an equitable action for breach of confidence.133  For instance, the 
tort of trespass to land is capable of providing direct protection against invasions of 
privacy by those who enter private property, without consent, to install surveillance 
                                                 
with the plaintiff’s person, land or goods must be direct.  It must be part of the defendant’s act and not 
merely a consequence of it.  It is from the action on the case that torts such as negligence and nuisance 
are derived: at 627-628.  The tort of trespass to the person consists of battery and assault, and false 
imprisonment.  The tort of battery is committed by directly and intentionally bringing about harmful 
or offensive contact with the person of another.  In Mallette v Shulman (1991) 2 Med LR 162 (CA Ontario), 
[the plaintiff was given a blood transfusion after a serious car accident this was held to be a battery]; 
Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; [1962] HCA 63 [where K sued F, a hardware shop assistant, in 
battery].  K had purchased goods at the shop and later returned them.  F accused him of failing to pay 
for the goods).  The tort of assault is committed by intentionally creating in another an apprehension 
of imminent harmful or offensive contact.  False imprisonment is committed by directly and 
intentionally confining the plaintiff within an area fixed by the defendant, without legal authority (see, 
for example, Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742; 15 ER 668 Court of Queen’s Bench). 
128 See ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 20, 43.   
129 Luntz and Hambly, Torts: Cases and Commentary, above n127 [the essential elements of trespass to 
person such as Assault and Battery and false imprisonment are outlined]: at 649-662. 
130 Ibid  [the tort of trespass to land lies only where there is a ‘direct’ invasion of land in possession of 
the plaintiff.  Trespass to land is committed by ‘directly and intentionally (or, it would seem, 
negligently) entering or remaining upon, or causing some object to come into contact with, land in the 
possession of another, without consent of the person in possession or other legal justification or 
excuse’]: at 680.   
131 Ibid  [whereby the tort of trespass to land lies only in a ‘direct’ invasion of land, an ‘indirect’ 
interference with the possessor’s use and enjoyment of land is in nuisance]: at 731; Private nuisance ― 
see, for example, Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1961] 2 All ER; [1961] 1 WLR 683 Queen’s Bench 
Division [where the plaintiff complained of activities relating to the defendants’ nearby oil depot].  
132 See Des Butler and Sharon Rodrick, Australian Media Law (Thomas Reuters, 4th ed, 2011).  Defamation 
occurs where one person communicates, by word, photographs, video, illustrations or other means, 
material which has the effect or tendency of damaging the reputation of another; see, for example, 
Gorton v Australian Broadcasting Commissioner (1973) 22 FLR 181, 25 [where the then Prime Minister sued 
in an Australian Capital Territory court on the basis of matter broadcast simultaneously in New South 
Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory].  See also McIlwraith and Madden, Health Care 
and the Law, above n69: at 328; Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 327 [This case involved 
the newspaper publication of an article claiming that Mrs Whitaker, the plaintiff in Roger v Whitaker 
(1992) 175 CLR 479 (Rogers Case) had been ‘blinded by a surgeon’s negligence’ defamed Dr Rogers, the 
defendant surgeon.  The 1992 High Court Rogers Case concerned medical negligence, resulting in 
damages being awarded to the Plaintiff (Mrs Whitaker). However, following the Rogers Case, a separate 
court action between Mrs Whitaker and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) was commenced].  This 
later tax case resulted in the defamatory newspaper article and subsequent defamation action by Dr 
Rogers against the publishers (Rogers V Nationwide New Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 327).  
133 See McIlwraith and Madden, ‘Patient Privacy and the Duty of Confidentiality’ in McIlwraith and 
Madden, Health Care & the Law, above n69: at 311, 312.  
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equipment,134 photograph, film, and record or interview the occupants of the land.135  
The modern action for trespass to land ‘will provide a remedy for invasion of privacy 
only incidentally when it happens to be otherwise available.’136  Alongside trespass to 
property protection rights, there is also the tort of trespass to the person which 
includes assault, battery and false imprisonment actions.137  Significantly, ‘the 
common law maintains that any unwanted interference with a person’s body or the 
creation of fear of such interference is an actionable wrong.’138  According to the law 
of trespass to person no such action (touching) ‘may be taken without the person’s 
consent’, other than in limited situations.139  This right afforded by the law to obtain 
an individual’s consent may provide an ‘indirect’ way of protecting bodily privacy 
rights.  
Private nuisance, on the other hand, offers limited protection against breaches 
of privacy.  It does not provide protection against casual observation, filming or 
recording outside the property.  Private nuisance may be used in a situation where 
                                                 
134 See Bernstein v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479; [1977] 2 All ER 902 [The defendant’s took a 
single aerial photograph of Lord Bernstein’s country house in Kent]; see Bathurst CC v Saban (1982) 2 
NSWLR 704 [‘Peep through my window from afar and I may be remediless; put a foot over my 
boundary while you look and the invasion of my dignity can be taken into account in damages awarded 
for your trespass’]: at 708; see also Luntz and Hambly, above n127. ‘On a limited scope of the law of 
torts for protecting privacy’: at 74.  
135 See Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457, 456 (Young J) [The plaintiff sought 
an injunction to restrain the defendant from televising a videotape allegedly made in the course of a 
trespass on the plaintiff’s property]; Emcorp Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1988] 2 Qd R 
169, 176 (Williams J) [arose out of a visit by a television crew, which filmed an interrogation of the 
plaintiff’s staff by a reporter who alleged that the plaintiff had committed a criminal offence]. 
136 Luntz and Hambly, Torts: Cases and Commentary, above n127: at 74. 
137 Ibid [Trespass to Person]: at 627. 
138 McIlwraith and Madden, Health Care & the Law, above n69: at 71. 
139 Ibid; exceptions to obtaining consent would include situations where there is an emergency: at 79-
80. 
154 
 
the plaintiff is seeking to protect some private interest, such as indirect interference 
with the possessor’s use and enjoyment of land.140 
Defamation action,141 and other innominate torts in certain situations, may 
incidentally provide a remedy for breach of privacy.142  According to Luntz, ‘the 
dignitary interest in one’s person and the interest in privacy may also be incidentally 
protected by the tort of defamation, but primarily the remedy is there to protect the 
interest in reputation.’143  However, since 1 January 2006 the defence of justification in 
New South Wales has been changed so that truth alone constitutes a defence under 
the Defamation Act.144  New provisions were adopted as part of uniform defamation 
legislation among the states and territories.145  This change makes defamation less 
effective in providing privacy protection to health-related information.146 
                                                 
140 Raciti v Hughes (1995) 7 BPR 14 [the court, in this case, granted the plaintiffs’ application for an 
injunction against an adjoining occupant to prevent the operation of video surveillance equipment, 
which overlooked their backyard].  The defendant was monitoring every activity of neighbours, 
including the use of bright light was held to amount to nuisance.  Some courts have used private 
nuisance to deal with telephone harassment, considering it as invasive of a person’s privacy. 
141 See generally Butler and Rodrick, Media Law in Australia, above n132: at 25. 
142 In Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press Limited (unreported, NSWCA, 13 October 1993) [a 
photograph was taken of a well-known sports person in the shower and published in a magazine].  The 
New South Wales Supreme Court held that publication of the photograph defamed him.  Traditionally, 
s15 of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) required that the defendant show that the imputation was not 
only substantially true, but also that it relates to a matter of ‘public interest’.  This requirement (‘public 
interest’ and ‘public benefit’) was described as ‘the closest the law of defamation comes, as presently 
framed, to protect privacy, at least in those jurisdictions which so limit the defence of truth’: see Johnston 
v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1993) FLR 307, 312 (Higgins J). 
143 Luntz and Hambly, Torts: Cases and Commentaries, above n127: at 75; see also ALRC, Unfair 
Publication: Defamation and Privacy: ALRC 11 (1979). 
144 See, for example, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s25. 
145 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 135; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 22; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) 
s25; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 23; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s25; 
Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s25. 
146 Bruce Clarke, Brendan Sweeney and Mark Bender, Marketing and the Law (LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2011).  
Another possible tort relating to privacy is ‘passing off’.  This tort involves the appropriation of the 
name, image or likeness of a person without his or her consent: at 173.  This is arguably a form of 
invasion of privacy to the extent that his or her interest in the exclusive use of his or her own identity 
is infringed.  However, this tort is limited to commercial situations and is of limited value to healthcare 
155 
 
The innominate tort of intentional infliction of nervous shock and psychiatric 
illness was discussed in the English case of Wilkinson v Downton147 and the Australian 
case, Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey.148  However, many invasions of privacy will not 
result in psychiatric damage and unless it is extended to mental distress, Wilkinson v 
Downton149 may prove of limited value in the context of privacy protection.150 
B Breach of Confidence 
In a search for a robust theory of privacy it is essential to explore the role of 
confidentiality.  Although confidentiality and privacy are often seen as 
interchangeable, they have developed somewhat independently and are different 
concepts.  Confidentiality is concerned with security of information.  The concept is 
linked ‘to personal dignity and patient autonomy and is an equitable and legal concept 
                                                 
privacy.  In Henderson v Radio Corporation Pty Ltd (1960) 60 SR NSW 576, the plaintiff succeeded in 
obtaining an injunction to restrain the defendant from releasing a record of ballroom dancing music, 
which displayed the plaintiff’s photograph on the cover without consent. 
147 [1897] 2 QB 57; see also Coultas v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1886) 12 VLR 895 [Mary Coutas 
was being driven in a buggy by her husband, her husband drove through a railway crossing as a train 
was approaching, she suffered a miscarriage as a result of the shock]; for tort development, see also 
Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316; Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234; Giller v Procopets [2008] VSCA 236 
[The husband videotaped himself with Ms G having sexual intercourse on at least 10 occasion without 
her knowledge]; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 54 ALR 417 [The plaintiff developed severe anxiety 
and depression after it was revealed to her that her husband had been severely injured in a collision].  
Two aspects of the rule in Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 potentially limit its application to cases 
involving invasion of privacy.  The first aspect relates to its uncertain scope and the second aspect 
requires that the plaintiff must show that his or her reaction to the defendant’s conduct is accompanied 
by some ‘physical injury’.  Consequently, mere distress will not suffice. 
148 (1970) 125 CLR 383; [1971] ALR 253 [the plaintiff was working with two electricians who were 
horribly burnt at work and as a result, the plaintiff suffered a schizophrenic episode].  In Wilkinson v 
Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 [the defendant, by way of a practical joke, told the plaintiff that her husband 
had met with an accident and was seriously injured].  ‘As a result, the plaintiff suffered a violent 
nervous shock with serious physical consequences, which the defendant was held liable for.’  The basis 
of the decision is that ‘If a person deliberately does an act of a kind calculated to cause physical injury 
for which there is no lawful justification or excuse and in fact causes injury to that other person he is 
liable in damages’. 
149 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57. 
150 Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 [involved the strip search of a mother and son for drugs 
on a prison visit]. 
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long recognised in the law, whereas privacy is a more modern notion, primarily based 
on information protection.’151  Characteristically, ‘the duty to maintain confidence is 
also expressed through various authorities, including professional codes and 
charters,152 international obligations153 and common law precedents.’154   
The duty to preserve confidence in healthcare arises because of ‘the specific 
relationship between the professional and the patient and only to information that is 
confidential in nature.’155  Confidential information is information that is not generally 
or publically known, but is known to a restricted number of individuals.156  Similarly, 
                                                 
151 See White, McDonald and Willmott, Health Law in Australia, above n50: at 301; see also Graeme 
Laurie, Genetic Privacy (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 212; A-G v Guardian Newspaper (No 2) [1990] 
1 AC 109 (the Spycatcher Case) [where Lord Goff summarised the law regarding confidential 
information]; Seager v Copydex [1967] 1 WLR 923 per Lord Denning established the principle that ‘a 
person who received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it … the person must 
not make use of it to the prejudice of the person who gave it without obtaining consent’: at 658; see 
Furniss v Fitchet [1958] NZLR 396 [a husband and wife were having marital difficulties and attended 
the same doctor who wrote a report about Mrs Furniss]; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 
[these two cases were dealt with by the HC and were about a psychiatric illness as a reaction to an 
erroneous statement by a police officer in a traffic accident report]. 
152 See Australian Medical Association (AMA), Code of Ethics (2006), 1.1 (12) under ‘Patient Care’, 1.1 
(13) is also relevant to the duty ─ ‘Upon request by your patient make available to another doctor a 
report of your findings and treatment’; see also Health Care Complaints Commission v Khan [2008] 
NSWNMT 15 [where an enrolled nurse was prosecuted by the Health Care Complaints Commission 
for inappropriate disclosure of patient personal information]; see generally, Nurses Registration Board 
of New South Wales, Professional Conduct (New South Wales Registration Board, 2001). 
153 See Declaration of Geneva, Editorial Revision, 2006. 173th Council Session of the World Medical 
Organisation, Divonne-les-Bains; European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950) (European Convention) as amended by Protocol 11 (1998) and Protocol No 14 (2010) opened for 
signature 13 May 2004, Council of Europe Treaty Series No 194 (entered into force 1 June 2010), 
European Convention of Human Rights, International Code of Medical Ethics Declaration of Geneva (1950); 
Z v Finland (1997) 25 EHRR 371 (ECtHR); see, for example, MS v Sweden (1997) 45 BMLR 133 (ECtHR). 
154 See Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services & Health 
(1990) 22 FCR 73 at 121 (Gummow J recognised that equity acts can protect confidential information); 
Furniss v Fitchett [1958] NZLR 396; Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [1986] 1 NZLR 
513; Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; Moira Paterson, Freedom of Information and Privacy in Australia 
(LexisNexis, 2005): at 17; L McRae, “Withholding Medical Records without Explanation: A Foucauldian 
Reading of Public Interest” (2009) 17(3) Medical Law Review 438. 
155 Allan and Blake, The Patient and the Practitioner, above n69: at 300. 
156 See A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109; see also Kim Forrester and Debra Griffiths, 
Essentials of Law for Health Professionals (Elsevier Australia, 2009); McIlwraith and Madden, Health Care 
and the Law, above n69: at 311; see also Danuta Mendelson, “The Duchess of Kingston’s Case, the Ruling 
of Lord Mansfield and Duty of Medical Confidentiality in Court” (2012) 35 International Journal of Law 
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once information moves from the private sphere to the public sphere, it loses the 
necessary quality of confidence.  Thus ‘trade secrets, business practices and 
government data, as well as personal information can be confidential.’157  As a result 
of extensions (such as contracts) in the law, the equitable action for breach of 
confidence is a powerful legal weapon to protect individuals from the unauthorised 
disclosure of confidential information.158  ‘There does not have to be a contract 
between people for there to be an obligation to maintain the confidentiality of 
information.’159  
The issue of the future development of an action for a breach of confidence to 
protect a person’s privacy was foreshadowed by Gleeson CJ in ABC v Lenah Games 
Meat, as a venue that could be further developed by courts.160  Gleeson CJ stated that 
‘an equitable action for breach of confidence may be the most suitable legal action for 
protecting people’s private information from disclosure’, noting that ‘[t]he law should 
                                                 
and Psychiatry 480: at 480-489.  However, there are a number of common law immunities, including 
Public Interest Immunity under s 130 of the Uniform Evidence Act 2008 (Cth) and at common law, under 
the principle espoused in Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 per Gibbs ACJ: at 38.  The scope of the 
public interest in confidentiality of health records was also discussed in Royal Women’s Hospital v 
Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 22, which was an appeal from Royal Women’s Hospital 
v Medical Practitioners Board [2005] VSC 225 (affirmed) [the case involved termination of a suicidal 
mother’s pregnancy at 32 weeks, after ultrasound tests indicated that the foetus had skeletal dysplasia].  
Although the Medical Practitioner’s Board was empowered to investigate the matter, the Royal 
Women’s Hospital resisted production of the mother’s medical records.  The hospital argued, inter alia, 
public interest immunity from disclosure of medical records. 
157 Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 213. 
158 See McIlwraith and Madden, Health Care and the Law, above n69: at 318. 
159 An action for breach of confidence can be brought where: the information is confidential in nature; 
it has been imparted in circumstances giving rise to an obligation of confidence; and it is used without 
authority to the detriment of the person who gave it; see Argyll v Argyll [1965] 1 All ER 611 [where the 
Duke of Argyll sought to sell information about the private life of his estranged wife, the Duchess of 
Argyll, to a newspaper]; Giller v Procepets [2008] VSCA 236 [where Mr P videotaped himself and Mrs G 
having sexual intercourse on at least 10 separate occasions, without her knowledge]. 
160 See ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 180. 
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be more astute than in the past to identify and protect interests of a kind which fall 
within the concept of privacy.’161  Further stating that: 
[E]quity may impose obligations of confidentiality even though there is no imparting of 
information in circumstances of trust and confidence.  And the principle of good faith upon 
which equity acts to protect information imparted in confidence may also be invoked to restrain 
the publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained … For 
reasons already given, I regard the law of breach of confidence as providing a remedy, in a case 
such as the present, if the nature of the information obtained by the trespasser is such as to 
permit the information to be regarded as confidential.162 
 
Generally, in Australia the traditional claims for breach of confidence will rely 
upon a number of established legal remedies including: ‘injunctions for the 
anticipated or continuing breach of confidence; compensation for economic loss due 
to the breach or an account of anticipated profits arising from the breach.’163  These 
remedies are usually about confidence relating to commercial, government or 
personal information.  However, in Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: 
Discussion Paper 80, the ALRC highlighted a number of limitations that existed in the 
present law.  Noting that where the breach of confidence in relation ‘to personal 
information or private information has occurred and an injunction is futile, the 
consequence that a claimant is most likely to suffer is emotional distress,’ rather ‘than 
harm in the way of economic loss.’164  This proposition was supported by Tilbury who 
acknowledged that ‘the very object of the action [for invasion of privacy] will be to 
                                                 
161 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 per Gleeson CJ: at 
40. 
162 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 180; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats 
Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 per Gleeson CJ: at 34, 39, 40, 55. 
163 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 182. 
164 Ibid. 
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protect against [mental or emotional distress], at least in part.’165  While the limited 
circumstances for the recovery of compensation ‘for ‘mere’ emotional distress has 
been a ‘perennial issue for the law torts’’,166 the issue of ‘recovery in equity has not 
been raised in Australia until the case of Giller v Procopets.’167 
As discussed, the tort actions of trespass to land, trespass to person, nuisance 
and breach of confidentiality do not provide protection from unauthorised and 
serious intrusions into a person’s private activities in numerous situations, so they are 
of limited value in relation to invasion of privacy protection.168  In addition, based on 
these tort actions,169 tort does not provide a remedy for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress which does not amount to psychiatric illness.170  While the 
equitable action for breach of confidence can provide effective legal protection to 
prevent the disclosure of private information, it is currently less effective after a 
wrongful disclosure, because it is unclear whether a plaintiff may recover 
compensation for emotional distress.171  There is continuing uncertainty as to the 
                                                 
165 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, per Michael Tilbury, ‘Coherence, Non-Pecuniary Loss and the 
Construction of Privacy’ in Jeffrey Berryman and Rick Bigwood (eds), The Law of Remedies: New 
Directions in the Common Law (Irwin Law, 2010) 127 cited by ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 
182.  
166 Ibid; see Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1 (Neave JA and Ashley JA, Maxwell P dissenting); see 
Barbara Mc Donald, ‘Tort’s Role in Protecting Privacy: Current and Future Directions’ in James 
Edelman, James Goudkamp and Degeling (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomas Reuters, 2011).  
167 ALRC, ibid; Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. 
168 Trespass to person requires bodily contact, or a threat of such contact, to be actionable.  Both trespass 
to land and nuisance protect only the occupier of the relevant land, and the former requires an intrusion 
onto the land.  
169 Trespass, nuisance and defamation. 
170 Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417 
171 See Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1; Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 QB 57; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v 
Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 71; see ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n47. Lord Cairns’ Act (21 & 22 Vict 
c27) 1858, where a court has power to grant an injunction or to order specific performance, the court 
may award damages to the party injured: at 183; Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s68.  
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relevant principles to be applied when a court is considering whether to grant an 
interlocutory injunction to restrain the publication of true, private information.172  
Unless the area is developed by the courts the present situation creates a ‘gap’ and a 
measure of ‘uncertainty’ in the law.173  
This legal ‘uncertainty’ in personal privacy protection is especially pertinent in 
the digital information era given the current federal Coalition Government’s 
reluctance to clarify the situation by adopting statutory protection.  It was 
recommended by the ALRC and other state independent bodies,174 that the 
Commonwealth Government consider enacting a statutory cause of action and that 
this be contained in a new, stand-alone, invasion of privacy Act, the general consensus 
being that the likely direction of the future development of the common law is 
uncertain.175  It is also acknowledged that although the breach of confidence is well 
supported by the law, realistically pursuing litigation in equity and tort courts is an 
                                                 
172 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80; above n47; see also George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian 
Constitution, above n28 [provides an analysis of the gaps between the constitutions of the Australian 
states and the self-government Acts of the territories, for example, Northern Territory (Self-Government) 
Act 1978 (Cth) s50 and the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) s23 – provide that 
the respective parliaments cannot legislate for the ‘acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms’.  
This mirrors the limitation on Commonwealth power found in s51 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution.  
None of the state constitutions contains a like provision]: at 8 
173 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 47-49. The ALRC, ‘recognises a number of significant 
‘gaps’ or uncertainties in existing privacy protection.’  For example, ‘further uncertainty, or at least 
some debate, as to the relevant principles to be applied when a court considers whether to grant an 
interlocutory injunction’ to restrain certain behaviour: at 47. 
174 See NSWLRC, Invasion of Privacy: Report 120 (2009); Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance 
in Public Places: Report 18 (2010).  
175 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n47: at 20, 50; see also, from the chapter discussion, that invasion 
of privacy has been recognised by two lower court decisions: Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 and Jane 
Doe v Australian Broadcasting Board [2007] VCC 281.  Both cases were settled before the appeals, by the 
respective defendants, were heard. 
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expensive, time consuming and complicated option, which is likely beyond the 
general reach of most ordinary citizens.176  
Consequently, the general consensus is that the future development of the tort 
of invasion of privacy is uncertain and remains in legal ‘limbo’.177  However, what can 
be determined from the case law is that an expanded judicial view of modern-day 
privacy protection is not a forthcoming option in Australia unless Parliament says so.  
The judiciary in Australia is still impeded by the narrow interpretation of privacy 
concepts and strict Parliamentary sovereignty rules.  As a consequence, ‘it is fair to 
say that this area has not significantly progressed since Lenah Game Meats in 2001.’178  
It can be observed ‘that the concern in protecting and keeping a person’s health 
records private and confidential is one shared by the whole patient community.’179  
This apprehension emanates from the fact that a person’s health information might 
affect a person’s treatment in the employment or insurance context, as well as a widely 
held belief that healthcare information is essentially ‘private’ in nature.180  Moreover 
it can also be illustrated that international and Australian citizen frustration relating 
to adequate individual privacy protection in the digital economy represents a serious 
problem that needs to be adequately addressed by law.  This is evidenced by recent 
worldwide publicity supported by influential local (and international) members of 
society, calling for the United Nations to urgently intervene by declaring a Bill of 
                                                 
176 See Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2002).  
177 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 193. 
178 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
179 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46: at 319. 
180 ALRC, Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic Information in Australia: Report 96 (2003) for 
discussion of the basis of patients’ concerns about disclosure of their health information: at 3.37-3.39. 
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Digital Rights to Protect Privacy to ensure citizen rights; this demonstrates the political 
and social reach of the privacy protection problem.181  
To conclude, it has been the introduction of legislation, rather than judge-made 
changes, which has sought to address ‘gaps’ in coverage.182  As noted by Allan:  
[T]hese changes have created questions about the relationship of the common law protections 
to the statutory regime, particularly those associated with the exceptions that permit access to 
information under the privacy legislation and which appear to conflict with the duties of 
confidentiality.  The problem is complicated by the fact that much of the relevant legislation 
preserves the common law duties as they exist.183 
If the ‘coverage’ issue remains ‘unaddressed’ it will continue to be a source of 
confusion for custodians of health information.184 
IV.       COMMONWEALTH PRIVACY STATUTORY PROTECTION 
As mentioned earlier, the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) represents the main federal privacy 
legislation regulating the handling of personal information and outlines certain 
safeguards that government, private sector organisations and individuals must 
observe when collecting, storing, using and disclosing personal information, 
including health information.  The Privacy Act purports to ‘make provision to protect 
                                                 
181 See Bridie Jabour, ‘Australian Authors Join Call for UN Bill of Digital Rights to Protect Privacy’ The 
Guardian (United Kingdom), 10 December 2013, 1.  The petition to the United Nations states that mass 
surveillance treats everyone like a suspect, overturning the presumption of innocence and making the 
individual ‘transparent’, while the state operates in secret.  “A person under scrutiny is no longer free; 
a society under surveillance is no longer a democracy”: at 2.   
182 See Breen v Williams (1995) 186 CLR 71 per Gaudron and McHugh JJ. [Highlighted a number of ‘gaps’ 
in the way in which common law deals with healthcare information]: at 107.  
183 Allan and Blake, The Patient and the Practitioner, above n69: at 318; see, for example, Information Act 
2002 (NT) s55; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) s39; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT); Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Vic) s35. 
184 Allan and Blake, The Patient & the Practitioner, above n69: at 318. 
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privacy of an individual, and for related purposes.’ 185  The Act is generally the 
principal mechanism for protecting public and private sector privacy in Australia.  
The objective of the Privacy Act is to balance the protection of the privacy of 
individuals with the interests of public and private sector entities, in carrying out their 
lawful and legitimate functions and activities.  It enables the personal information of 
an individual to be collected, used and disclosed in certain circumstances,186 and 
recognises that collection, use, storage and sharing of personal information, including 
its release without an individual’s knowledge or consent, can amount to interference 
with privacy.187  In addition, the Act details the conditions where this type of 
interference with individual privacy is authorised by law.188   
However, section 3 of the Privacy Act makes it clear that the Australia 
Parliament did not intend to ‘cover the field’ and override state and territory laws 
relating to the protection of personal privacy and states: 
It is the intention of the Parliament that this Act is not to affect the operation of a law of a State 
or Territory that makes provision with respect to the collection, holding, use, correction, 
disclosure or transfer of personal information … and is capable of operating concurrently with 
this Act. 
                                                 
185 Allan, et al, The Patient & the Practitioner, above n69: at 318. 
186 See, for example, APP 3 and APP 6. 
187 See Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy 
Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012, 2012.  
188 Ibid.  This authorisation is based upon legitimate objectives such as ‘imminent threat to life’ and 
must be ‘reasonable, necessary and proportionate’: at 15-17.  Such activities include the promotion of 
the government’s service delivery, taxation, law enforcement and national security objectives, and the 
needs of business to offer services to the public.  The overall context of the Privacy Amendment 
(Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth) takes into account the changing advances in technology, 
modern electronic healthcare systems and aims towards flexibility of the system.  
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Other limitations to the scope and operation of the Privacy Act are found in s 16E, 
which specifically excludes personal, family or household affairs from the operation 
of the Act: 
Nothing in the National Privacy Principles applies to: (a) collection, holding, use, disclosure or 
transfer of personal information by an individual; or (b) personal information held by an 
individual; only for purposes of, or in connection with, his or her personal, family or household 
affairs. 
The Act itself provides a range of definitions of terms used in the legislation such as 
‘sensitive information’ and ‘health provider’.189  It includes Privacy Codes that clarify 
codes of conduct and public interest determinations.  It also sets out the functions of 
the Information Commissioner, including his or her role in complaint handling.190  The 
Act applies to acts done and practices engaged in by agencies or organisations191 and 
contain a range of exemptions and exceptions.192  An ‘exemption’ applies where a 
specified entity or class of entity is not required to comply with the privacy principle 
(e.g. small business exemption), whereas an ‘exception’ applies where a requirement 
                                                 
189 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1) defines ‘sensitive information’ to ‘mean (a) information or an opinion 
about an individual’s: (i) racial or ethnic origin; or (ii) political opinions; or (iii) membership of a 
political association; or (iv) religious beliefs or affiliations; or (v) philosophical beliefs; or (vi) 
membership of a professional or trade association; or (vii) membership of a trade union; or (viii) sexual 
preferences or practices; or (ix) criminal record; but is also personal information; or (b) health 
information about an individual; or (c) genetic information about an individual that is otherwise health 
information.’ 
190 The overall structure of the Privacy Act is set out as follows ― the definition and interpretation of 
terms are set out in Part II.  Part III deals with information privacy such as interference with privacy (s 
13) and interference with privacy by organisations (s 14).  Part IIIA requires reporting of privacy 
breaches and contains the Privacy Codes.  The function of the Information Commissioner is set out in 
Part IV and privacy investigations are located in Part V.  Part VI deals with public interest 
determinations.  The obligation of confidence is found in Part VIII.  Part IX outlines miscellaneous 
events, such as the guidelines about genetic information (s 95AA) and Regulations (s 100).  
191 Privacy Act s6(1), which defines ‘organisations’ as an individual, a body corporate, a partnership and 
any other unincorporated association or a trust, but specifically excludes many private sector small 
business operators and registered political parties’. 
192 Privacy Act sets out exemptions and exceptions. 
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in the privacy principles does not apply to any entity in a specified situation or in 
respect of certain conduct.193  
Over the years the Privacy Act has been amended by a raft of amending 
legislation.  For instance in December 2000, the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 
2000 (Cth) was enacted by federal Parliament, extending coverage of the Act to most 
private sector organisations.  At the time, the amendments included the National 
Privacy Principles (NPPs), which provided the benchmark for industry codes.194   
Subsequently, the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 
(Cth) amended the Privacy Act by introducing a ‘unified’ set of privacy principles, the 
Australian Privacy Principles (APPs)195 that now supersede the previous IPPs and 
NPPs and cover both public and private sector information obligations.196  The fact 
that there is now a single set of privacy principles (APPs) applying to private and 
public sphere at the Commonwealth level, potentially removes one source of 
confusion under the previous system.   
                                                 
193 Privacy Act s 7. 
194 Commonwealth Parliament, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (No 15749, 
Parliamentary Debates, 12 April 2000) (D Williams, Attorney-General).  At the time, the aim of the NPPs 
was to encourage private sector organisations and industries, which handled personal information, to 
develop and implement privacy codes of practice (see Privacy Act s 18B, Privacy Codes). These have 
now been replaced by the APPs. 
195 The key to the new legislative scheme is the 13 APPs, which set-out the legal obligations of both 
public and private sector for collection, storage, access and disclosure of personal information. In March 
2014, the APPs replaced the 11 IPPs and 10 NPPs.  The 13 APPs broadly deal with the collection, use 
and disclosure of personal information, and rights to access and corrections.  The 13 APPs consist of: 1) 
open and transparent management of personal information; 2) anonymity and pseudonymity; 3) 
collection of solicited personal information; 4) dealing with unsolicited information; 5) notification of 
the collection of personal information; 6) use and disclosure of personal information; 7) direct 
marketing 8) cross-border disclosure of government related identifiers; 9) adoption, use and disclosure 
of government-related identifiers; 10) quality of personal information; 11) security of personal 
information; 12) access to personal information; 13) correction of personal information. 
196 See APPs, above n195. 
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It also introduced general provisions which rewrite the credit reporting 
provisions and provide for more comprehensive credit reporting, together with new 
provisions on privacy codes.  Further, it clarified and strengthened the functions of 
the Australian Privacy Commissioner.197   
The Government views the Privacy Act as the ‘cornerstone of the privacy 
protection framework’198 and represent a:  
 Streamlined and harmonised set of obligations that draw on the existing principles; ensure 
that standards also take into account an individual’s reasonable expectations around the 
handling of their information and to ensure that regulations strike a balance between the 
public’s and individual’s interest in efficient and effective service delivery and public safety.199  
 
V. STATE AND TERRITORY STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT IN HEALTH 
AND INFORMATION PRIVACY 
All state, territory and federal jurisdictions possess, to a lesser or greater extent, 
authority to govern and make laws in Australia.  Constitutional limitations, which 
often result in law fragmentation, constitute a significant problem for harmonising 
state, territory and federal healthcare privacy protection.  This is because the 
constitutional framework does not have one national health system; it has multiple 
systems.  Recognising jurisdictional limitations and the impact of state and territory 
health and privacy laws provides essential, foundational bases for fully 
                                                 
197 Department of Parliamentary Services, Mary Anne Neilsen Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy 
Protection) Bill 2012 Law and Bill Digest No. 20, 2012-2013, 18 September 2012, 5-6.  
198 Joe Ludwig, Cabinet Secretary, Companion Guide to Australian Privacy Principles (Department of 
Parliamentary Services No 6, Parliament of Australia, 2006); see also, OAIC, Australian Privacy Principles 
Guidelines: Privacy Act 1988 (OAIC Privacy Fact Sheet 17, date of initial publication: February 2014, 
revised 1 March 2014).  
199 Department of Parliamentary Services, Mary Anne Neilsen, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy 
Protection) Bill 2012, Law and Bill Digest No. 20 of 2012-2013, Parliamentary Library, 18 September 2012. 
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understanding ongoing federal involvement, progress and challenges in the new, 
national, electronic healthcare privacy regime in Australia.200  
At the state and territory level, Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales, 
Queensland and the Northern Territory have separate privacy legislation.201  In 
addition some states and territories such as Australian Capital Territory, New South 
Wales and Victoria have introduced specific legislation dealing with health records.202  
However, the states and territories share commonality in respect of information 
privacy rights.  These jurisdictions traditionally provide a regime for the responsible 
collection and handling of personal information.203  Alongside privacy legislation each 
jurisdiction has freedom of information legislation that deals with accessing 
information held by state or territory government agencies and organisations. 204  
The complexity of the legislation surrounding information privacy in different 
jurisdictions across Australia can be demonstrated by the Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2001 
                                                 
200 See Victorian Privacy Commissioner, ‘Federal Privacy Law Changes Welcome but Does Not Affect 
Victorian Privacy Legislation’ (Media Release, 21 March 2014); Blackshield and Williams, Australian 
Constitutional Law and Theory, above n5.  Constitutionally, the responsibility for healthcare is retained 
by the states and territories under their ‘residual’ powers: at 125.  See also Constitutional limitation in 
s109 of the Constitution, where ‘in those jurisdictions where statutory regime is stricter, state or territory 
law may prevail, provided it is not inconsistent with the Commonwealth legislation … where there is 
an inconsistency between a Commonwealth and state/territory Act the Commonwealth law prevails 
and the state law is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.’  
201 Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas); Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic)); Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); Information Act 2002 (NT). 
202 Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 1997 (ACT); Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 
(NSW); Health Records Act 2001 (Vic). 
203 Information Act (NT); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld); Freedom 
of Information Act 1991 (Tas); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA).   
204 See Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW); Freedom of 
Information Amendment Act 20042 (Qld); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA); Freedom of Information Act 
1991 (SA); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT); Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Cth). 
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(NSW), Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) and Health Privacy Act 2001 (Vic) 
legislation,205 which each contain privacy standards that regulate the way NSW and 
Victoria agencies handles personal information.  For example, the Health Records and 
Information Privacy Act 2002 implements a privacy regime for health information in 
NSW private and public sector and contain 15 Health Privacy Principles (HPPs) that 
outline how health information must be collected,  stored, used and disclosed.206  
Along similar lines as NSW, the Victorian Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) covers the 
handling of personal information (not health information) in the state public sector.207  
The Act encompasses 10 Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) and are comparable to 
the old NPPs in the Privacy Act.  Health records in Victoria are found in the Health 
Records Act 2001 and contain 11 Health Privacy Principles (HPPs), which covers how 
health information in Victoria is collected, stored used and disclosed, the Act is 
administered by the Office of the Health Services Commissioner. 
The Commonwealth Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) interact with state 
and territory laws, providing a complex web of prohibitions on, and exceptions to 
personal information collection, use and disclosure.208  Notwithstanding, the APPs are 
similar but not identical with the HPPs in New South Wales and the NPPs in Victoria 
in that health information (‘sensitive information’ in the HPPs and NPPs) ‘may be 
                                                 
205 Note health records are excluded from the ambit of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 
1998 s4A. 
206 See, ALRC, Discussion Paper 108, above n71: at 166-167. 
207 Note health records are excluded from the ambit of the Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) s3. 
208 See s109 of the Constitution where ‘in those jurisdictions where the statutory regime is stricter, the 
state or territory law may prevail, provided it is not inconsistent with the Commonwealth legislation.’  
See generally Danuta Mendelson, “Travels of a Medical Record and the Myth of Privacy” (2003) 11 
Journal of Law and Medicine 136. 
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used for the purpose for which it was collected, or for a secondary purpose where it 
is directly related, and a person would reasonably expect it to be used in that way.’209  
However, in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Privacy Principles (PPs) ‘require 
only that the secondary purpose be “directly related”’ to the purpose.210  This slightly 
‘different’ wording in the principles may result in health professionals, healthcare 
providers and researchers in different state jurisdictions having to comply with both 
sets of principles (state and APPs).211   
As noted, the legislation in various jurisdictions across Australia may differ, 
even in recognising how many privacy principles are covered and the length of time 
public records are kept.212  For instance, Commonwealth legislation, such as the 
Archives Act 1983 (Cth), differs from its state equivalent in that it is drafted specifically 
so that it dovetails with the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).  Its provisions 
concerning access are considerably more detailed and adopt a wider scope than the 
state legislation.213  However, fundamentally the Commonwealth and state legislation 
share certain similar characteristics, such as specific statutory requirements for the 
staff of government health authorities to respect the confidentiality of patients whom 
they treat, as well as general privacy provisions.214    
                                                 
209 See White, McDonald and Willmott, Health Law in Australia, above n50: at 390. 
210 Ibid. 
211 See Victorian Privacy Commissioner, ‘Federal Privacy Law Changes Welcome But Do Not Affect 
Victorian Privacy Legislation’ (Media Release, 21 March 2014). 
212 For instance, New South Wales has 15 HPPs, whereas Victoria has 10 privacy provisions. 
213 See Moira Paterson, Freedom of Information and Privacy in Australia (LexisNexis, 2005).  Paterson notes 
that the scope of the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) is more extensive than the state legislation and is subject to 
wider merit review: at 212; see also Review Process State Records New South Wales, Issue Paper: Review 
of the State Records Act 1998 (2004). 
214 For instance, the Healthcare Act 2008 (SA), Health Administration Act 1982 (NSW), Health Services Act 
1988 (Vic) and the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) provide that all Commonwealth and state officers have 
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A Related Legislation 
When exploring healthcare privacy, it is important to also consider a plethora of other 
related state and territory legislation that impact on the area.  While most of this 
related legislation is unique to its own state or territory jurisdiction, it does share many 
similar characteristics with all other states and territories, in that it generally 
complements existing Commonwealth legislation.  Included in state and territory 
legislation is Freedom of Information Acts,215 which forms a vital part of a broader 
network of laws, both formal and informal.   
Other laws that contribute and affect the overall objective of transparency such 
as transparency of the executive branch of government include: information privacy 
laws, public records laws, laws which require administrative decision-makers to 
provide reasons for their decisions and whistle-blower protection laws.216  In turn, 
these laws enhance the accountability of Parliament, including the offices of the 
Ombudsman and Auditor-General. 
                                                 
obligations to keep records confidential.  Procedural problems arise when it comes to information 
privacy complaints procedures, as these mechanisms may differ significantly between states and 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
215 See Freedom of Information legislation, above n206.  Likewise, there are a number of instances across 
Australia (in states and territories) that permit or require, in certain circumstances, the disclosure of 
confidential information.  For example, Public Health Act 2010 (NSW); Health Administration Act 1982 
(NSW) ss20E-G, 22 and 23; Public Health Act 1997 (Cth) s69; Health Act 1958 (Vic) s 128; HIV/Aids 
Preventative Measures Act 1993 (Tas); Health Services Act 1988 (Vic).  These Acts are similar across the 
different states and territories. 
216 See Ombudsman (Northern Territory) Act 1977 (NT); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld); Public Records Act 
2002 (Qld); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA); State Records Act 1997 (SA); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas); Archives 
Act 1983 (Tas); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic); Public Records Act 1973 (Vic); Whistleblowers Protection Act 
2001 (Vic); Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld); State Records Act 2000 (WA); Public Finance and Audit 
Act 1983 (NSW); Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW); States Records Act 1998 (NSW); Ombudsman Act 
1974 (NSW). 
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The Health Complaints Agencies in each state and territory may also address 
healthcare complaints that raise questions about the safety and quality of health 
services, and thus may incidentally field concerns about privacy breaches (which 
generally would then be referred out to the appropriate agency).217  For example, 
complaints notification requirements may differ between the different states, in 
Queensland, all complaints and notifications about Queensland-based registered 
health professionals are referred to the Queensland Health Ombudsman.218  Whereas, 
New South Wales chose not to adopt the national law in its entirety, arguing that it 
would not ensure ‘the maintenance of a strong, accountable and transparent 
disciplinary and complaints system in New South Wales.’219  Consequently, state 
complaints procedures can still result in some inconsistency between Commonwealth, 
state and territory health privacy protection laws across Australia.220  These Acts may 
widen the scope and opportunities of resolving, investigating and prosecuting 
complaints about healthcare in some, but not all, jurisdictions.221  However, the 2009 
national adoption of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law across Australia 
                                                 
217 See, for example, Health Quality and Complaints Commission Act 2006 (Qld); Health Complaints Act 1995 
(Tas); Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW). 
218 See Health Ombusman Act 2013 (Qld) s68.  The Queensland Ombudsman can issue a prohibition order 
prohibiting the delivery of services or imposing restrictions on the delivery of services.  For example, 
an order may be issued if the health professional’s conduct, performance or health means they pose a 
serious risk and it is necessary to issue the order to protect public health and safety. 
219 New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates No 18872-18874, 28 October 2009 
(Carmel Tebbutt, Minister of Health)).  
220 See, for example, Queensland Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld). 
221 See Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (‘AHPRA’), Delegations Under the National Law 
(LPN 22, 3 February 2014); AHPRA, Court or Tribunal Power to Stay a Board Decision (LPN 21, 18 October 
2013); Tribunals in Victoria, Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Western Australia have 
statutory powers to grant stays.  The New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission has a 
Charter to resolve, investigate and prosecute complaints about healthcare under the Health Care 
Complaints Act 1993 (NSW). 
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has greatly contributed to the overall coordination and ‘harmonisation’ of national 
regulation of healthcare providers and health care complaints processes.222 
To conclude, agreement between the federal, state and territory governments 
towards national consistency and ‘harmonisation’ laws, in relation to health reform 
and continuing individual privacy protection, has resulted in a new era of national 
cooperation between Australian governments across Australia.223  Over the last 
decade, this level of cooperation has resulted in new Commonwealth laws and 
regulations in the healthcare privacy area.  Nevertheless, there remains a level of 
caution as some states are not convinced that the federal Government will continue to 
provide adequate individual privacy protection, particularly in relation to online 
information technology advances.224   
VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEW ELECTRONIC HEALTHCARE 
REGIME 
Since the late 1990s onwards, the federal government, with state and territory 
government cooperation, has taken a very active leadership role in introducing and 
implementing a new electronic healthcare regime in Australia.225  As a result of this 
cooperation between the different governments, significant advances in health and 
privacy legislative and regulatory reform have been introduced by the federal 
                                                 
222 See, for example, Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2009 (Cth); Health Practitioners Regulation 
National Law Act 2009 (NSW); Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Queensland); Health 
Practitioner Regulation Act 2009 ((Vic).  
223 See, for example, COAG, Australian Health Ministers Cooperation towards National Health Care (2001); 
COAG, National Healthcare Agreement (2011); COAG, National Healthcare Agreement 2011-2013. 
224 ALRC, Report 108, above n71: at 499. 
225 See National Health Information Management Advisory Council, A Health Information Action Plan 
for Australia (2nd ed, 2001); National e-Health Transition Authority (‘NEHTA’), Frontiers in Healthcare 
Delivery (2007); see chapter 2, pp38-68 for a detailed discussion on health services. 
173 
 
Government.226  At the EPR and e-health conception stage, all Australian governments 
agreed that to sustain 21st century healthcare services in Australia, the introduction of 
electronic healthcare delivery systems must be coordinated by the federal 
Government, in order to achieve greater national consistency and harmonisation of 
laws across Australia.227 
Major contributions by the federal Government to legislative privacy reform 
and PCEHR e-health systems implementation include recent amendments to the 
Privacy Act, enactment of new legislation such as the Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 
(Cth) as well as since abandoned ‘proposed’ statutory changes, including a Statutory 
Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of Privacy.228  Legal reform in the privacy and PCEHR 
healthcare area is also influenced by numerous government reports over the last 
decade.229  Government generated and privately commissioned reports provide 
significant insight into the overall objectives and ongoing evolution of privacy and 
PCEHR healthcare privacy legislation in Australia.230 
A Commonwealth Legislation Supporting PCEHR Implementation 
                                                 
226 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations: Relating to the Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic 
Health Records System (September 2011). 
227 See chapter 2, pp38-68 for a detailed discussion on health services; Australian Government, National 
Health Reform (2011). 
228 See earlier chapter, pp146-163 discussion on common law privacy development. 
229 Australian Government, Healthcare Identifiers and Privacy: Discussion Paper on Proposals for Legislative 
Support (2006); Australian Government, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records System: Legislation 
Issues Paper (2008); NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n226.  
230 See chapter 2, pp38-67 discussion on federal Government e-health policy development; see, for 
example, ALRC, Discussion Paper 108, above n71; Australian Government, Concepts of Operations, 
above n226; National E-Health and Information Principal Committee, Deloitte, National E-Health 
Strategy (30 September 2008). 
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The Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 and the PCEHR Act 2012 represent Commonwealth 
legislation supporting a national, coordinated approach to the implementation of a 
new electronic healthcare regime in Australia.  The Healthcare Identifiers Act is a 
foundational piece of Commonwealth legislation, because it enables ‘accurate 
identification, retrieval and information sharing’ throughout the healthcare system.231  
The purpose of the Healthcare Identifiers Act is to establish a national healthcare 
identifier system for patients, healthcare providers and healthcare provider 
organisations, as well as setting out the purposes for which healthcare identifiers can 
be used.  In addition to this Act, other supporting legislation and regulations were 
also introduced: Healthcare Identifiers (Consequential Amendments) Act 2010 (Cth) and 
the Healthcare Identifiers Regulations 2010 (Cth).  
Under s 9 of the Healthcare Identifiers Act, Medicare Australia is appointed as 
the Service Operator of the system.  The Service Operator is authorised to assign 
healthcare identifier (‘HI’) numbers to both health consumers and healthcare 
providers and manages the system.  The assignment by Medicare of a HI number to 
an eligible consumer is mandatory.  Key definitions are located in Part 1 of the 
Healthcare Identifiers Act and include: ‘healthcare’, ‘healthcare identifier’, ‘healthcare 
provider’, ‘health recipient’ and ‘healthcare information’.  
The definitions of ‘healthcare provider’ in s 5 of the Healthcare Identifiers Act and 
‘healthcare services’ in s 6 of the Privacy Act must be read together and provide 
                                                 
231 See Danuta Mendelson, “Healthcare Identifiers Legislation: A Whiff of Fourberie” [2010] 17 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 660.  
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exceptionally wide meanings to each term.232  Both the Privacy Act and the Healthcare 
Identifiers Act allow for the possibility (particularly in the regulations) of an increasing 
number of people and organisations claiming access rights to personal health 
information; this is problematic for consumer healthcare information privacy because 
it represents an unanticipated source of access to medical records.233  
The PCEHR Act 2012 (Cth) provides for a system of access to electronic health 
records and related purposes.  The object of the Act is to enable the establishment of 
the personally controlled electronic health record system and provide its regulatory 
framework, including an entity that is responsible for the operation of the PCEHR 
system to: 
(a) help overcome the fragmentation of health information; and 
(b) improve the availability and quality of health information; and 
(c) reduce the occurrence of adverse medical events and the duplication of treatment; and 
(d) improve the coordination and quality of healthcare provided to consumers by different 
healthcare providers.234 
The PCEHR Act outlines the PCEHR system infrastructure set up and defines the legal 
requirements for collecting, using and disclosing patient information.  The Act also 
sets out the proposed management and governance arrangements for the PCEHR 
system.235  Further it regulates the function of the System Operator and registration 
by the System Operator of consumers, healthcare provider organisations, repository 
                                                 
232 Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth) s5: ‘Healthcare provider means: (a) an individual healthcare 
provider; or (b) a healthcare provider organisation.’  Privacy Act s6: ‘Healthcare services means: (a) an 
activity performed in relation to an individual that is intended or claimed (expressly or otherwise) by 
the individual on the person performing it: (i) to access record maintain or improve the individual’s 
health; or (ii) to diagnose the individual’s illness or disability or suspected illness or disability; or (iii) 
treat the individual’s illness or disability or suspected illness or disability; or (b) the dispensing on 
prescription of a drug or medicinal preparation by a Pharmacist.’ 
233 See, for example, naturopaths, herbal medicine practitioners, masseurs. 
234 PCEHR Act 2012 (Cth) s3. 
235 See chapter 6, pp184-234 for discussion of the PCEHR and e-health governance proposal. 
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operators, portal operators and contracted service providers.  The PCEHR Act states 
that the System Operator is authorised to use or disclose health information included 
in a consumer’s PCEHR if the System Operator ‘reasonably believes that the use or 
disclosure is reasonably necessary for one or more [of the listed] reasons’ such as ‘the 
prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution or punishment of criminal 
offences’.236  The implication of this section is that it provides wide latitude of control 
to the System Operator in relation to disclosure of PCEHR information. 
The PCEHR Act established two new advisory bodies to NEHTA and the 
Department of Health and Ageing—the Jurisdictional Advisory Committee and the 
Independent Advisory Council—further examined in chapter 6 of the thesis.237  The Act 
requires that the Minister makes PCEHR Rules and that he or she ‘must consult the 
Committee and Council’ about new or altered Rules.238  However, the legislation also 
states that the validity of the Rules (new or established) is not affected by the 
Minister’s failure to consult with Committee or Council about the Rules.  This ‘loophole’ 
gives rise to the potential that the Minister can effectively ‘by-pass’ overview 
processes when introducing new PCEHR Rules.  Consequently, this situation 
effectively fails to provide genuine oversight of the Minister’s decision-making 
powers in the PCEHR area and is of concern to the overall transparency and 
democratic functioning of the PCEHR system.  
 B Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Act 2013 (Cth) 
                                                 
236 PCEHR Act 2012 s70 (5). 
237 See PCEHR Act 2012 s2 (a)-(b), s18, s24. 
238 PCEHR Act 2012 Part 2 Division 1, s16, Divisions 2, 3 and 4. 
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The latest addition to strengthening privacy protection is the Privacy Amendment 
(Privacy Alerts) Act 2013 (Cth) (‘Alerts Act’).239  Prior to the Alerts Act there was no legal 
obligation on entities to notify the Information Privacy Commissioner, or any 
individuals whose personal information had been compromised; this situation was 
rectified by this new privacy amendment.240 
 ‘Data breach notification’ is a topical concern around the world, especially in 
relation to identity theft and identity fraud, which have been the main issues driving 
the development of new laws in this area.241  As part of its first stage response, the 
Australian Government decided not to implement the initial ALRC recommendation 
about mandatory breach notifications.242  However, due to a number of high profile 
data hacking cases, including the hacking of the ABC’s website, and breaches at 
Telstra, Medvet and Sony PlayStation, the government brought the introduction of 
this legislation forward. 243 
Mandatory ‘data breach notification’ commonly refers to: 
A legal requirement to provide notice to affected persons and the relevant regulator when 
certain types of personal information is accessed, obtained, used, disclosed, copied, or modified 
by unauthorised persons.  Such unauthorised access may occur following a malicious breach 
                                                 
239 The first Parliamentary reading of the Alerts Act took place on 29 May 2013.  It had its second reading 
and moved through Senate on 17 June 2013 and came into effect in March 2014. 
240 At the time, IPP 4 and NPP 4 (now superseded by the APPs) required agencies and organisations to 
take reasonable steps to maintain the security of the personal information they held.  A voluntary guide 
for entities, giving advice on how to handle a data breach, was developed in 2008 by the Privacy 
Commissioner (OAIC, Data Notification: A Guide to Handling Personal Information Security Breaches (2008, 
revised late 2011)). 
241 ALRC, Report 108, above n71: Para 51.1.  
242 See Mary Anne Neilson, Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Bill 2013, Law and Bills Digest No. 146, 
2012-2013, 19 June 2013; Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Explanatory Memorandum, 
Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Bill 2013, 2013: at 6.    
243 See Department of Parliamentary Services, Rhonda Jolly, Personally Controlled Electronic Health 
Records Bill 2011, Bills Digest No. 100, 2011-2012, 7 February 2012; Australian Parliament, House of 
Representatives, Explanatory Memorandum, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Bill 2011, 
2011.  
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of the secure storage and handling of that information (e.g. a hacker attack), an accidental loss 
(most commonly of IT equipment or hard copy documents), a negligent or improper disclosure 
of information, or otherwise.244 
The principle behind increasing the Privacy Commissioner’s mandate and overall 
responsibilities contained in the Privacy Act is considered a very positive step forward 
for overall governance of healthcare privacy; however there remains a pressing 
question of adequate resource allocation, particularly in light of the federal 
Government’s rationalisation and devolution policy.  It was noted by the Law Council 
of Australia, that while supporting the general principle of data breach notification, 
that this does bring forward some interesting limitations in relation to resourcing and 
enforcement: 
Already stretched resources … will be substantially affected by the expansion of the functions 
and powers of the Commissioner proposed under the Amending Act … Any mandatory 
notification scheme should therefore be considered in the context of the available resources at 
the OAIC and any subsequent limitations in its governance and policing of privacy obligations 
and organisations and agencies. If too great a burden is placed on the OAIC, it may be unable 
to effectively perform the functions conferred upon it by the Privacy Act.245 
The above comments by the Law Council of Australia resonate with the thesis 
observation that despite current legislation, effective enforcement of individual 
privacy rights proposed by the previous federal Government may be compromised in 
the future by the lack of proper robust governance, including necessary allocation of 
resources to support the new laws and system.246  This observation takes on further 
                                                 
244 See Department of Parliamentary Services, Rhonda Jolly, Personally Controlled Electronic Health 
Records Bill 2011, Bills Digest, above n196; Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Explanatory 
Memorandum, PCEHR Bill 2011, 2011: at 1.  
245 Law Council of Australia, Submission to the Attorney-General’s Department Discussion Paper on 
Australian Privacy Breach Notification (29 November 2012); see also Mary Anne Neilson and Jonathan 
Chowns, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012, Law and Bills Digest No. 20, 2012-
2013, 7 November 2012. [Notes position of major interest groups, for instance Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Law Council of Australia, Australian Direct Marketing Association, Victorian Privacy 
Commissioner, relating to main issues and key provisions (such as function creep): at 11-14]. 
246 See chapter 6, pp184-234 for discussion of PCEHR and e-health governance issues. 
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relevance with the federal Coalition Government’s 2014 federal budget cuts to health 
and plans to rationalise the Office of the Information Privacy Commissioner. 
C The Problem of ‘Function Creep’ 
During the Healthcare Identifiers Bill 2010 (Cth)’s initial consultation period, a 
number of worrying concerns about privacy protection emerged in relation to the 
introduction of individual and healthcare provider HI numbers.247  These concerns 
included that ‘such a highly reliable identifier is not usurped for purposes beyond the 
health system and the clinical care of individuals’.248  At the time, the Office of the 
Australian Privacy Commissioner (‘OAPC’),249 noted that ‘function creep’250 had been 
experienced in relation to Canada’s Social Insurance Number, which came to be 
viewed as a mode of identification, with property owners requiring its production for 
other unrelated situations.251  In its submission on the Healthcare Identifiers Bill, the 
                                                 
247 See, for example, Danuta Mendelson, “Healthcare Identifiers Legislation”, above n184: at 301-40; 
Graham Greenleaf, ’Quacking like a Duck: The National ID Card Proposal' (2006) Compared with the 
Australia Card (1986-87)’ (Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre, Faculty of Law, University of New South 
Wales (Draft only) 12 June 2006).  Revised version of paper available at 
<http://www.cyberlawcentre.org>; Graham Greenleaf, Submission 59 (2009): at 1-2; Senate 
Community Affairs Legislation Committee, Healthcare Identifiers Bill 2010 (Cth); Provisions 
Healthcare Identifiers (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2011 (Cth) (March 2010).  
248 Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Submission on the Healthcare Identifiers and Privacy Discussion 
Paper on Proposal for Legislative Support (12 August 2009) 
249 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner is also referred to as the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner. 
250 Graham Greenleaf, “Access all Areas: Function Creep Guaranteed in Australia’s ID Card Bill (No 
1)” [2007] University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 11. ‘ The term ‘function creep’ ‘is 
said to occur when customer or patient data is stored for one purpose, such as medical records, but 
someone figures out another use for it, or wants to share the data with another party.  That is, when the 
original intention for storing information is expanded to gain extra information about the subjects or to 
use the information for an entirely different purpose’; see R LeMay, ‘Hackers on Medicine Smartcard 
Waiting List’ ZD Net (online) <http://www.zdnet.com.au/hackers-on-medicare-smart-card-waiting-
list> (viewed on 24/2/2005); see also S Mitchell, ‘Privacy Warning on Medicare Smartcard’ The 
Australian (Australia), 22 November 2005, 2. 
251 See OAPC, Submission on the Healthcare Identifiers and Privacy: Discussion Paper on Proposal for 
Legislative Support (2009).  
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OAPC provided overseas examples of this type of ‘function creep’.252  The OAPC 
observed: 
Property owners asked for it on apartment rental applications, video stores required it as 
security for movie rentals, universities and colleges requested it on their application form and 
pizza places even used it as a customer number for their delivery system.253 
 The long-term implication for Australian healthcare consumers of increasing 
‘function creep’ is that, unless individual privacy protection law is both unambiguous 
and strong in its purpose to protect individual healthcare privacy requirement, there 
remains a high possibility that, despite legislative prohibition, the HI number and 
information will be used for non-health related management and commercial 
purposes.254   
As Daniel Solove explains, this type of ‘function creep’ is especially problematic 
where the government is strongly committed to ongoing health commercialisation 
and privatisation, extending personal health information access to a growing number 
of local and international, public and private sector, healthcare organisations and 
researchers, who operate in an environment where corporate and business interests 
typically advocate ‘free flow’ deregulation of all information.255  This is particularly 
                                                 
252 OAPC, Submission on the Healthcare Identifiers and Privacy, above n248. 
253 Ibid.  
254 OACP, Submission on the Healthcare and Privacy, above n252 [where it is argued by the thesis that the 
submission observations made by the OAPC continue to resonate in 2015], with the federal Coalition 
Government arguing for the expansion of HI number information usage to include general commercial 
interests, and the argument that PCEHR and e-health governance should increasingly be managed by 
the private sector.  
255 See Daniel Solove, The Digital Person (New York University Press, 2004) 1-9; see also Brian 
Murchison, ‘Revisiting the American Action for Public Disclosure of Private Facts’ in Andrew Kenyon 
and Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006): at 32. 
Review Panel, Richard Royle, Steve Hambleton and Andrew Walduck, Review of the Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (December 2013) (‘Royle Review’).  The Royle Review, recommendations 
(at time of writing February 2015) are yet to be accepted by the federal Government; Coalition Policy on 
E-Government and Digital Economy, above n60, make it highly probable that HI numbers will be extended 
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pertinent given the 2013, Royle Review recommendation that would allow the 
expansion and use of HI numbers.256  This issue is further discussed in chapter 6. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The above analysis of the legal dimension highlights the growing importance of 
privacy and law and its continuing relevance to individual healthcare privacy 
protection.  As recently highlighted by the ALRC, ‘privacy is a fundamental value 
worthy of protection,’ that ‘privacy laws should be adaptable to technological change’, 
and the law should be ‘consistent and coherent,’ as well as ‘clear and certain.’257  The 
chapter discussion also demonstrates the limitations surrounding federalism, 
common law and statutory law, particularly in the modern digital information 
environment.  In Australia, the constitutional framework (federation) continues to 
result in legal fragmentation and adds to the complexity of laws in both the health and 
privacy domain.  This occurs mainly because State and Territory Governments 
continue to feel pressure to fill in the ‘gaps’ in relation to individual privacy 
protection, as they attempt to grapple with emerging legal and moral privacy concerns 
that arise in a modern, global, information economy.   
The issue of state/territory and federal cooperation and ‘harmonisation’ of 
laws is also threatened with the current federal government at risk of compounding 
                                                 
beyond their original promised purpose and be used for general commercial purposes (outside of 
healthcare services: at 15-18; See chapter 7, pp250-255 ― this chapter details the Review of the Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (‘Royle Review’) (December 2013) recommendations and Coalition’s 
Policy for E-Government and the Digital Economy, above n60: at 3.   
256 Review of the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record, ibid. 
257 ALRC, Discussion Paper 80, above n46, see Principle 1, Principle 5, Principle 6 and Principle 7: at 28, 
32, 33. 
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the problem of fragmentation in health and privacy as it pursues a policy of economic 
restraint, decentralisation, and deregulation of healthcare delivery services.  It is 
foreseeable that given the current federal Government’s vision of global 
commercialisation and privatisation of healthcare systems, that earlier collaboration 
trends will be jeopardised as Australian states and territories individually respond to 
continuing pressure to regulate this area.  
The following chapter 6 continues the analysis of a new electronic healthcare 
regime in Australia by expanding upon the statutory and governance dimension and 
further exploring alternative ways to best protect Australian individual and collective 
privacy interests and rights.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ENHANCING HEALTHCARE PRIVACY: E-HEALTH 
TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNANCE MEASURES  
 
Along with recent legislative changes, outlined in the previous chapter, the aim of this 
chapter is to further extend the analysis of the Australian Government’s PCEHR and 
e-health privacy solutions, by exploring various proposals for the adoption of privacy-
friendly technical and PCEHR governance measures, as well as identifying their 
application and progress thus far.  The analysis centres on newly arising privacy 
governance concerns such as ongoing e-health governance development; current 
private and public regulatory overview; government health privatisation and 
commercialisation policy; the consumer PCEHR ‘opt-in’ consent model; and security 
and storage of healthcare information data.  The chapter also emphasises recent 
recommendations made to the federal Health Minister by the review panel in Review 
of the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (‘Royle Review’).1  
In order to appreciate the current modern Australian political and economic 
‘shift’ in healthcare governance discourse and its increasing importance on the day-
to-day management and lives of ordinary citizens, the chapter adopts a multi-
dimensional, political, economic and social contextual perspective for exploring 
emerging privacy challenges.  These include the rise of modern-day communication 
                                                 
1 See Review Panel, Richard Royle, Steve Hambleton and Andrew Walduck, Review of the Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (‘Royle Review’) (December 2013). 
184 
 
‘networks’, democratic theory development, civil liberties rights, as well as 
constructing modern era governance in light of growing globalisation influences, 
which all impact on the very fabric of liberal democratic societies, such as Australia.2  
The analysis of earlier Australian Government PCEHR reports and legislation,3 along 
with recent recommendations, is fundamental to understanding e-health governance 
arrangements because PCEHR proposals enhancing personal privacy tend to treat 
these arrangements ‘as an end in itself’ utility problem, rather than an essential part 
of a democratic process.4   
Crucially, so far as the future of PCEHR and e-health governance development 
is concerned, the chapter argues that the focus of attention, or analytical lens, is on 
how best to stimulate a form of deliberative democracy within the arrangements ― 
thus achieving an overall balance that, it is suggested, law, technology and market 
mechanisms cannot achieve on their own.  This is the basis for the thesis contention 
that a new Council with multiple governance oversight functions, represents a vital 
democratic reform mechanism for addressing ongoing e-health governance 
deficiencies.  The Council being argued for in the thesis is designed to foster an 
inclusive governance approach that promotes democratic citizen participation and 
                                                 
2 See Simon Davies, ‘Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed from a 
Right to a Commodity’ in Philip Agre and Marc Rotenberg (eds), Technology and Privacy: The New 
Landscape (The MIT Press, 2001): at 143. 
3 See chapter 5, pp124-182 for discussion on Commonwealth PCEHR legislation; see e.g.  Healthcare 
Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth); Personally Controlled Electronic Health Act 2012 (Cth). 
4 See Evgeny Morovoz,” The Real Privacy Problem” (22 October 2013) 116(6) MIT Technology Review 32-
43. 
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government transparency, connecting with wider ongoing democratic, political and 
economic accountability in the evolving modern global economic environment.5 
Chapter 3 critiqued various philosophical and theoretical arguments 
concerning the rise of modern utility technology (such as computer technology, social 
media and APP networking reliance), as it impacts on PCEHR and privacy 
development in Australia.6  Nevertheless, it is worth reiterating that the rapid rise of 
the knowledge and information economy, preferences for neoliberal economic 
arrangements and forms of governance, together with the push towards marketplace 
globalisation, further complicates realising PCEHR privacy protections and 
accountability through democratic participation. 
I. MODERN DAY CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY 
The evolution of the ‘state’ is closely bound up with ideals of liberal democracy, which 
promotes the rule of law, separation of powers, the role of citizens and generally, 
democratically elected political representatives.7  The modern-day threat to 
democracy in the present, economic context occurs because the traditional division 
between business focus on profits (economics) and state systems (administration), to 
provide public good, is challenged by non-governmental actors in an increasingly 
global environment.8  Another significant influence on traditional, liberal, democratic 
                                                 
5 See chapter 7, pp255-260 for overview and details of an Independent Council (Council). 
6 See chapter 3, pp70-98 for technology analysis. 
7 See Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of Government Action (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2012).  Creyke 
and McMillan outline the historical the development of Westphalia (‘state’) system of Government and 
its relationship with accountability mechanisms: at 3-4.   
8 See Eugeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n4: at 32. 
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ideals, such as election of government and centralised policy making, is the formation 
of a decentralised global ‘network’ system based upon the ‘free’ flow of information.9  
The rise of globalisation theory, according to John Dryzek, inverts the 
relationship between domestic and international factors.10  For globalists, the key 
influences on the state are now international, and consequently, domestic forces are 
downplayed.  What this implies is that global systems are regarded as fundamental.  
These systems may be markets, ‘networks’ or may involve communications (such as 
internet), or may mix political, economic and cultural aspects.  Thus, globalists tend 
to insert assumptions about the importance of international flows, systems and 
networks compared to their domestic counterparts.11 
Further, Morozov’s privacy and citizen right analysis contends that another 
central threat to democracy is the power of modern-day communication media, such 
as social media.  He argues that social media will satisfy what people think they need 
and as a consequence people will become complacent and cease to question the real 
driving motive beyond the virtual fantasy world.  Noting that ‘smartphone and other 
computer applications have the potential to direct our behaviour, remind us when we 
have erred and blunt our capacity to challenge society.12  
                                                 
9 See Ramesh Subramanian and Eddan Katz, ‘Perspectives on the Global Flow of Information’ in 
Ramesh Subramanian and Eddan Katz (eds), The Global Flow of Information (New York University, 2011): 
at 1. 
10 See John Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 
221. 
11 See Ramesh Subramanian, et al, The Global Flow of Information, above n9; John Dryzek, et al,  Theories 
of the Democratic State, above n10: at 310; see also Penelope Simons and Audrey Macklin, The Governance 
Gap (Routledge, 2014). 
12 See Evgeny Morovoz, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n4: at 32. 
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Morozov speculates that human complacency and acceptance about 
technology constitutes a very real threat to established, democratic processes and 
citizen privacy rights,13 because ‘we can now be pinged whenever we are about to do 
something stupid, unhealthy or unsound.’14  He imagines the new digital 
infrastructure as ‘thriving as it does on real-time data contributed by citizens, allowing 
technocrats to take political, with all its noise, friction, and discontent, out of the 
political process.’15  It replaces ‘the messy stuff of coalition-building, bargaining, and 
deliberation with the cleanliness and efficiency of data-powered administration.’16  
II. TOWARDS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
In order to address perceived democratic deficiencies in an increasingly global, 
political, economic and social environment, some modern theorists ascribe to 
‘deliberative democracy’ as an alternate form of democratic process protection.17  
Accordingly, the deliberative model of democracy is able to acknowledge the 
contribution of both state and non-state actors (including citizens) to global 
governance, that emerge outside the traditional realm of institutionalised politics.  A 
key assumption of the deliberative model of democracy is the idea that politics does 
not exclusively take place in official, governmental institutions, but already starts at 
the level of deliberating, civil society associations.  Regulatory activities of 
                                                 
13 See Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo, “The New Political Role of Business in a Globalised 
World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implications for the Firm, Governance, and 
Democrat” (4 June 2011) 48Journal of Management Studies 4. 
14 Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n4: at 32; see also chapter 3, pp78-79 for 
discussion on ‘social media’ technology. 
15 Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n4: at 32-33. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See Scherer and Palazzo, “The New Political Role in a Globalised World”, above n13: at 917;  Dryzek 
and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10: at 215. 
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governments should be connected to those processes of public-will formation.  Thus, 
democratic legitimacy is created by the strengthened links between the decisions in 
the political institutions and the processes of public-will information, as driven by 
non-governmental organisations, civil movements and other civil actors ‘who map, 
filter, amplify, bundle and transmit private problems, values and needs of the 
citizens.’18  
Consequently, with non-government actors becoming more powerful and 
through their engagement in the process of self-regulation, they become subjects of 
new forms of democratic processes: control and legitimacy.  Whilst liberal models of 
democracy place emphasis on the beneficial outcomes of the political process, 
deliberative democracy turns on the argumentative involvement of citizens in the 
decision-making processes themselves.  Certainly, the introduction of the proposed 
Council as a political citizen forum within the proposed (but modified) governance, 
institutional model would promote a deliberative, democratic approach by 
establishing a citizen ‘voice’ in present and future institutional, decision-making 
activities.  Given that effective citizen representation falls short of expected 
participation in the governance process, and is arguably denied in the Royle Review 
model discussed later in the chapter, the introduction of the  Council seeks to re-
establish and re-affirm citizen ‘voice’ and active participation in present and future 
institutional, decision-making activities.  
                                                 
18 See Jurgen Habermas, ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’ in Jurgen Habermas (ed), The 
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge MIT University Press, 1998): at 239-52; see 
also Jurgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge University Press, 2001); see also 
Scherer and Palazzo, “The New Political Role of Business in a Globalised World”, above n13: at 918. 
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Deliberation is a recognised communication process whereby individuals 
reflect upon their own views in light of what others have to say, ideally in a context 
free from coercion, deception and manipulation.  The highlighting of deliberation 
means that ‘talk-centric democratic theory replaces voting-centric democratic theory 
― though voting is not ruled out.’19  Deliberative democracy is not just a political 
theory; it has inspired a wide range of social reforms in liberal democracies in recent 
years.20 
‘Deliberative democracy’ is grounded in an assumption that individuals 
emphasise their capacity to reflect upon their own preferences, values and judgments 
in their participation in political dialogue with other individuals.  As noted, rather 
than a focus upon the electoral connection between the state and public spheres, there 
are a number of other mechanisms for the transmission of public opinion and concern, 
apart from counting heads in an election.  For instance, these might include the 
government’s fear of political instability, leading to policy that addresses the concerns 
raised by, say, disadvantaged groups in society.21  Discursive legitimacy is then 
secured when a public policy is consistent with the ‘constellation of discourses’ found 
in the public sphere, but only to the extent this constellation is itself under the 
reflective control of competent actors.  Public opinion can then be thought of as the 
outcome of the engagement of discourses, as transmitted to the state.22   
                                                 
19 Simone Chambers, “Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation” (2004) 
12 Journal of Political Philosophy 389, 391. 
20 See, for example, Danish Board of Technology. 
21 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10: at 216. 
22 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10; see also Julia Black, ‘Critical 
Reflections on Regulations’ (Paper Presented at Australian Society of Legal Philosophy Conference in 
Canberra, February 2001); see Jon Stern and Stuart Holder, “Regulatory Governance: Criteria for 
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In a deliberative democracy model, state and society ought to be connected by 
means that are themselves deliberative.  Legitimacy of ‘deliberative democracy’ 
depends on ‘the right, opportunity and capacity of those subject to collective decision 
to participate in consequential deliberation about the content of the decision in 
question.’23  Citizens need to be able to participate in deliberation about a decision, 
rather than simply vote upon it.  Applied to large and complex societies, such as 
Australia, however, the theory of ‘deliberative democracy’ immediately runs into 
problems of scale.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of possible solutions to the scale problem.  
The first is to restrict the number of deliberators to, say, elected representatives.  This 
would satisfy deliberative democrats who highlight deliberation within the 
legislature.  The main problem which arises, when relying on elected representatives 
to deliver on the legitimacy claims of deliberative democracy, is that election 
campaigns themselves are often not very deliberative.  A more democratic, non-
electoral way to identify deliberating representatives is to follow the ancient Athenian 
model and select them by lot ― just as jury pools are selected for court cases.  The 
people selected can be representative of the population in a statistical sense, because 
they lack any accountability to a broader public outside the deliberative forum.24 
                                                 
Assessing the Performance of Regulatory Systems: An Application to Infrastructure Industries in the 
Developing Countries of Asia” (March 1999) 8 Utilities Policy 35; see Richard Au and Peter Croll, 
‘Consumer-Centric and Privacy-Preserving Identity Management for Distributed E-Health Systems’ 
(Paper Presented to 41st Hawaii International Systems Sciences Conference, March 2008).  
23 See Bernard Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation” (1987) 15 Political Theory 338, 339; see 
also Simons and Macklin, The Governance Gap, above n11. 
24 See John Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World: Problem of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy 
(Oxford University Press, 2006) 218. 
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This concept of individual participation and action is completely different to 
that deployed by market liberals, who treat individual preferences as fixed and given, 
and view action exclusively in terms of individuals’ pursuit of pre-given preferences.  
Elite theorists would see deliberative democracy as a sideshow, on the basis that 
members of the ruling elite are perfectly aware of their own interests and how to go 
about achieving them, without reflection from others.25 
Some deliberative theorists have been silent on the institutional specifics of a 
deliberative democracy, focusing mainly on the activity of deliberation rather than its 
location.  However, this thesis argues that the institutional design is relevant for 
deliberation, and the settings (outside and inside formal or informal spheres) are 
significant to its successful political application.  Designed institutional forums, such 
as a Council proposed in this thesis, are a means of securing the direct, deliberative 
participation of non-government actors.  Non-partisan forums involve lay citizens, 
recruited at random from the larger population.  They are brought into an 
information-rich setting and given access to advocates for different sides and expert 
witnesses.  
As noted previously, the idea is that citizens then deliberate amongst 
themselves on the issue and produce a set of recommendations for public policy.  The 
number of citizen deliberators range from 10 to many hundreds (depending on the 
issue).  Examples include consensus conferences, such as the Danish Board of 
Technology.  Traditionally, the main issues deliberated by lay citizen forums have 
                                                 
25 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10: at 215. 
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focused upon genetically-modified foods; but there is no reason why this mechanism 
cannot be expanded to include technology and privacy rights under the proposed 
‘Council’.  Normally, lay citizens suggest recommendations more sensitive to the risks 
associated with technology and privacy, than the positions taken by government and 
industry-dominated committees.  It is recognised that lay citizens can make 
exceptionally good deliberators in such forums, because they are not encumbered by 
any prior partisanship on the issue and so approach decision-making with an open 
mind, amenable to persuasion.  
However, a problem with ‘deliberative democracy’ is the recognition that not 
all communication is deliberative, and might include sensationists, propagandists or 
public relations ‘spin-doctors’.  A discourse is a shared language-based form that 
enables understanding of the world, embodying judgments, assumptions, contentions 
and capabilities.26  Those who subscribe to a particular discourse can ‘then recognise 
and process sensory inputs into coherent accounts or stories, shared in inter-
subjectively meaningful fashion.’27  Examples of shared discourse include 
environmental policy, human rights (such as privacy) and international global politics 
(e.g. the United Nations (UN), OECD and World Trade Organisation (WTO)).  The 
engagement of discourses in the public sphere may also produce a cultural change 
that eventually pervades politics. 
Under pluralism, market liberalism and corporatist theory, the legislature is 
less ‘central’ and so their deliberation capacities are less crucial.   Of equal concern, 
                                                 
26 Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10. 
27 See John Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World, above n24. 
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and gaining more currency in Australian politics, is the degree of deliberativeness in 
the corporate institutions that integrate executive officials, business and labour 
federations.28  These institutions often operate in greater secrecy than Parliament, and 
any deliberative qualities they do possess are attenuated by a lack of democratic 
representativeness of the non-governmental officials present.29 
The thesis proposition for the introduction of the Council30 to evaluate present 
and future PCEHR privacy practice and management, empowered by Parliament, 
with direct access to the federal Health Minister, the Standing Council on Health, and 
the Australian Commission for Electronic Health.31  This recommendation for political 
oversight of a Council aligns with democratic citizen participation values and is on 
equal footing with other non-government and government actors proposed by the 
Royle Review.32 
A Pluralism Democracy 
The pluralist model of democracy involves a more complex view of political power 
than the standard account of representative democracy.  Pluralists assume that power 
resides with individuals who organise themselves into pressure groups, in order to 
                                                 
28 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10: at 222; John Braithwaite, 
Regulatory Capitalism (Edward Elgar, 2008) 14-15. 
29 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10: at 222-223; Julia Black, ‘Critical 
Reflections on Regulations’, above n22; see also Julia Black, “Constitutionalising Self-Regulation” 
[January 1996] The Modern Law Review.  
30 See chapter 7, pp255-260, which outlines and discusses the process of selection for the Independent 
Council.  
31 As proposed by the Royle Review, above n1. 
32 The role of a Council would be in line with the proposed Independent Advisory Council and the 
Australian Commission for Electronic Health, it would report directly to the federal Minister of Health, 
Standing Council on Health and Parliament; see chapter 7, pp238-260 structural details of a Council and 
Royle Review are outline in chapter 7. 
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assert their interests on any given issue.  Under this model, governments function as 
neutral adjudicators, balancing the various claims and resolving problems, by 
developing what they take to be the most appropriate social policy.33  
Democracy is not seen as a form of self-government, but as a political process 
in which individuals are able, if they want to play a significant role in influencing the 
government’s determination of social policy.  Under this model, individuals are able 
to participate more directly than allowed by the other models, as their participation 
goes beyond electoral politics or the politics of protest.  Individuals can organise 
themselves into groups to create and influence policy by lobbying about whatever 
they consider important enough to justify their time and energy.34  
Pluralism today grapples with the realities of concentrated business power, 
corporate partnerships, and the growing influence of technical expertise in policy 
making, large and complex states and networked and multi-level governance.  At the 
same time, pluralism remains committed to dispersed power and representative 
government.  It is considered that money must not be allowed to be the dominant 
good that controls the distribution of all other social goods ― such as political power, 
healthcare, education and other areas of life.35  
Appeals to pluralism often had to repel attacks from market liberals, who saw 
groups as obstructions to the public interest.  Some theorists believe that the ultimate 
locus of collective decisions can be found in the formal institutions of the state, whilst 
                                                 
33 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10. 
34 See Beth Gaze and Melinda Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy (The Law Book Company, 
1990). 
35 Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10: at 154. 
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others believe that the state has devolved into more informal networks.  The 
development from pluralism to neo-pluralism involved increasing the emphasis on 
‘polyarchy’ as a way of thinking about the closest approximation to democracy 
possible in the real world.   
In contrast to earlier pluralists, neo-pluralists believed that inequality of 
influence was inevitable.  This kind of imbalance of input that preoccupied neo-
pluralists was between business corporations and everyone else.  The level of 
influence by business is explained by the sheer wealth at its disposal, which means 
that business is able to hire the best lobbyists, conduct the best market research and 
engage the most persuasive spin-doctors and top lawyers to promote its cause.  
B Market Liberalism Democracy 
Market liberalism seeks to reform government, in the belief that capitalism is the 
optimal system for discovering and using knowledge, for securing prosperity and 
promoting economic and political freedom.  It argues that private corporations 
operating under the discipline of the market can always perform service delivery and 
manufacturing better.  By the late 1970s, market liberal theorists had built up a 
comprehensive, explanatory theory on state, democracy and human capabilities that 
accepted the assumptions about self-interested rational choice theory.  New proposals 
by a wave of economic theorists include privatisation of state-owned enterprises, 
competitive bidding for private contractors to supply government services and de-
regulation of the economy.  Consequently, large hierarchical public systems should 
give way to more competitive arrangements designed to establish individual 
consumer control over services such as education, social insurance and healthcare. 
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Under this model, roughly speaking, consumers maximise their utility and 
private producers maximise their profits or market share.  Interest groups (or firms 
operating in government-regulated markets) try to obtain from government a ‘rent’ 
or unearned benefit, either financed via general taxation or achieved by manipulating 
regulatory rules.36  Prescriptions for engaging in this model would involve a less 
ideological style of managing the public sector, adopted by both left and right 
politicians, called ‘new public management’.  
This ‘new’ type of management has three core principles, which are all evident 
in the Royle Review, discussed later in the chapter.  These principles are:  
disaggregation (breaking up large government bureaucracies);37 competition (forcing 
public services to perform competitively in order to attract customers and finance, 
rather than obtaining a budget as of right);38 and incentivisation (shifting away from 
professionalism or a public service ethos towards pecuniary incentives, to encourage 
personnel to perform better).39  This model, alongside pluralism and potentially elite 
neo-pluralist sentiments, is suggested as being the most indicative description of 
modern-day Australian government, political and economic thinking. 
C Civil Liberties and Civil Rights 
Besides the enactment in 1901 of the Commonwealth Constitution and the establishment 
of formal courts of law, including the High Court of Australia, the complementary 
                                                 
36 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10: at 131. 
37 See Royle Review, above n1, Rec. 2 and 9 to dissolve NEHTA and restructure the Department of Health 
and the Department of Human Services: at 15-16. 
38 Royle Review, Rec. 9, 11 and 12. 
39 Royle Review, Rec. 12, 19 and 36. 
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system of administrative law has evolved and includes the development of additional 
mechanisms to facilitate review of government decision-making oversight,40 as 
explained in chapter 5.  Australia has developed a strong administrative regulatory 
governance tradition that is premised upon democracy, civil liberties41 and long-
standing principles, such as open-government and accountability.42  
There exists a strong relational link between civil liberties, civil rights and 
democracy.43  However, the scope of claims to civil liberties depends very much on 
the justification proffered.  For instance, it can include claims made in the name of 
rights, to the state providing goods and services and to the state protecting the interest 
of individuals, where these are threatened by non-state agencies.  These 
interpretations of the scope of the guarantee that the state should provide for its 
citizens, turns in part, on ‘the vision of democracy held by the proponents of the right 
or liberty and in part on the theoretical basis upon which claims to rights and liberties 
are made.’44  
Because the traditional focus of most liberals is a commitment to promoting 
individualism (negative liberty protections against intrusions on individual rights), 
the distributive welfare assertion that the state provide individuals with sufficient 
                                                 
40 See for example, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee, Tribunals, Ombudsman 
41 See Gaze and Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy, above n34.  According to Gaze and Jones, 
the concern of civil liberties is the position of the individual in society’: at 2, and that ‘the freedom of 
the individual to act or to voice a concern is considered by most Australians to be an inherent benefit 
of living in Western democracy’: at 2.  It is also noted that ‘democracy as a political ideal is often taken 
for granted in Australian society, the commitment to freedom being an essential aspect of our lives’: at 
2.   
42 Gaze and Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy, above n34; see also Creyke and MacMillan, 
Control of Government Action, above n7. 
43 Gaze and Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy, above n34: at 3.  
44 Ibid 4.   
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food, clothing, shelter and medical attention is based upon ‘unrealistic assumptions’ 
and often referred to as ‘positive liberty’.45  Some liberal advocates criticise the 
commitment by government to social welfare policy, arguing that government 
regulations, taxation and revenue distribution interferes with the individual’s right to 
compete freely in economic market activities.  Sir Isaiah Berlin in 1958, for example, 
argued that the freedom proposed by liberal thinkers involved ‘negative liberty’,46 
such as freedom from constraint (including the state), freedom from laws dictating 
lifestyle, freedom from interference with individual decision making and freedom 
from restrictions on personal behaviour.  
These governance choices have been thrown into high relief by a recent review 
of the previous government’s PCEHR and e-health policy, commitment and progress.  
Due to political, economic and social changes in Australia over the last decade, 
including the election of a new federal government in late 2013, the in-coming 
administration commissioned the Royle Review, which focused on the merits of the 
new, electronic health regime and made a number of recommendations about future 
governance of the system.47 
                                                 
45 Gaze and Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy, above n34.  Gaze, et al, argues that this view 
(negative liberty) has caused a problem for modern political theorists of the liberty tradition, ‘who are 
currently grappling with the problem of the relationship between liberty and equality’: at 4.  They point 
out that in ‘the late 19th and early 20th century, Governments began to take on more domestic policy 
functions’: at 4.  Governments regulated markets to preserve competition, ‘they developed social policy 
by providing public education, pensions and sickness pay and healthcare, they regulated housing and 
working hours and conditions.  ‘This trend accelerated in the wake of World War 1 and the Great 
Depression of the 1930s’: at 5.  Also ‘across Europe, key industries were brought into state ownership 
(nationalised)’: at 5.  In Australia, Australian Government spending on social welfare expanded 
dramatically during and after the war.  ‘Market liberalism was exiled to the margins of politics except 
in certain countries’: at 5. 
46 See Sir Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty (Clarendon Press, 1958) in 
Gaze and Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy, above n34: at 4. 
47 See Royle Review, above n1.   
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III. THE ROYLE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 
On 3 November 2013, the federal Health Minister, Hon Peter Dutton, commissioned a 
review of Australia’s struggling Personally Controlled Health Records program, 
which had failed to attract enough doctors and consumers to participate in the project.  
While previous governments had laid the foundations for e-health, the adoption of 
the new electronic healthcare regime had not delivered the anticipated outcomes 
expected from its original vision and inception.  The review panel membership 
consisted of three industry experts:  Richard Royle (Chair), Steve Hambleton and 
Andrew Walduck.48  No health consumer members, representing the views of this 
group, were appointed by the Health Minister to this committee.  The completed 
review, which made 38 recommendations, was submitted to the Health Minister 
within six weeks in December 2013.  
The terms of reference of the Review deal with (but are not limited to) PCEHR 
implementation; updating the gaps between expectations of users and what has been 
delivered; the governance and control systems that were applied during the 
development and implementation phases; key patient and clinician utility issues; the 
level of use of the PCEHR by healthcare professionals in clinical settings; the future 
role of the private sector in providing solutions; the policy settings required to 
generate private sector solutions, and the governance arrangements to set the ongoing 
                                                 
48 Membership of the Royle Review panel include: Richard Royle (Chair) UnitingCare Health, Steve 
Hambleton AMA President and Andrew Walduck Chief Information Officer Australian Post. 
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future directions of the PCEHR in the context of other e-health initiatives (and timing 
of changes).49  
As a consequence of the review, the 2014 federal Budget allocated $140.6 million 
to continue to support the operation of e-health and the PCEHR system for 12 months, 
while the government continues planning its response to the recommendations.50  The 
current federal government refers to this phase of the PCEHR as the second stage of 
design, implementation and uptake of the system.51 
According to the Review summary of findings, there is ‘overwhelming support’ 
for implementing a consistent electronic health record for all Australians.52  However, 
the review accepted that a change was warranted in the approach to implementation 
issues, choice of strategy and the role that shared electronic health records play in the 
broader system of healthcare.  The following sets out a list of the more pertinent 
PCEHR concerns and issues identified by the review panel:  
1. Concerns with data accuracy under a patient controlled model; 
2. Opt-in versus opt-out of consumers; 
3. Value proposition for users until data sets are populated with clinically usable information; 
4. Value proposition for users if data sets are unreliable or incomplete, and the liability and 
indemnity that flows from this; 
5. Usability of the system at all stages of engagement; 
6. Change management, in particular the lack of education and training; 
7. The governance processes around the PCEHR did not adequately represent the industry and 
were overly bureaucratic in nature and did not effectively balance the needs of government 
and private sector organisations; 
8. Engagement, effective consultation and buy in from a number of stakeholder groups; 
9. The need for effective support for users of the system via the web; 
10. Incentives and effective use of financial support to offset initial and ongoing costs of 
implementation for organisations and clinicians; 
11. The lack of integration between current systems; 
                                                 
49 Royle Review, above n1: at 5. 
50 Australian Government, 2014-15 federal Budget (2014); new federal Budget 2015 just released (not 
examined) 
51 2014-2015 federal Budget (2014). 
52 See Royle Review, above n1: at 15.  
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12. The level of incentives and support for investment by software vendors; 
13. Privacy and security of records remain a priority for all users and an understanding of how the 
privacy and security works for consumers and practitioners; 
14. Development of and compliance with standards are critical for adoption of any federated 
system or process.53 
In response to these perceived difficulties, the Review recommended that a new 
structure be considered dealing with matters relating to organisation, monitoring and 
oversight, and that ultimate decision-making be shifted to a new body, the Australian 
Commission for Electronic Health (‘ACeH’), reporting directly to the Standing Council 
on Health (SCoH).54  
The membership of these new organisational structures effectively moves the 
governance focus further away from citizens and back to health professionals and 
industry.  This is a retrograde step, in that preference will be given to private sector 
interests (ahead of those of citizens), such as the interests of private health insurance 
companies, pharmaceutical companies and IT experts gaining substantial control over 
individual healthcare choices, which would totally transform the original ‘consumer-
centric’ notion of the PCEHR system.  Locating PCEHR and e-health delivery 
(including, ultimately, welfare provision) to health industry and professional 
interests, without proper regulations in place, goes back on promises made by both 
political parties regarding implementation of fair, democratic PCEHR system 
processes and challenges the established notions of open-government and 
transparency of the system.  
                                                 
53 Royle Review, above n1. 
54 Royle Review, above n1 Rec. 2-12. 
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It is acknowledged here that the Review makes some major contributions, such 
as strengthening ‘networks’ and PCEHR system inter-operability function, and that 
these recommendations are worthy of government consideration.55  Nevertheless, 
unlike past PCEHR and e-health reports,56 the Review seeks to preference and 
empowers private industry and healthcare professional providers, by committing 
financial incentives and public funds, to encourage commercial and professional 
participation.57  These privatisation preferences ultimately diminish and reduce 
government public sector PCEHR and e-health governance control oversight, 
resulting in a significant reduction of ‘eyes’ privy to policy changes, as well as 
impacting on transparency mechanisms and citizen participation rights.  
As previously indicated, the Review would begin this power ‘shift’ by reducing 
an individual to the level of ‘steward’ of their personal healthcare information and 
seeks to minimise citizen participation to that of a secondary reporting committee in 
the ongoing management of the PCEHR and e-health system.  This focus ‘shift’ is 
unacceptable in light of the fact that healthcare consumers represent the majority 
group affected by this new electronic regime. 
A. Recommendations 
The Review emphasises the proposition that the benefits of the PCEHR should be 
realised sooner and focuses on a number of key strategies in order to achieve this 
                                                 
55 Royle Review, above n1.  Strengthening e-Health Technical and Data Foundations: at 37, for example, 
secure messaging (SMD), information security standards, directory services, ECLIPSE: at 72.   
56 See, for example, ALRC, Review of Australian Privacy Law: Discussion Paper 72 (September 2007). 
57 Royle Review, above n1 Even though incentives was always part of the PCEHR and e-health incentive 
scheme such as iPIPs, the Royle Review approach to financial and other incentives is far wider (including 
a broad range of peripheral health activities) and very generous in its incentive recommendation: at 44-
47. 
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result.58  Given the core strategies of decreasing citizen participation and increasing 
health industry/professional involvement, the primary recommendation made by the 
review is to restructure the current PCEHR approach to governance, dissolve NEHTA, 
effectively by-passing the Department of Health and Department of Human Services 
and replacing them with a new body, the Australian Commission for Electronic 
Health, which reports directly to the Standing Council on Health.59  The Review 
maintains that this structure of industry actors will provide open and transparent 
communication on the performance of the e-health system, including oversight of the 
System Operator.60  
The Review posits that effective and impactful governance is critical for any 
major investment program and that several factors are essential for building and 
maintaining a strong governance function.  This, according to the Review, would 
include (but not be limited to) issues such as selection of trusted personnel who will 
represent the authority and have accountability to act, and the alignment of the 
governance body as an effective strategy.  Empowering operating performance 
transparency would ensure effective decision-making and put in place appropriate 
framework and processes to effectively govern and coordinate investments.  This 
strategy, it is contended, would require decision makers to act in an open, accountable 
way and be in regular communication with all impacted audiences.61  
                                                 
58 See Royle Review, above n1: at 13. 
59 Royle Review Rec.2. 
60 Ibid 2. 
61 Ibid 20. 
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The Review provides no solid, theoretical bases for its presumptions.  The 
recommendations it makes can be roughly divided into two groups.  The first group 
is primarily concerned with economic, political and governance changes to the PCEHR 
system, while the second group of recommendations focuses more on practical issues, 
such as system governance implementation and uptake.  The principal 
recommendation made by the review is to restructure the approach to governance and 
adopt a ‘network’ commercial and professional focus for PCEHR governance 
systems.62   
The Review also recommends renaming the system from PCEHR (Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Records) to My Health Record (‘MyHR’), thus removing the 
personally controlled component out of the equation.  This name change highlights the 
fact that ‘the change of name will reflect more a partnership between the clinician and 
the patient.’63  However, this observation is quite deceptive in that the Review states 
that the consumer engagement is that of a ‘steward’ to their records, rather than 
‘partnership’ status.64  This name change is rather ironic, in that the overall intent of 
the proposed new governance review is to take away (shift the focus) from consumers’ 
‘ownership and control’ of their personal electronic health records, towards 
professional and industry control.  The significance of a name can be illustrated by 
other legislation such as the Fair Work Act, which some commentators argue is 
                                                 
62 Royle Review Rec.9 - recommends dissolving NEHTA, disempowering and reducing the governance 
role of Government Departments such as Department of Health and Department of Human Services. 
63 Ibid Rec.1 - name change: at 15; see Royle Review recommendations in detail: at 19.   
64 Royle Review, above n1: at 19. 
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deceptive and indeed a misnomer, because workplace ‘fairness’ is not necessarily 
reflected in this Act.65 
Additionally the Review recommends that the Jurisdictional Advisory Committee 
and the Independent Advisory Council be retained, although the Independent Advisory 
Council would now report directly to the Minister of Health and its membership 
would consist of industry and professional members.66  This is a significant power 
shift for health professionals and industry, because the Independent Advisory Council 
would have direct access to the Health Minister.67  This means that it would not be 
directly accountable to bodies such as the Australian Commission for Electronic Health. 
Other sub-committees would also be established that would report to the new 
Australian Commission for Electronic Health.  These sub-committees would include a 
Clinical and Technical Advisory Committee, a Consumer Committee and a Privacy and 
Security Committee.68  
Amongst the main Review operational changes is the recommendation that an 
‘opt-out’, rather than an ‘opt-in’, model be adopted effective from the target date of 1 
January 2015.  However this target date has since passed and the recommendations 
                                                 
65 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth); see Andrew Stewart, Stewart’s Guide to Employment Law (The Federation 
Press, 5th ed, 2015); see also Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (The Federation Press, 
2010). 
66 Royle Review, above n1 Rec. 8, Rec. 26. 
67 This direct access to the Health Minister is quite different from the original concept of the Independent 
Advisory Council operated by the PCEHR Act in that under this proposal there would be no intermediary 
reporting body (such as NEHTA or the System Operators) involved in the Royle Review proposed 
governance structure.  The introduction of the Council along similar reporting lines as proposed in this 
thesis would, it is argued, would help restore this obvious power imbalance between 
professional/industry groups and citizens. 
68 See chapter 7, pp250-255 for outline of sub-committees. 
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made by the Review have not yet been implemented by the federal Coalition 
Government.69  It is argued that:  
Costs associated with patient registration and the related debate around providing financial 
incentives to the health care industry to assist, are likely to be eliminated with the introduction 
of an opt-out model … For vendors, achieving a critical mass of users would help drive 
innovation.70  
This would include accompanying commission technical assessment and change 
management for ‘opt-out’ process and require an annual report from the Privacy and 
Security Committee on statistics (e.g. as to who ‘opted out’).  
Further the Review recommends recognition of principles of transparency, 
through extensive use of metrics,71 arguing that good intentions (even if they are 
culturally different), plus good data (metrics), must equal good outcomes.  This 
approach has implications for consumer healthcare data consent issues, research and 
secondary data use.  The Review contends that consumers now expect initial healthcare 
consent to be ongoing and include an extensive range of secondary use and third party 
access.72  This particular proposition ― ‘authorising ‘free’ multiple industries and 
research actors’ access to expanded health data repositories ― is argued to best 
advantage Australia’s commercial future.73  However, the counter argument against 
                                                 
69 See Royle Review, above n1: at 28. 
70 Royle Review 55. 
71 Ibid Rec. 35. 
72 Ibid 31. 
73 Ibid. See the Australian Health Informatics Association (‘AHIA’) recommendations that the legislation 
ensures adequate security of stored data rather than limiting the options for where data can be stored 
(e.g. requirement for data to be stored in Australia).  The requirement to store data in Australia places 
limitations on potential data warehouse options such as overseas warehouses with no connection with 
Australia.  According to Royle Review, this limitation ‘to storing data precludes emerging and 
potentially more efficient and cost effective technologies such as cloud or virtualisation of servers’: at 
81.  However, the legislation (PCEHR Act) that limits healthcare data storage ensures that privacy and 
security are paramount concerns that may not be achievable or adequately regulated overseas: at 46   
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‘free flow’ information is that without robust privacy and security mechanisms in 
place, personal healthcare privacy rights will be further compromised.74  This thesis 
finds the latter view more compelling.  
Shifting the oversight of PCEHR system governance away from established 
accountability mechanisms, such as government public sector and independent 
statutory bodies (e.g. the Privacy Commissioner), diminishes open government 
transparency and accountability, because it increases the possibility of making non-
transparent decisions and effectively reduces the number of ‘eyes’ that contribute and 
protect the public interest.  To claim that this new, proposed ‘closed elite’ system will 
ensure ‘open and transparent communication of the performance of e-health’ 
implementation is not supported by the nature and focus of the political agenda 
driving the review recommendations.  
Consumers represent the largest, and potentially the most affected, of all 
stakeholder groups in the uptake of PCEHR systems, yet if the basic thrusts of the 
Review recommendations are accepted, it is likely that this group will be further 
distanced from decision-making and ultimately denied an adequate say over the 
future use of their personal healthcare record.  The proposed establishment of a 
Consumer Advisory Committee, which constitutes one of numerous sub-committees, 
falls well below the anticipated type and level of consumer input this thesis argues is 
required by the system. 
                                                 
74 Graham Greenleaf, ‘APEC’s Privacy Framework Sets a New Low Standard for the Asia-Pacific’ in 
Andrew Kenyon and Megan Richardson, New Dimensions in Privacy Law (Cambridge University, 2006): 
at 91. 
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Furthermore, the Review says virtually nothing about individual privacy, 
consumer consent issues and secondary use information protection rights, framing 
these major concerns within a wider economic agenda.75  It lists privacy and security 
as recommendation six, which suggests diminished importance.  The review does 
suggest the establishment of a Privacy and Security Advisory Committee, which would, 
along with other sub-committees, report to the new Australian Commission for 
Electronic Health (ACeH).  While privacy and security numbering issues may seem 
‘picky’ or over exaggerated (similar to the name change concerns), the reality is that 
privacy is being psychologically and physically relegated to a less important position 
and is indicative of the ‘focus shift’, away from promised consumer-centric control and 
privacy concerns, and towards multiple third parties ‘sharing’ personal healthcare 
information.  
The Review also recommends establishing a regulatory body that monitors and 
ensures compliance against e-health standards that are set and maintained by the 
ACeH.  The spirit of this proposal represents a positive and important move, to ensure 
harmonised, national e-health standards.  However, the down-side to this 
recommendation is that it fails to provide any real detail explaining how this 
regulatory body would be constituted and function, such as how membership would 
be determined or what its responsibilities would be.76  Given that this is, arguably, a 
very important governance mechanism process; the lack of any significant detail is 
disappointing compared with the Concepts of Operations: Relating to the Introduction of 
                                                 
75 See Royle Review, above n1. 
76 Ibid 16, 26. 
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a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (Concepts of Operations),77 which at least 
attempted to provide operational detail regarding its recommendations.78 
The Review makes no significant recommendations about consumer complaint 
mechanisms and does not include accountability to consumers for their privacy, in the 
list of effective and impactful governance recommendations.  In fact, the review, if 
accepted, further strengthens the requirement that there be an immediate update of 
the MyHR strategy to actively enable ‘decentralisation’ and ‘networking’ of 
information across multiple data repositories to occur, with information being linked 
using the HI.  It also recommended that by 1 January 2015, Medicare item number 
requirements for health assessments, comprehensive assessments, mental health care 
plans, medication management reviews and chronic disease planning items require a 
copy of the information to be uploaded to the MyHR.  However, as noted earlier, this 
2015 date has now passed without the implementation of these recommendations.  
This Medicare item number covers most areas of healthcare delivery, and despite the 
potential sensitivity of information (such as mental health care plans) and obvious 
lack of voluntary consumer acceptance of the impact this will have on individual 
healthcare privacy, this information would automatically be added to every person’s 
MyHR. 
There is no argument in this thesis against the Review proposition that the 
approach to the PCEHR system needs to be reconsidered in light of advancing 
                                                 
77 Australian Government, National Electronic Health Transition Authority (NEHTA), Concept of 
Operations: Relating to the Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record System (September 
2011).  
78 Ibid.  
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economic and social developments.  Indeed, the upgrade to strengthen e-health 
technical and data foundations, such as secure messaging and the creation of an ‘e-
health ecosystem’, are generally sound and sensible propositions.  Nevertheless, this 
proposition could be realised by using a fairer and more democratically inclusive way 
to change the system, and the governance model in the Review ought to be modified 
and adopted according to principles that promote adequate, individual privacy 
protection and democratic ideals.  This new proposed governance overview, outlined 
in chapter 7, does not displace the necessity for the involvement of commercial 
expertise and professional healthcare input, but it does rank and prioritise this level of 
interest below those of the general public and democratic processes. 
It was anticipated, by the Concepts of Operations that a multi-layered approach 
would adequately safeguard the PCEHR system and incorporate both technical and 
non-technical controls, including accurate authentication, audit trails, proactive 
monitoring, rigorous security and requirements that healthcare providers and 
organisations comply with specific PCEHR system business rules and relevant 
legislation.79  This commitment to privacy resulted in the adoption of technical 
advancement outcomes ― Privacy by Design and technical self-regulation ‘evolution’ 
― to further ensure strong, privacy and security protection measures. 80  
                                                 
79 NEHTA, Concepts of Operation, above n77: at 17.  
80 Ibid; NEHTA, e-Health Architecture, Interoperability and Standards 
http://www.nehta.gov.au/connecting-australia/ehealth-architecture (viewed on 15/4/2013).  This 
document identifies three key Architectural paradigms: 1) National e-Health Architecture (sector-
wide), which provides ‘both capability and solutions views for e-health in Australia; 2) E-Health 
interoperability specifications, national infrastructure solutions and frameworks development; 3) 
NEHTA, Enterprise Architecture, which utilises traditional Enterprise Architecture approaches 
ensuring strategically aligned, consistent deliverables and outcomes.  ‘The e-health Interoperability 
Framework provides a shared language for defining business context for e-health systems, designing 
e-health solutions and standards-based conformance processes.  The aim is to provide an increasing 
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Privacy by Design maintains that in order to adequately protect electronic 
healthcare privacy rights, there must be actively ‘embedded’ privacy and well-
designed security systems implemented early (upfront) into new health information 
technology designs (e.g. hardware, programs, software), and business practices, to 
facilitate ‘gold standards’ in personal health information sharing and individual 
privacy protection in the information era.81  This design concept is based upon a 
proactive approach, with an emphasis on ‘positive-sum and win-win’ outcomes for 
privacy protection, which encompass seven foundational principles such as: proactive 
not reactive; privacy as a default setting; privacy embedded into design; full 
functionality; positive-sum not zero-sum; end-to-end security: full life-style 
protection, and visibility and transparency: keep it open and respect for user privacy: 
keep it user-centric.82  
Commitment to Privacy by Design by the previous federal government 
acknowledges that adequate system design (e.g. such as ‘default’ options) will take 
time and effort to build the necessary framework for protecting consumer privacy in 
                                                 
level of semantic interoperability both between humans involved in designing and building systems 
and between e-health systems’: at 1-4.   
81 See Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner Ontario, Canada, Embedding Privacy into 
Health Information Technology: An Absolute Must (June 2010); see also Ann Cavoukian, Information and 
Privacy Commissioner Ontario, Canada, ‘Privacy by Design: Strong Privacy Protection Now and Well 
into the Future’ (Paper Presented at 33rd International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners, Jerusalem, 29 October 2010); See Ann Ohlden, ‘Landmark Resolution Passed to 
Preserve the Future of Privacy, Adoption of Privacy by Design as an International Standard’ (Paper 
Presented at International Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Jerusalem, 29 October 2010);  
82 See Ann Cavoukian, Embedding Privacy into Healthcare Information Technology: An Absolute Must, above 
n81. The seven Privacy by Design Foundational Principles are: 1. Proactive not Reactive; Preventative 
not Remedial; 2. Privacy as the Default Setting; 3. Privacy Embedded into Design; 4. Full Functionality; 
Postive-Sum, not Zero-Sum; 5. End-to-End Security: Full Lifecycle protection; 6. Visibility and 
Transparency: Keep it Open; and 7.  Respect for User Privacy: Keep it User-Centric: in Information and 
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, Privacy by Design (Paper presented at 33rd International 
Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners Report, 30 October 2011). 
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an era of rapid global change.83  This implies careful consideration of any new 
technology, and promotes the idea that rather than rushing to adopt innovative, novel 
and untested technology, even in a competitive market environment, all options must 
be carefully considered in order to secure ‘long-term’, robust privacy and security 
protection design and governance outcomes.84  
IV. ‘CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS’ GOVERNANCE VISION 
As a result of EPR research and inclusive community consultation over more than a 
decade by government, which clearly indicated ongoing public anxiety about PCEHR 
individual privacy rights, the long-term plan adopted by various federal 
Governments (both when elected and while in opposition) for its development and 
implementation favoured a ‘consumer-centric’, ‘opt-in’ EPR consent model, whereby 
healthcare consumers voluntarily enrolled and participated in the PCEHR system.  
Previous governments envisaged that the ‘trilogy’ combination of robust legislation, 
governance and technical reform measures would continue to ‘balance’ the needs and 
interests of individuals and business in the new e-health regime.  This would ensure 
                                                 
83 See Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, Submission of the 
Information & Privacy Commissioner, Response to the FTC Framework for Protecting Consumer Privacy in an 
Era of Rapid Change (21 January 2011). 
84 Ann Cavourkian, Submission of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, Response to the FCT Framework 
for Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, above n83; Ann Cavourkian, Reject Unlawful 
Surveillance – Stand Up for Privacy and Freedom by Design (28 February 2014) The Electronic Surveillance 
State Canadian International Council; see also Ann Cavourkian, Privacy by Design in the Age of Big Data 
(12 June 2014) DMM Analytics; see also Eugeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above 4; see 
also Tal Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business! Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining 
of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion” (2003) 5 Yale Journal of Law and Technology. 
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stakeholder and public trust and confidence, as well as persuade voluntary uptake of 
the PCEHR by consumer and healthcare providers.85  
The earlier proposed PCEHR system operation framework, largely contributed 
to by the ALRC report on privacy in Australia and physically manifested by NEHTA, 
reflected a theoretical, conceptual model based upon participatory institutional 
governance, placing the healthcare consumer at the forefront of ‘control’ of their 
electronic healthcare record.86  However, the reality of just how much consumer 
‘control’ should be exercised was (and still is) a hotly debated issue by consumer 
advocates, health industry stakeholders and healthcare professional groups.87  
The Australian Medical Association (‘AMA’), for example, has remained 
particularly vocal and sceptical regarding ‘consumer-centric’ PCEHR ‘control’, 
arguing the merits of consumer capacity to reliably and accurately manage their own 
healthcare information.88  The AMA also vehemently criticised the proposed 
                                                 
85 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operation, above n77: at 8; see also chapter 2, pp38-67 for discussion on 
Government PCEHR and e-health policy. 
86 Consumer Health Forum (CHF), “Consumers have told Consumer Advisory Committee that they 
want to actively participate in the management of their records, rather than passively enable providers 
to enter information” quoted in Royle Review, above n1: at 30. 
87 See, for example, Royle Review, above n1: at 53; Paul Smith, ‘Non-Medical E-Health Curators Risky’ 
Australian Doctor (Australia), 17 June 2011, 3; David Braue, ‘E-Record Support Comes at a Price’ Medical 
Observer (Australia), June 2010, 9; Paul Smith, ‘GPs to be E-Record Guardians’ Australian Doctor 
(Australia), 18 March 2011, 1. 
88 Australian Medical Association (AMA), ‘Personal Control versus Clinical Need for Complete 
Unedited Records’ (Press Release by AMA, 26 November 2013).  It was reported that “We support 
people taking greater responsibility for their own health and the PCEHR has the potential to assist with 
this, but patient control should not mean that the PCEHR cannot be relied upon as a trusted source of 
key clinical information” quoted in Royle Review, above n1: at 30. 
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‘subordinate’ curator/guardian role of doctors in the scheme, decrying the increased 
workload and lack of monetary compensation associated with its adoption.89  
As a consequence of pressure on government from professional and business 
interest lobby groups, the final Concept of Operations report was significantly different 
from the original consumer-centric model first proposed by NEHTA, because it 
contains multiple compromises and reversal of PCEHR consumer control promises 
made by various governments over the years.  Nevertheless, it is accurate to say that 
the final Concept of Operations does contain many positive, innovative and affirmative 
privacy protection measures, such as robust systems audits, ‘opt-in’ consent 
mechanisms, and security update system requirements and in certain circumstances, 
consumer controls that can limit PCEHR access.90  In addition, the report included a 
firm commitment by government to further implement technical privacy and security 
protective measures such as Privacy by Design, discussed earlier in the chapter.91 
Prior to the change of federal government in Australia in late 2013, the previous 
Australian Labor government92 made significant and substantial progress in PCEHR 
system development, architecture, interoperability measures and privacy protection 
design, by adopting a systematic approach to its implementation.93  As a starting 
point, taking what government considered being the most important ALRC 
                                                 
89 AMA, ‘Personal Control versus Clinical Need’ (Press Release by AMA, 26 November); see Paul Smith, 
‘Patients to Censor Own E-Health Records’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 22 April 2011, 2. 
90 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n77. [Where the original Government vision of consumer 
control is greatly modified in this final report]. 
91 See chapter 3: at pp81-97; chapter 4: at pp99-120.   
92 The previous federal Government was the Labor Government (2006-2013).  The current Australian 
Government (2013 onwards) is the Coalition Liberal-National Government. 
93 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n77. 
215 
 
recommendations, it conceived and designed the system architecture and introduced 
new legislation and regulations to progressively support the new system.  This 
process culminated, some critics argue, prematurely, in the official launch of the 
PCEHR consumer enrolment program in July 2012.94  
Nonetheless, despite time, effort, public inclusion consultations,95 business 
support, industry and professional partnership agreements, general practitioner 
incentive programs and the ongoing financial commitment from federal government, 
there has been disappointing progress in the new PCEHR system reaching targets of 
expected voluntary consumer and healthcare provider uptake.96  Similarly, there has 
also been a noticeable lack of positive, identifiable PCEHR and e-health systems 
governance processes and outcomes in place.  Thus, the current situation is that 
                                                 
94 See Suzanne Williams, ‘GP Uploads First-Ever E-Health Record’ Australian Doctors (Australia), 14 
September 2012, 5; Rhonda Jolly, ‘The e-Health Revolution – Easier Said Than Done’ (Research Paper 
No. 3, Parliamentary Library, 17 November 2011). [Where it was noted that ‘the National Health and 
Hospitals Reform Commission supported the introduction of personal electronic health records, 
recommending that they be in place by 2012 (NHHRC, A Healthier Future for all Australian: Final Report 
(December 2008)].  It was recognised that this date represented an ambitious target requiring 
considerable commitment by Government at all levels, and some commentators labelled it almost 
impossible to achieve’: at 40; see also Karen Dearne, ‘E-health Shock for Roxon’, The Australian, 
(Australia), 29 July 2009, 51.  
95 See Rhonda Jolly, ‘The E-Health Revolution - Easier Said than Done’, above n94.  Jolly noted that 
consultation and feedback was available via NEHTA’s, Draft Concepts of Operations Relating to the 
Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record System (April 2011).  Feedback on the Draft 
Concept of Operations closed on 7 June 2011.  ‘Consumers, medical providers and IT experts expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Draft Concept of Operations plan.  However, the Government noted that 
consumer (and other groups) had been consulted in the development of the National E-Health Strategy 
and the design and privacy framework for the Healthcare identifiers Service’: at 34.  In September 2011, 
a revised Concepts of Operations paper was released.  The updated Concepts of Operation, above n77.  This 
report noted the comments on proposals received.  This had been reviewed independently by Deloitte 
and between the Departments of Health and Human Services and NEHTA. 
96 NHHRC, A Healthier Future for all Australians: Final Report, above n94. ‘The Commission advocated a 
‘middle out’ approach to e-health to give government national responsibility to create a common set of 
technical goals and underpinning standards to accelerate and adequately resource the National E-Health 
Strategy.’ See Rhonda Jolly, ‘Easier Said than Done’, above n94.  According to Jolly, as one analyst 
phrased it, the approach was an attempt to develop a system which could ‘avoid the opposite extremes 
of an industry free-for-all and bureaucracy’s dead hand’: 35; Karen Dearne, ‘E-Health Could be a 
Reality by 2012’, The Australian (Australia), 28 July 2009   
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despite the plethora of new legislation and other governance measures in this area, 
the current system falls short of addressing the main privacy protection concerns 
identified in earlier reports, in a number of significant ways.   
Key components of ‘shared’ electronic healthcare records include proper 
authentication systems and the mandatory adoption of HI numbers for consumers and 
healthcare providers.  This requirement is implemented in the Healthcare Identifiers Act 
2010 (Cth).97  In conjunction with the Healthcare Identifiers Act,98 the PCEHR Act99 set 
out the proposed governance arrangements for the PCEHR system.  The PCEHR Act 
establishes the legal and regulatory framework under which the PCEHR system 
operates, as well as the privacy regime, which governs the system and operates in 
tandem with federal, state and territory privacy laws.100  
Balancing the needs of consumers, healthcare providers and industry was not 
without its complications, however, despite these complications with feedback 
sufficient time was allowed for public participation.  During the earlier HI feedback 
process, consumer advocate groups, and some State Privacy Commissioners,101 
                                                 
97 Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth). 
98 Australian Government, Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council, Healthcare Identifiers and 
Privacy: Discussion Paper on Proposals for Legislative Support (July 2009); Australian Government, First 
Stage Response to the ALRC Recommendations (August 2009); see also chapter 5, pp163-182 for discussion 
of legislative response to PCEHR and e-health systems. 
99 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record Act 2012 (Cth). 
100 National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission (NHHRC), A Healthier Future for all Australians: 
Final Report, above n94.  The Commission’s analysis echoed ‘long-standing’ themes of the need to 
coordinate and harmonise legislative response to e-health initiatives.  Despite some e-health initiatives 
at federal, state and territory levels, lack of connectivity across jurisdictions and settings in healthcare 
meant that information sharing within the national health system was at ‘best fragmented, and at the 
worst, non-existent’ in  Rhonda Jolly, ‘Easier Said than Done’, above n94: at 29. 
101 See, for example, Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission to the Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on Healthcare Identifiers Legislation (9 July 2012); See CSC 
Healthcare Research Group, A Rising Tide of Expectations (July 2010), CSC (CSC is not an abbreviation 
of the name) [notes Australian consumers’ views on electronic health records – a necessary ingredient 
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expressed concerns about the possibility of extended commercial use of the HI 
number.102  As a consequence of these concerns, legal assurance was given that the HI 
number allocated to citizens would not be available for use by private organisations 
that did not provide direct healthcare services to the public.103  However, the Review 
challenges the legally protected use of the HI number and recommends that the 
legislation be changed to extend its adoption, to include wider and peripheral 
commercial purposes.104  This recommendation goes against the previous 
understanding, assurances and promises that the Australian Government gave to the 
general public about the intended use and protection of HI numbers.105  
The PCEHR Act introduced a range of mechanisms to provide transparency 
and scrutiny of the PCEHR system’s operation, including the review of decisions by 
the System Operator, annual reports by the System Operator, reports by the OAIC and 
reviews of legislation.  It also established two new advisory bodies, a Jurisdictional 
Advisory Committee and Independent Advisory Council.106  The Jurisdictional Advisory 
Committee would provide advice to the System Operator on matters relating to the 
                                                 
in healthcare reform, noting that ‘most Australians see themselves as being in control of their 
healthcare’ and that this remains important to the success of health reform in Australia]: at 7.  
102 See Rhonda Jolly, ‘The e-Health Revolution: Easier Said than Done’, above n94: at 30; see Danuta 
Mendelson, “Healthcare Identifiers Legislation: A Whiff of Fourberie” (May 2010) 17(5) Journal of Law 
and Medicine 660; see also Office of the Australian Privacy Commissioner, Submission on the Healthcare 
Identifiers and Privacy: Discussion Paper on Proposal for Legislative Support (2009); Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission to Healthcare Identifiers and Privacy: Discussion Paper on Proposals for Legislative 
Support (August 2009); COAG, Australian Health Ministers’ Conference, Joint Communique (Media 
Release, 13 November 2009). 
103 This provision is subject to exemptions.  This assurance that the HI consumer number would not be 
used for other commercial purposes included those organisations that did not directly deliver a 
healthcare service (doctors, allied healthcare, hospitals). See Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth). 
104 Royle Review, above n1: at 38-40. 
105 See Rhonda Jolly, ‘The e-Health Revolution: Easier Said than Done’, above n94: at 35. 
106 See chapter 5, pp174-181 for discussion of Commonwealth legislation and the establishment of the 
Jurisdictional Committee and Advisory Council. 
218 
 
interests of the Commonwealth, states and territories in the PCEHR system.  The 
Independent Advisory Council would provide advice to the System Operator and 
NEHTA on the operation and participation in the PCEHR system, together with 
clinical, privacy and security matters relating to the PCEHR system’s operations.   
Despite good intentions behind the establishment of these two advisory bodies, 
a number of management issues emerged relating to the operation of the PCEHR 
system and in particular, the decision-making activities of the System Operator and 
NEHTA, resulting in an impasse between the Independent Advisory Council, medical 
practitioner members and NEHTA.  This resulted in all of the medical practitioner 
representatives resigning from the Council.107 
V. CONSTRUCTING MODERN ERA GOVERNANCE 
The adoption of public sector, economic, rationalist management approaches by the 
Australian Government, in line with most Western capitalist countries,108 has resulted 
in a growing ‘conflict of interest’ gap between business propositions, based upon 
principles such as ‘commerce in confidence’, productivity and efficiency values, and 
established public sector traditional values such as open government, transparency 
and accountability.  Generally, Australian Governments have managed to ‘balance’ 
the interests of public and private demands, nevertheless expanding global 
                                                 
107 See, for example, Steve Hambleton, ‘To All E-Health Questions the Answer Seems to be ‘No’’ 
Australian Doctor (Australia), 8 June 2012, 22; Paul Smith, ‘GPs to be E-Record Guardians’ Australian 
Doctor (Australia), 18 March 2011, 1; Paul Smith, ‘Non-Medical E-Health Curators Risky’ Australian 
Doctor (Australia), 17 June 2011, 3; David Braue, ‘E-Record Support Comes at a Price’ Medical Observer 
(Australia), October 2010, 9; Michael East, ‘A Record Revolution’ Australian Doctor, (Australia), 24 June 
2011, 45. 
108 See, for example, Robert Locke and J C Spender, Confronting Manageralism (Zed Books, 2011); Peter 
Jackson, Michelle Lowe, Daniel Miller and Frank Mort (eds), Commercial Cultures (Berg, 2000). 
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marketplace pressures and expanding technology, threaten to diminish the rights of 
citizens, and compromise elected governments.109   
Governance was once synonymous with central government (or the ‘state’), but 
more recent usage of the term involves something quite different ― the production of 
collective outcomes (in the context of public problems) that is not controlled by a 
centralised authority.  The decision-making power of public administrators, or formal 
government, diffuses outwards to be exercised by industry groups, interest groups, 
non-government organisations, private businesses, research institutes, professions 
and academics; while inside government, agencies with different objectives and goals 
compete and are often balanced off against each other.110  
The purpose of governance is to ensure strategic oversight measures, 
operational management and regulatory oversight functions of the system.  However, 
governance can also be defined narrowly as ‘the act or manner of governing, the office 
of function of governing, archaic sway control.’111  This view of governance implies 
both the physical and psychological act itself of governing, plus recognition and 
implementation of the values and manner in which governing function norms are 
determined in society.  For the purpose of the governance reforms recommended in 
this thesis, the concept of governance has a far broader meaning than just the 
manifestation of day-to-day management instruments, such as rules, regulations, 
obligations, compliance and dispute mechanisms which are adopted by government 
                                                 
109 See Jack Balkin, ‘Information Power: The Information Society from an Antihumanist Perspective’ in 
Subramanian, and Katz, The Global Flow of Information, above n9: at 232; Kenyon and Richardson, New 
Dimensions in Privacy Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
110 Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10: at 140-141. 
111 The word ‘Governance’ defined in Oxford Dictionary. 
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bodies or other institutional and economic interests.  Governance, as viewed in this 
broader light, encompasses core social values.  It includes ethical principles and 
cultural norms and expectations that underpin democratic social contracts between 
citizens and states, encompassing principles such as transparency, open government, 
distributive justice, accountability, efficiency, efficacy and productivity.  
As previously noted, the governance function represents a key factor for 
promoting both PCEHR consumer and healthcare provider confidence and uptake of 
the new electronic health regime, as well as providing further assurances to citizens 
as to ongoing, adequate, individual healthcare privacy protection.  A strong 
commitment to PCEHR governance was made by the previous Australian 
Government, which resulted in the enactment of the PCEHR Act as an important first 
stage government response, setting out governance requirements based upon ALRC 
recommendations relating to e-health privacy protection and governance.112  
As a result of rapidly increasing, modern-day, global economic pressures on 
governments – such as the need to sustain worldwide, competitive economic growth, 
marketplace deregulation and free trade agreements – all areas of traditional 
administrative government operation are now subject to intense scrutiny by many 
different industry and professional actors wishing to participate in decision-making 
activities.  Questions now surface as to traditional public sector authority, regulatory 
and governance roles in the new global networked system.  Unlike the hierarchy of 
                                                 
112 See Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth); see also ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, 
above n56; see also chapter 3, pp81-97; chapter 4, pp99-120.   
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nation-state governance, these new initiatives often rely on ‘heterarchic’ or ‘network’-
like relationships.  
These new forms of political regulation operate above and beyond the nation-
state, in order to re-establish the political order and circumscribe economic rationality 
by new means of democratic control.  Consequently, with intensified engagement of 
private actors and social movements, and the growing activities of international 
institutions, a new form of ‘trans-national regulation is emerging ― global governance, 
the definition and implementation of standards of behaviour with global reach.’113  It 
is not only public actors, such as national governments and international 
governmental institutions (e.g. UN, ILO, OECD, WHO) that are contributing to this 
new-world order.114  These global governance initiatives also often present themselves 
as public-private or public-private partnerships of multi-stakeholder interests, which 
have been described as a ‘new form of governance with the potential to bridge 
multilateral norms and local action by drawing on a diverse number of actors in civil 
society, government and business.’115  
Traditional approaches to governance rely on national governance systems 
with proper execution of formal rules (hard law), through the legal and administrative 
                                                 
113 See Scherer and Palazzo, “The New Political Role of Business in a Globalised World”, above n13: at 
909. 
114 See Belinda Bennett, ‘Globalising Rights? Constructing Health Rights in a Shrinking World’ in 
Belinda Bennett, Terry Carney and Isabel Karpin (eds), Brave New World of Health (The Federation Press, 
2008): at 8; see also Terry Carney, ‘Where Now Australia’s Welfare State’ (2013) iv Diritto Pubblico 
Comparato ed Europeo [Journal of Comparative and European Public Law] 1353-1370.  
115 See Karl Backstarnd, “Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Rethinking 
Legitimacy, Accountability and Efficiency” (2006) 16 European Environment 291; see Rebekah Gay, 
“Mainstreaming Wellbeing: An Impact Assessment for the Right to Health” (6 June 2008) 13 Australian 
Journal of Human Rights 33; John Braithwaite, “Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies” 
(Published by Elsevier on 21 April 2005) (online)) www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev (viewed on 
17/8/2010).  
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system (sanctions).  Non-political actors are required to ‘play the game’ according to 
the rules, through mechanisms of enforcement in a hierarchical system of ‘command 
and control’.116  Even under the auspices of ‘self-regulation’, it is assumed that they 
operate in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, meaning there is the conceivable threat that 
stricter regulations will be enacted, unless the potentially deviant business adapts 
their behaviour to expectations of the legislator.117  
The global governance problem is well addressed in international relations and 
political science scholarship, where the concrete design of private-public policy 
networks, in the regulation of global issues, is discussed.  It is argued that, within the 
context of the global regulation and production of public goods, neither nation-state 
agencies nor international institutions have the knowledge and capacity to resolve the 
issues.118  Rather than just focusing on state actors and international institutions, such 
as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, World Trade Organisation and 
International Labour Organisation119 alone, political theorists acknowledge the role 
that non-government organisations (‘NGO’) and private business firms play in global 
(and arguably national) governance.120  
                                                 
116 See John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, above n28.  
117 T Shillemans, “Accountability in the Shadow of Hierarchy: The Horizontal Accountability of 
Agencies” (2008) 8 Public Organisation Review 175. 
118 John Braithwaite and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
119 See United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (GATT), established in 1947, and later in 1994 the World Trade Organisation (WTO); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in force 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in force 1976; International Labour Organisation, a body established after World War 1 (1916) and 
of which Australia was a founder member.  The ILO is a tripartite body whose parliament, the 
International Labour Conference, is comprised of representatives of employers, workers, unions and 
government from each member state. Merely by belonging to the ILO, Australia is committed to 
observe the core principles on which the ILO operates. 
120 See Scherer and Palazzo, “The New Political Role of Business in a Globalised World”, above n13.   
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As earlier mentioned, the growing engagement of business firms in public 
policy leads to concerns of a democratic deficit; in other words those who are 
democratically elected (government) to regulate have less power to do so, while those 
who are engaged in self-regulation (private corporations) have no democratic 
mandate for this engagement and cannot be held accountable by a civil polity.  From 
a classical, liberal point of view, corporations are private, not political actors.  
Deliberative democracy theory, as outlined earlier, is often suggested as an alternative 
model, which it is argued ‘seems better equipped to deal with the post-national 
constellation and to address the democratic deficit.’121 
A. Hard or Soft Law Approach? 
In a complex economic society, such as Australia, there is a move away from a ‘hard 
law’ to ‘soft law’ regulatory or governance approach.122  Governments have generally 
responded to regulatory challenges by way of delegated legislation (e.g. regulations) 
or other quasi-legislation (such as standards or guideline declarations), which devolve 
the power of day-to-day management to subordinate bodies such as independent 
commissions, specialist committees, authorities and non-government organisations.  
                                                 
121 Scherer and Palazzo, “The New Political Role of Business”, above n13: at 907 [a review of a new 
perspective on CSR and its Implications for the firm, governance and democracy]. 
122 See Penelope Simons and Audrey Macklin,  ‘The Governance Gap: Multistakeholders and 
Intergovernmental Initiatives’ in Simons and Macklin, et al, The Governance Gap, above n11: at 79;  see 
also Greg Weeks, ‘The Use and Enforcement of Soft Law by Australian Public Authorities’ (Paper 
Presented to the Practice and Theory of Soft Law Academic Symposium, Peking University Soft Law 
Centre, 9 July 2011); See Penelope Simons ‘Private Law Beyond the State: Harder Than Hard Law’ in 
Simons and Macklin, The Governance Gap, above n11: at 88; Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on 
Regulation,’ above n22;  see also, Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence (Butterworths, 1989) 83.  
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This allows for greater self-regulating power and control in determining their 
preferred governance process.123  
This new form of governance establishes a new institutional context with 
private actors in a regulatory role; it also relies on a different form of regulation, the 
so-called ‘soft law’ approach that operates without a governmental power to enforce 
rules and to sanction deviate behaviour.  As a consequence, self-regulation is 
becoming a key issue in this debate, thus favouring a ‘soft law’ approach to issues 
such as industry and professional compliance measures.124  
Another related discourse promulgated by scholars draws on legal pluralism, 
as well as new governance scholarship.125  This discourse contends that certain trans-
national, self-regulatory initiatives together have created a ‘working networked 
system of governance that is substantially greater than its parts.’126  Legal pluralist 
scholars dispute the positivist hegemony of the state, in the development and 
enforcement of law, and put forward ‘a poly-centric or poly-morphic concept of law’, 
questioning the distinction between legal rules enacted by the state and norms created 
by non-state actors.127  From a legal pluralist view, the state is only one source of law 
and consequently, state-made law is only one form of law.   
                                                 
123 See Greg Weeks, ‘The Use and Enforcement of Soft Law by Australian Public Authorities’, above 
n122.  
124 Ibid.  
125 See Larry Cata Backer, ‘Governance without Government: An Overview’ in G Handl, J Zekoll and P 
Zumbansen (eds), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalisation (Martin 
Nihhoff Publisher, 2012): at 87, 118. 
126 Penelope Simons, ‘Private Law Beyond the State: Harder than Hard Law?’ in Simons and Macklin, 
The Governance Gap, above n122: at 88. 
127 Simons and Macklin, The Governance Gap, above n122.  
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Some theorists contend that corporate codes and even multi-stake holders, 
Corporate Social Responsibility (‘CSR’) initiatives can be seen as 
private/public/private legal orders that articulate, but do not depend upon, state-
based law and are normatively equivalent to state-created law.128  It is argued that the 
decline in governance capability of nation-states is partly compensated by the 
emergence of new forms of global governance, above and beyond the state.  Scherer 
and Palazzo contend that, in this new global governance age, public issues once 
covered by nation-state governance may now fall under the discretion and 
responsibility of corporate managers.129 
B.  New Reflexive and Network Governance Models 
What is now being proposed by some commentators is a ‘new reflexive governance’ 
regime, which may or may not include the government as a regulator.  In fact, the very 
foundation of state sovereignty and the future role of government in regulating 
corporate and business interests are under threat by dominant forces, such as market 
liberalism, corporatism, multinational corporate enterprise (‘MNE’s) interests, 
pluralist and neo-pluralist transformation politics and globalisation.  The main 
consideration of such ‘reflexive’ and ‘network’ governance models is the recognition, 
integration and transfer of power to other actors, beside traditional government and 
its agents, as political and social change actors in a ‘post national’ constellation era.  
New reflexive models identifies sophisticated, complex, ‘networking’ systems 
                                                 
128 See Scherer and Palazzo, “The New Political Role of Business in a Globalised World”, above 13: at 1; 
G Teubner, “Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of ‘Private’ and ‘Public’ Corporate Codes 
of Conduct” (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 617; see generally John Farrar, Corporate 
Governance (Oxford University Press, 2005) 52. 
129 See Scherer and Palazzo, “The New Political Role of Business in a Globalised World”, above n13. 
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technology that includes, not just traditional hierarchical actors (such as government), 
but also vertical, multiple, economic actors contributing different interests and skills, 
as the new source of legitimacy in a global economy.130  
Thus, the theory of ‘reflexive law’ falls under the broad umbrella of new 
management governance.  It is premised on the concept of law being one of many 
‘autopoietic’ societal subsystems ― self-referencing and self-reproducing.131  Drawing 
on Systems Theory and the work of Niklas Luhmann, law is conceived as one of many 
normative subsystems, such as religion, and like other normative systems; law is 
operationally or normatively closed, yet cognitively open.132  Substantive law is, 
therefore, unable to effectively influence behaviour within the various social 
subsystems, since each subsystem will process law according to its normative 
structure.133  According to Teubner, the solution to the deficiencies of substantive 
regulation lie in ‘reflexive law’, which restricts legal performance to more indirect, 
abstract forms of social control.134  Like ‘reflexive law’, ‘responsive law’, developed by 
                                                 
130 See Simons and Macklin, The Governance Gap, above n11 cites G Teubner: at 13; see also L C Backer, 
‘Governance without Government: An Overview’ in Handl, Zekoll and Zumbansen, Beyond 
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133 See Humberto Mariotti, ‘Autopoiesis, Culture, and Society’ (online) 
http://www.oikos.org/mariotti.htm (viewed on 15/9/2014). 
134 See G Teubner, ‘Justification – Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’ in G  Teubner (ed), Juridification 
of Social Spheres (Walter de Gruyter, 1987) cited in Simons and Macklin, The Governance Gap, above n11: 
at 13-14.  
227 
 
Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite, falls within the concept of new governance or 
‘decentred’ forms of regulation.135 
New theories of governance reflect the complex direction of an advanced post-
industrial society, within which there is no longer any single dominant point of 
societal leverage.  Civil regulation is one kind of activity where some of the traditional 
functions of government seem to have been usurped by non-governmental actors.136  
Further social change is driven, largely, by international influences, examples and 
pressure.  Pluralist agents stress the importance of ‘networks’, or policy communities, 
in the new governance age.  
‘Networks’ can involve actors from different interest groups, the professions, 
social media, and non-governmental organisations ― even from other countries.137  As 
previously noted, ‘networked’ governance is pluralistic in the sense that it involves 
many different actors in the production of collective outcomes.  Theorists of ‘network’ 
governance assign less significance to the formal moments of legislation and executive 
decision that pluralists once highlighted.  This form of governance also differs from 
corporatism, because much of the action does not occur in peak, level negotiations 
between a small set of major players ― it is more decentralised than that.  ‘Networks’ 
are generally organised horizontally, rather than hierarchically, which follows from 
the presumption that there is no sovereign power within a network.138 
                                                 
135 See Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992) 35. 
136 See John Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (2011) 44 UBC Law Review 476; see 
Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, above n135.   
137 See chapter 3, pp78-97 for discussion on ‘network’ technology advances. 
138 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10: at 142. 
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The rise of ‘network’ governance poses some major questions for the theory of 
the liberal, democratic state: most notably, whether it is still really democratic, or 
indeed still a state in the traditional sense.  Electoral democracy means accountability 
of government to the voters.  Hence, the basic problem for the state is how to convert 
private interests into some form of public benefit.  Market liberals may accept 
democracy, but they generally believe that any sort of politics is full of deficiencies 
and problems, compared with ‘virtuous’ markets.  The basic agenda of market liberals 
is clear enough: shrink the role of government so that it performs no more than the 
essential functions described above.   
The development in the organisation of institutions and policy making in many 
societies, such as Australia, can be interpreted in light of contemporary pluralism.  
This model emphasises the degree to which models of collective decision in plural 
societies now feature governance, rather than government.  The Royle Review, 
however, simultaneously reduces the official overview role of government (and by 
extension citizens) participation and extends the importance and role of economic and 
professional actors ― highlighting economic imperatives that recognise ‘effective and 
impactful governance is critical for any major investment program.’139  
This model argues that strong governance alignment must consider an effective 
economic strategy, which will realise the economic, marketplace, profit-generating 
potential of the PCEHR system.  In order to achieve this economic competitive 
outcome, governance control is extended to non-government actors and relocated 
                                                 
139 Royle Review, above n1: at 20. 
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beyond traditional government representatives; thus potentially favouring healthcare 
professionals and the private health industry in elite decision-making processes , and 
elevating IT vendor groups as prominent decision leaders.140  Citizens are reduced to 
the position of consumer, a receiver of goods and services.  
Although the Review lacks any significant theoretical grounding it is, 
nevertheless, best interpreted from an elite market, liberal, neo-pluralistic, ‘network’ 
perspective.  Reconceptualising certain propositions advanced in the Review PCEHR 
governance structure and introducing a Council into the equation, as detailed in 
chapter 7 would help to redress the balance, by better realising the promotion of 
representative democracy.  However, emphasis must be placed upon the notion that 
the Council is a significant, component of the overall, healthcare privacy solution.  
Further, it is noted that its introduction does not mitigate what democratic elected 
governments are morally required to do;141 that is, provide strong, transparent and 
accountable leadership and retain oversight of the PCEHR and e-health system, by 
developing adequate, individual healthcare privacy protection regulations and 
governance processes for the benefit of citizens.  
Without a clear priority and commitment by government to continue to 
actively regulate the area and manage the cumulative tension between individual and 
collective rights to personal healthcare information, human identity and experience is 
                                                 
140 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10. 
141 See Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, ‘Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or 
Performance?’ in Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam (eds), Disaffected Democracies (Princeton University 
Press, 2000): at 31; Russell Hardin, ‘The Public Trust’ in Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam (eds), 
Disaffected Democracies (Princeton University Press, 2000): at 52; Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison 
(eds), Silencing Dissent (Allen & Unwin, 2007). 
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compromised by increasing global capitalist forces that insist upon objectifying 
individuals by transforming them into tradable commodities.142  It is therefore 
imperative that agreed governance regulations that preference consumer voice and 
choice, in the governance process and privacy regulations, be established and 
supported, before the federal government ultimately relinquishes the ongoing 
management (and privacy rights) of the PCEHR and e-health system’s ‘command and 
control’ into the hands of private industry interests.143 
VI. TECHNICAL MEASURES 
In conjunction with the development of privacy law and governance protection plans, 
the Australian Government predicts that advancing sophisticated technology 
measures ― ‘functionality and network interoperability’ ― and design capabilities will 
further enhance PCEHR and e-health privacy, and security supporting governance 
within the proposed system.144  It is anticipated that a multi-layered approach will 
safeguard the PCEHR system and will incorporate both technical and non-technical 
controls, which include accurate authentication, rigorous security and requirements 
that healthcare providers and organisations comply with specific PCEHR system 
business rules and relevant legislation.145  
                                                 
142 See Huw Beverely-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of the Personality (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); see also the International Labour Organisation (ILO), ILO Constitution, which declares that 
‘labour is not a commodity’; see Colin Fenwick and Tonia Novitz (eds), Human Rights at Work (Onati 
International Series in Law and Society, 2010) vii.  
143 See Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State, above n10.  Dryzek outlines and discusses 
the position and importance of ‘command and control’ mechanisms relating to governance: at 20.  
144 See NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n77: at 3; see generally on the importance of security law 
in Australia and its growth in modern society - Rick Sarre and Tim Prenzler, The Law of Private Security 
in Australia (Thomas Reuters, 2nd ed, 2009). 
145 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n77: at 12.  
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The Review concurs with technical security measures outlined in the 2011 
Concepts of Operation, including the establishment of a Commission on Information 
and Security Risk Assessment to oversee the end-to-end flow of consumer 
information.  It also recommends that ‘findings and mitigation actions be reviewed 
and agreed by the Privacy and Security Committee.’146  However, the most 
contentious recommendation is for the immediate update of the MyHR strategy, to 
enable ‘decentralisation’ of information across multiple data repositories, using the HI 
number.147  These proposed function and interoperability measures display a 
disregard for long-term privacy, security planning and public risk considerations 
outlined in the Concepts of Operation document,148 by promoting the set-up of the 
PCEHR system and a ‘wait and see’ approach for identifying security and privacy 
problems as they arise.  This appeal to immediacy, based on the PCEHR regime 
commercial demands, effectively puts ‘the cart before the horse’ in relation to 
designing ‘gold standard’, embedded technical measures protecting individual 
healthcare information security and privacy rights.149 
Another important consideration informing the PCEHR system technical 
measure debate, is that technology ‘evolution’ will ‘self-regulate’, and that computer 
and information technology is becoming more sophisticated, enabling it to predict and 
solve its own function (such as security and privacy) limitations.150  There are 
                                                 
146 See Royle Review, above n1 Rec. 16. 
147 Ibid Rec. 31. 
148 Ibid Rec. 32. 
149 See Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design in an Age of Big Data, above n84; Ann Cavoukian, Embedding 
Privacy into Healthcare Information Technology, above n83. 
150 See chapter 3, pp68-97 for discussion technology; NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n77: at 77; 
Bryan Foster and Yvette Lejins, ‘E-Health Security in Australia: The Solution Lies with Frameworks 
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numerous counterarguments to the proposition that individuals can rely on 
technology to ‘self-regulate’ privacy and security values beyond their own fiscal 
interests.151  For instance, there is ample evidence to suggest that business entities have 
very good reasons, such as corporate reputation and economic interest, to build 
consumer trust by embedding privacy.152   
On the other hand, there exist numerous examples of how privacy is lost 
because it is too late, too difficult and too costly to upgrade earlier programs that have 
not embedded adequate privacy.153  Indeed, it is also highly predictable that it may 
not be in the interest of governments and industry to discard information it has 
previously collected or dismantle existing systems.154  
Limitations to the ‘self-regulate’ argument include that technology is not a 
passive or ‘neutral utility’ player.155  Technology designs and programs reflect 
dominant political and economic ideology that may or may not support individual 
privacy protection rights or democratic ideals.  What becomes embedded in 
technology programming will often reflect many different social activities, which 
                                                 
and Standards’ (Paper Presented to Australian eHealth Informatics and Security Conference, 2013);   
See generally Don Ihde, Philosophy of Technology (Paragon Publication, 1993); Paul Barren, “The Future 
of Computer Utility” (1967) The Public Interest Policy cited in Evgeny Morovoz, “The Real Privacy 
Problem”, above n4: at 2.  
151 See Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n4: at 3; Daniel Solove, The Digital Person 
(New York University Press, 2004); Daniel Solove, Marc Rotenberg and Paul Schwartz, Privacy, 
Information, and Technology (Aspen Publishers, 2006); Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard 
University Press, 2008); Tal Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business”, above n84. 
152 See Ann Cavoukian, Embedding Privacy into Healthcare Information Technology, above n83; Ann 
Cavoukian, Privacy by Design in an Age of Big Data, above n84.  
153 See Eugeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n4. 
154 Ibid 3; Daniel Solove, The Digital Person, above n151: at 131; see generally, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, 
Delete (Princeton University Press, 2009). 
155 See chapter 3, pp83-88 for discussion on technology and technology ‘neutrality’; see also ALRC, 
Discussion Paper 72, above n56: at 342.  
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include the creation of commercial consumer activity, surveillance dossiers and 
satisfying government and private enterprise information gathering needs.156  The 
problem is that in an increasingly global, economic society, where information is 
power, democratic ideals such as civil liberties and privacy rights are under constant 
threat and in some circumstances, democratic processes are compromised or indeed 
sacrificed.157  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As a consequence of recent economic shifts, citizens must give careful consideration 
to competing healthcare stakeholder interests and decide how to protect their long-
term interests and positively influence the new electronic healthcare regime.158  The 
‘balance’ between individual and collective rights is under threat on a number of 
levels, including the election of the present federal government, because of its health 
restraint and rationalisation policy.  This will weaken the introduction of robust 
governance mechanisms that have already been put in place by the previous 
government to prioritise individual privacy protection rights within the new 
electronic healthcare regime.  It also adds to the ongoing inconsistency and 
fragmentation of the proposed e-health and privacy protection scheme, and will 
ultimately affect national harmonisation considerations. 
                                                 
156 See Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide (Yale University Press, 2011) 21. 
157 See Eugeny Morovoz, “The Real Privacy Problem”, above n4. 
158 See Richard Au and Peter Croll, ‘Consumer-Centric and Privacy-Preserving Identity Management 
for Distributed e-Health Systems’ (Paper Presented at 41st Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, 2008); see Gaze and Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy, above n34. 
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Australia operates under democratic principles that guard against repressive 
and nondemocratic activity and practices.  The right to vote and the right to question 
any mechanisms (even inevitable modern technology progress) that may be complicit 
in denying (intentionally or otherwise) citizens’ rights to expect transparent and 
accountable processes, by governments or anyone else operating in Australia, is 
fundamental to democratic principles.  Denying citizens a proper voice in the PCEHR 
and e-health process, transferring central power for the continuing leadership and 
management of the system to private industry, and supporting further clinical control 
over individual personal electronic healthcare records, is questionable and 
democratically dangerous.  
The Royle Review, whilst putting forward some very positive ideas for 
progressing PCEHR systems demonstrates just how far the present government has 
moved away from the foundational concept of inclusive consumer involvement in his 
or her PCEHR record creation.  This is a retrograde step and further contributes to the 
ever-diminishing, democratic rights of citizens, particularly in an increasing global 
environment.  The rise of global market liberalism and neo-pluralistic polity threatens 
the very core of civil society, as powerful economic actors insist upon the 
‘commodification’ of citizens and argue in favour of the necessity for unfettered 
political/social power.159 
In response to broader political and economic expansionism in Australia, it is 
not suggested that home state regulation provides the panacea for trans-national 
                                                 
159 See Jaron Lanier, You are Not a Gadget (Alfred Knopf, 2010). 
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problems, but rather that governance is complex and needs to be tackled on a variety 
of jurisdictional and normative planes.  It is recognised by governance scholars, 
Simons and Macklin, that the long-term limitations of home state regulations do not 
necessarily address the governance gap.160  Nevertheless, the lack of requisite 
consensus for establishing international responses is not solved by shifting ‘command 
and control’ away from domestic mechanisms and relocating it in commercial 
business and MNE’s.161  
Unilateral home state governance and regulation (such as individual privacy 
rights protection) is a crucial part of a multi-level, multi-jurisdictional project and will, 
if democratically supported, contribute to the eventual development of consensus at 
the domestic and international level for a global response to the problem of corporate 
impunity.162 
To conclude, it is recognised in this chapter that despite prior legislative 
responses and advances in the new electronic healthcare regime, essential and 
considered developed governance measures have not yet been achieved, nor 
implemented, given that the PCEHR system has been operational since 2012.  The lack 
of governance progress in this area, at this late stage, is inexcusable.  Governance 
mechanisms and assurances represent an essential key privacy element for all 
stakeholders.  Hence, the proposed trilogy of legislation, technology measures and 
governance, despite much progress over the last decade towards implementation of 
                                                 
160 Simons and Macklin, The Governance Gap, above n10: at 179. 
161 Ibid 20-21. 
162 Ibid 21. 
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the PCEHR system and the work of the Review, is still inadequate, because it fails to 
provide the necessary individual privacy protection ‘balance’ promised to citizens by 
past Australian Governments.  
Consequently, the thesis argues that it is time to rethink and restructure the 
PCEHR and e-health governance strategy in light of advancing, global, political, 
economic and social tensions and to identify what governance mix best reflects and 
balances the needs of all stakeholders.163  In this ever changing context, it is argued 
that the introduction of a Council will restore representative balance and positively 
progress the e-health governance system.  The following, concluding chapter, sets out 
the new, proposed governance structure, arguing its relevance and significance to 
further advance privacy protection, as well as ensuring adequate accountable and 
transparent democratic processes, to restore the necessary balance of citizen rights.  
 
 
                                                 
163 See Bridie Jabour, ‘Australian Authors Join Call for UN Bill of Digital Rights to Protect Privacy’ The 
Guardian (UK), 10 December 2013, 1.   
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CHAPTER 7 
THESIS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The thesis has identified and analysed the political, economic and social development 
and implementation of PCEHR and e-health Systems as well as health privacy 
protection measures in Australia over the last few decades; arguing its continuing 
relevance and impact on our day-to-day lives.  Earlier chapters provide a detailed 
analysis of the evolution and theoretical advancement of health, technology, law, 
governance and privacy in order to contextualise and ‘frame’ the thesis proposition 
promoting the introduction of a Council and arguing why this significant change is 
necessary in light of recent Australian Government healthcare policy changes and 
moves towards embracing rapidly advancing communication technology and 
globalisation.  
The thesis chapters also reflect not just the developing and shifting physical 
manifestation of the new Australian health and healthcare digital regime but highlight 
the multifarious problems and new conceptual reality of health and technology that 
now drives widespread ‘network’ linked communication system adoption in modern 
day knowledge and information economy era.1  This chapter concludes the thesis 
argument by summarising the earlier chapter information in order to further advance 
                                                 
1 See Jeffery Rosen, “The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy and Security in an Age of Terror” (2004) 46 
Arizona Law Review 607; David Watkins, ‘Sony Apologises for PlayStation Privacy Breach and Boosts 
Security’ Herald Sun (UK), 2 May 2012, 1. 
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the thesis proposition that individual healthcare privacy is threatened by the ‘shared’ 
electronic health regimes and that more must be done by the Australian Government 
to foster citizen trust and confidence in e-health and ensure adequate privacy rights 
protection in modern information era.2  
The early chapters of the thesis open with background information and an 
outline of the Australian Government’s rationalisation policy for introducing the new 
electronic health regime, including an outline of the contextual time frame (2000-2014) 
of the e-health evolution.  The thesis subsequently moves through time to the present 
federal Government’s political and economic policy changes and challenges, which 
includes less government oversight of the e-health systems in a move towards 
promoting greater healthcare privatisation, commercialisation and devolution 
practices.3  The thesis reconnoitres the continuing ‘blurring’ of lines between political 
and economic power roles (and actors), which captures the continuing Australian and 
worldwide erosion of traditional government governance mechanisms such as public 
sector organisations and independent bodies thus further impacting on democratic 
considerations such as civil liberties and human rights privacy protection.4  
                                                 
2 Michael Carey and Merrilyn Walton, ‘On Trust’ in Ian Kerridge, Christopher Jordens and Emma-Jane 
Sayers (eds), Restoring Humane Values to Medicine (Desert Pea Press, 2003): at 166; Adam McBeth, 
“Privatising Human Rights: What Happens to the State’s Human Rights Duties When Services are 
Privatised?” (2004)  5(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 133. 
3 See Waleed Aly, ‘Coalition Needs a Heart Transplant, Not a Facelift’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 
6 February 2015, 30.   
4 See Paul Smith, ‘Dutton’s Legacy: The Anti-Health Minister’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 12 January 
2015, 18; see also Bridie Jabour, ‘Australian Authors Join Call for UN Bill of Digital Rights to Protect 
Privacy’, The Guardian (UK), 10 December 2013, 1; See also Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo, 
“The New Political Role of Business in a Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR 
and its Implications for the Firm, Governance, and Democracy” (June 2011) Journal of Management 
Studies 48:4; Australian Government, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Discussion Paper 80 
(March 2014). 
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The analysis within the chapters also informs the ongoing debate about the 
growing ‘symbiotic’ relationship between health and technology by exploring 
‘networking’ systems that manipulate how people communicate with each other in an 
increasingly borderless virtual reality.5  This shift towards digital ‘collection and 
sharing’ of personal healthcare information is in direct contrast to how healthcare 
delivery has been organised in Australia, especially in relation to traditional legal and 
ethical reliance by patients on doctors to maintain confidentiality and protect privacy 
of personal healthcare records.6  
In combination with thesis exposition of modern day ‘shared health and 
technology’ system development is the concurrent rise of major privacy and security 
problems such as increasing intrusive surveillance mechanisms and expanding 
reliance upon national security measures.7  Chapter 5 explores federation and 
constitutional issues, common law and statutory responses and development of 
health, e-health and privacy area across the nation.  It highlights the importance of 
national cooperation and identifies the advantages relating to legal ‘harmonisation’ in 
light of the changes that Australia is now facing.  It achieves this by tracing the federal, 
                                                 
5 See chapter 3, pp70-97 for discussion of technology and ‘networks’; See generally Asher Moses, 
‘Software Takes Brain Power out of Hacking’ The Sydney Morning Herald (Australia), 28 July 2011, 23. 
6 Paul Smith, ‘Give Me Socialised Medicine Any Day’, Australian Doctor (online), 17 August 2009 
(online) http://www.australiandoctor.com.au/opinions/paul-smith (viewed on 3/2/2015); Angela 
Palombo, ‘Record Creation and Access: The Impact of Legislative Changes’ in Ian Freckelton and Kerry 
Petersen (eds), Disputes & Dilemmas in Health Law (The Federation Press, 2006): at 639; Jay Katz, The 
Silent World of Doctor and Patient (The John Hopkins University Press, 2002); Megan Richardson, 
“Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy for Australia?” (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law 
Review 20. 
7 See chapter 3, pp79-90 for discussion of surveillance; chapter 6, pp231-234 for discussion of security 
technology measures and Privacy by Design: at pp203-209; see Australian Government, Serious Invasions 
of Privacy in the Digital Era, above n4; ALRC, Surveillance: Final Report: Report 108 (May 2005). See also 
David Watkins, ‘Sony Apologies for PlayStation Privacy Breach and Boosts Security’, above n1: at 2; 
The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP), Computer and Information Security 
Standards (October 2011).  
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State and Territory legal responses to these powerful political, economic and social 
changes.  Significantly this legal analysis makes the important observation that 
‘harmonised’ law creation activities is vital to Australia’s future, and that any appeals 
to common law must contribute to creation of proactive protective mechanisms if we 
are to adequately protect privacy rights in Australia.  
Chapter 6 develops this theme further by outlining the current legal and 
governance responses to PCEHR and e-health systems implementation.  This pre-
emptive approach to governance mechanisms is particularly important given all the 
political and social changes that are occurring in Australia, especially in relation to the 
growth of neo-capitalism and the adoption of modern global digital economy, which 
threaten individual human rights and democratic processes. 8 
Interrelated and interwoven throughout the chapter analysis is the building of 
the argument towards the proposition that a Council be introduced in order to 
progress individual privacy protection and promote democratic processes in the e-
health area.  Given the progressive context of e-health systems, it is argued that it is 
time to put the pieces of the ‘puzzle’ together so that the ‘story’ of electronic health 
regime and adequate individual privacy protection has a satisfactory ending for all 
national stakeholders, particularly consumers. 
                                                 
8 See Evgeny Morozov, “The Real Privacy Problem” (22 October 2013) 116(6) MIT Technology Review 32.  
Morozov argues that ‘both capitalism and bureaucratic administration are convinced that the spread of 
digital networks and the rapid decline in communication costs represent a genuine new stage of human 
development’: at 33. ‘For them, the surveillance triggered in the 2000s by 9/11 and the colonisation of 
these pristine digital spaces by Google, Facebook, and big data were aberrations that could be restricted 
or at least reversed’: at 33. 
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As argued throughout the thesis, the need for these changes to health 
law/regulation have in large part been driven by advancing technology, which 
favours knowledge and information systems for rapid and cheap sources of 
information and communication.9  Generally, advanced communication system usage 
is highly desirable as a means of gaining an economic and competitive advantage in 
the new information driven world.  However, there are a number of unforeseen side-
effects to its acceptance, for instance the very concept of what it means to be human 
are challenged as are perceptions of established traditional local and community 
values and communication systems.10  
In order to advance this point about the significance of controlling technology 
rather than allowing it to control recipients, the theoretical bases for technology is 
explored in chapter 3.  The chapter highlights three major reports published over the 
last decade, which consistently indicate that in order to progress PCEHR system 
healthcare consumers must continue to be visible, heard and occupy a driving force 
                                                 
9 See Matthew Knott and David Wroe, ‘Laws to Reduce Hacking Risk Under Metadata Plan’ The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Australia), 1-2 November 2014, 9.  This newspaper report discusses the Abbott 
Governments plan to introduce new laws to stop internet companies storing customer’s records for two 
years on cheap overseas servers that are vulnerable to hacking by criminals and foreign governments: 
at 9; see Review Panel, Richard Royle, Steve Hambleton and Andrew Walduck, Review of the Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (‘Royle Review’) (December 2013).  On 3 November 2013, the then 
Federal Minister for Health, Peter Dutton, announced a review of the PCEHR system by a small panel 
of health and IT experts (no consumer representation).  As outlined in Chapter 6, the panel made 38 
recommendations, which it presented to the Minister in December 2013. One recommendation (Rec.31) 
by the Review is for: ‘[Immediate] update [of] the MyHR [PCEHR] strategy to actively enable 
decentralisation of information across multiple data repositories, with information being linked using 
the Healthcare Identifier (HI) number’: at 17.  It also recommended that PCEHR and e-health data 
storage repositories regulations should be extended to include overseas companies (storage 
repositories) in a bid to be more competitive in the marketplace. This is clearly contrary to the numerous 
promises and legislation (Healthcare Identifiers Act, PCEHR Act) by previous Australian Governments 
not to let personal health information be subject to storage in repositories where privacy laws may be 
far less robust, harder to enforce, leaving sensitive personal health records vulnerable to other 
inappropriate uses that were not anticipated by those consumers who were prepared to freely provide 
healthcare information.  
10 See chapter 3, pp70-97. 
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in the adoption process.11  In the CSC Healthcare Research Report – A Rising Tide of 
Expectations –consumer involvement is highlighted and it is noted that ‘the consumer 
voice in particular, has not yet been strongly heard in relation to e-Health.’12  Similarly 
the Concepts of Operations: Relating to the Introduction of a Personally Controlled Electronic 
Health Records System (Concepts of Operations), also contends that ‘central to the PCEHR 
System is the concept of [consumer] personal control and participation’ and that it is 
essential to gain consumer ‘trust and confidence’ in the system in order to make it 
worthwhile.13  Additionally it is articulated in A National Health and Hospitals Network 
for Australia’s Future, which amongst its recommendations also supports a need for a 
‘unified approach’ by all Australian Governments to health and the new health 
regime.14  It also recognises that consumer support and involvement in the system is 
essential if it is to be used successfully.15  The important theme of consumer ‘trust and 
                                                 
11 Australian Government, National Health Reform Committee (NHRC), A National Health and Hospitals 
Network for Australia’s Future (2010); NEHTA, Concepts of Operations: Relating to the Introduction of a 
Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record System (September 2011); Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Issues Paper 43 (October 2013); Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Review of Australian Privacy Law: Discussion Paper 72 (2007); ALRC, 
For Your Information: Privacy Law in Australia (2008); ALRC, Review of Privacy: Issues Paper 31 (2006). 
12 CSC Healthcare Research Report, A Rising Tide of Expectations Australian Consumer’s View on Electronic 
Health Records – A Necessary Ingredient in Healthcare Reform (July 2010).  CSC is a global leader in 
providing technology enabled business solutions and services in many industries.  Its research seeks to 
start the process of informing and eliciting Australian e-health debate (note: CSC is the full title of the 
company): at 1. 
13 NEHTA, Concepts of Operations, above n11: at 15. 
14 NHRC, A National Health and Hospitals Network for Australia’s Future: Delivering the Reforms, above n11.  
Under these reforms, the National Health and Hospitals Network (NHHN) will create a single national 
unified health system which is nationally funded: at 4.  ‘A core element of the National Health and 
Hospitals Network will be strong national standards and transparent reporting that is nationally 
consistent and locally relevant’: at 8; see also COAG, National Healthcare Agreement 2011.  This 
agreement defines the objectives, outcomes, outputs and performance measures, and clarifies the roles 
and responsibilities that will guide the Commonwealth and States and Territories in delivery of services 
across the health sector; John Paterson, “Australian Health Care Agreements 2003-2008: A New 
Dawn?” (2002) 6 Medical Journal of Australia 177 [COAG 2003-2008 agreements emphasised a focus on 
provision of best care and health outcomes rather than jurisdictional boundaries, with jurisdictions 
working cooperatively to advance community health and well-being]. 
15 See National Health and Hospitals Network (NHHN), A National Health and Hospitals Network for 
Australia’s Future, above n11: at 50. 
243 
 
confidence’ arises again and again in various other reports generated over the last ten 
or so years such as the Australian Law Reform Commission’s (ALRC) —Review of 
Australian Privacy Law.16  
A later 2013 Review of Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records report,17 
challenged that important notion of consumer-centric involvement, by recommending 
that a radical shift occur that would minimise public sector direct engagement and 
expand multi industry and professional control mechanisms in the future PCEHR 
governance of the system.  This shift recommended by the Royle Review would consign 
consumer involvement to that of steward of their personal health information and 
elevate other stakeholders – ‘the panel wishes to retain the engagement of the 
consumer as stewards of their own health … while recognising the needs of the 
clinicians.’18  It is argued in this thesis that this power shift would result in 
disempowerment of consumers whilst further promoting and guaranteeing greater 
professional and industry interests (and power) in directing and controlling the e-
health governance process (including privacy).19  Thus the promised objective of 
‘balancing the needs of individual and collective privacy interests’ in this area would 
be further compromised by favouring and empowering professional and private 
industry actors.20   
                                                 
16 ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n11: at 105. 
17 See Royle Review, above n9: at 19.   
18 Ibid.  
19 Paul Smith, ‘Who Are the Real Winners in the e-Health Pay Deal?’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 24 
August 2012, 18; Paul Smith, ‘Where is Debate on the Health of Our Nation?’ Australian Doctor 
(Australia), 13 August 2013, 18; Paul Smith, ‘Is the Private Health Push in the Public Interest?’ Australian 
Doctor (Australia), 2 April 2014, 18. 
20 Australian Government, Concepts of Operations, above n11: at 61; Australian Government, National 
Health Reform Council, Health Online: A Health Information Action Plan for Australia (2001): at 2. 
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Demonstrated throughout the thesis, is the argument put by economists and IT 
experts that rapid political, economic and social change is inevitable.21  While it is 
acknowledged that change is indeed unstoppable, a ‘balanced’ and well thought 
through approach towards progress can be envisaged:  one which better manages 
change in a way which truly reflect the interests and rights of all parties subject to that 
change.  In order to achieve this goal there are a number of non-negotiable PCEHR 
and e-health commitment criteria that citizens and Government must agree upon in 
order to initiate positive and inclusive change outcomes that preference community 
interests and social values.  These non-negotiable PCEHR and e-health governance 
commitments include – that privacy is the first priority of government, and that 
present and future decisions about PCEHR privacy governance remain organised 
through elected Governments (not transferred to private organisations) and continue 
to operate as transparent and accountable processes.22  
Furthermore it is posited that if the private sector is poised to take further 
advantage of the new electronic health regime that their involvement at all levels be 
subject to open transparent and accountable processes and that preference be given to 
amplifying citizen ‘voice’ and influence because the public represents the largest 
group affected by these proposed changes.  It is also imperative, particularly in the 
information economy that the public not be reduced to a mere recipients or receivers 
                                                 
21 See chapter 2: at pp38-67 and chapter 3: at pp70-97 for discussion on government health policy and 
technology. 
22 See Scherer and Palazzo, “The New Political Role of Business in a Globalized World”, above n4; Beth 
Gaze and Melinda Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy (The Law Book Company, 1990); see 
generally Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, A Bill of Rights for Australia? 
(1985). 
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of healthcare products or services, but have the option to be involved in decision-
making at the ‘grass roots’ level.23  Consequently a wider commitment to 
representation of viewpoints must be considered in order to elicit a ‘selection of 
trusted personnel who will represent the views of the target audience and who have 
the authority and accountability to act’,24 not only for economic stakeholders but also 
citizens. 
As highlighted in chapter 6, the Royle Review provides an interesting and in 
some circumstances relevant framework for how PCEHR and e-health governance 
could be organised and modelled in the future.  Some of the Review recommendations 
are worth considering in the current economic environment.  However, it is also 
recognised that hidden within this Review is the recommendation that health industry 
and health professionals be elevated to powerful decision-makers, that Government 
overview Departments and bodies be rationalised and given a secondary role, and 
that citizens participation be reduced in that they should ‘trust’ professional and 
industry experts appointed to committees to make informed decisions and manage 
the process with reduced oversight.25  
Problematic to the Review is the fact that it does not demonstrate nor appeal to 
any theoretical conceptual argument or substantial evidence on which to base its 
arguments or recommendations for this very radical engagement ‘shift’ from 
                                                 
23 Michael Carey and Merrilyn Walton, ‘On Trust’ in Kerridge, Jones and Sayers, Restoring Humane 
Values to Medicine, above n2: at 166. 
24 Royle Review, above n9: at 20. 
25 Ibid 14. 
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traditional consumer-centric to industry/professional-centric stakeholders preference;26 
although it does indicate that the main consideration is about progressing the system 
and is economic in nature.  Other Review arguments used to justify this radical 
industry/professional focus ‘shift’ emphasise the poor consumer and healthcare 
provider up-take of the system.  It suggests that the reason for healthcare provider 
and consumer low level up-take of e-health relates to the lack of stakeholder feedback, 
governance and NEHTA management style.27  All of which can be disputed as 
suppositions not entirely correct or sustainable by evidence-based criteria.28 
However what the thesis acknowledges is that the PCEHR system has 
ostensibly failed to attract the type of commitment that Government and industry 
anticipated because the public is far from convinced that giving up their ‘rights’ (real 
or perceived) to ‘control’ their personal health information simply provides no or very 
limited benefit for them, despite being reassured over the last twenty years that the 
PCEHR system is beneficial and will continue to protect their interests.  If indeed this 
is part of the problem, then mandating compliance such as introducing ‘opt-out’ 
rather than ‘opt-in’ consumer participation recommended by the Review will 
undoubtedly progress the system but it will ultimately fail to achieve its expected 
                                                 
26 Royle Review, above n9.  The Review states that strong international evidence exits that data 
aggregation and management has led to better outcomes and appeals to an American integrated care 
consortium example based in Oakland California.  However the Review provides absolutely no 
evidence-based research reference to actually demonstrate or indeed support this ‘fact’ statement: at 
13.   
27 Paul Smith, ‘Exodus of Doctor’s Adds to E-Health Uncertainty’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 28 
August 2013, 18; Deb Richards, ‘Medical Groups Snubbed by E-Health Initiative’ Medical Observer 
(Australia) 25 November 2005, 9 [Where Dr Haikerwal stated that: ‘We can’t wait for these guys 
[NEHTA] each time to screw up and ask us to help bail them out’: at 9]; Paul Smith, ‘Dutton’s Legacy: 
The Anti-Health Minister’ Australian Doctor (Australia), 12 January 2015, 18. 
28 ALRC, Discussion Paper 72, above n11.  
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purpose of public confidence/acceptance if there is no consumer commitment or 
‘ownership’ of the system.  For instance, some individuals will simply give what they 
consider to be necessary (or wrong) information to their healthcare providers.29  
It is also suggested that the primary reason why doctors have now come on 
board in relation to PCEHR system implementation is because they have been assured 
by Government of continued dominance over the implementation and control of the 
PCEHR and e-health system.30  This observation can be evidenced by the new 
proposed role of the Independent Advisory Council (IAC) (consisting primarily of 
healthcare professionals), which according to Review should be retained.  The review 
recommends that ‘The Independent Advisory Council (IAC), with existing 
membership, continues to operate under its terms of reference as identified in the IAC 
Charter’ (31 August 2012).  This recommendation changes the IAC current line of 
reporting to one that would allow a direct line to the Federal Minister and no longer 
require the IAC to report to the System Operator, NEHTA or any other new bodies 
such as the Australian Commission on Electronic Health.31  Thus for this particular 
Advisory Council (IAC) there would be virtually no external (other than the Health 
Minister) monitoring of its activities.  Indeed this situation does not embrace 
                                                 
29 See, eg, Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, “Big Date for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics” (April 2013) 11(5) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 239: at 245, 260-
263. 
30 See Royle Review, above n9.  The Review recommendation is for exclusive advisory role of IAC: at 26, 
79. 
31 Ibid.  There are a number of related issues that emerge concerning the Review recommendation about 
the new IAC, its independent, lack of external overview and oversight (transparency and 
accountability), and existing membership appointments including its proposed function and direct line 
access to Health Minister. 
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transparency and accountability in any way and would ultimately result in exclusivity 
and loss of public overview of the process. 
Chapter 6 analyses of PCEHR and e-health governance also suggests that the 
answer to dealing with these dilemmas is not found by expecting corporations to 
manage or direct their attention to developing extended social and political values via 
extended Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).32  This extreme suggestion quite 
clearly runs counter to democratic participation, and would result in hidden elite 
management and further diminish or indeed negate democratic principles and ideals 
of governance transparency and accountability processes.  Nevertheless, it cannot be 
ignored that the new modern economic constellation era has continued to blur the lines 
between traditional political and economic power roles and that there are now not just 
government but multi-layered industry and professional pluralistic actor pressures 
vying to control how the new world order will be governed, or indeed whether or not 
it should be governed or managed at all.   
Decentralising government, rationalising resources and services such as the 
Information Commissioner or engaging in exclusive relationships with corporations 
and/or other organisations (stakeholder actors) to ultimately take over responsibility 
for running society and determining citizen participation or rights is not an option 
that Australia should be entertaining.  We must reaffirm our commitment to 
democratic ideals and processes that promote shared community values and advance 
the notion of inclusive citizen discourse in the new information technology system.  
                                                 
32 See Scherer and Palazzo, “The New Political Role of Business in a Global World”, above n4. 
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The thesis posits that a Council can be viewed as a beginning stage of this collective 
idea by adopting this progressive measure.  A Council represents a new way of 
perceiving how PCEHR and e-health governance must be conceptualised and 
progressed now and in the future. 
The adoption by the Australian Government of a Council to further strengthen 
consumer privacy protection is highly recommended.  Additionally, it provides an 
extra layer of public administrative sector transparency and encourage democratic 
citizen participation in relation to ongoing protection of privacy rights in an era that 
increasingly needs to make us more visible and vulnerable to the ‘unwanted gaze’ of 
an increasing number of third party actors. 
I. DECONSTRUCTING THE ‘ROYLE REVIEW’ RECOMMENDATIONS  
In order to advance the idea of a Council it is necessary to diagrammatically reiterate 
what the Royal Review proposes in relation to PCEHR governance structure and 
compare its recommendations with the revised thesis proposition.  
The Review sets out its structural recommendation as follows: Diagram 1. 
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A basic Review assumption is that the government, public service and consumer 
involvement in e-health systems should be minimised: ‘[t]he government’s role in e-
Health system should be limited, focused on developing essential standards … with 
the requirements of vendors and end-users being the primary consideration in this 
process.’33  And that a:  
Revised body needs to have relative independence from State and Federal Government 
departments to ensure it is balanced and represents the needs of multiple key stakeholders to 
facilitate the elements of e-health delivery by a healthy private sector.34  
Further the Review contends that ‘ideally there should be an independent System 
Operator and an Independent Advisory Committee and that clinical oversight and 
control [emphasis added] is required.’35  The Review argues that since the handover to 
the Department of Health and Ageing – ‘now the Department of Health (DoH) – 
governance has been reduced to essentially non-existent’.  Given these observations 
about the Department of Health, the above statement represents an extraordinary 
representation and interpretation of present events.36  
The Australian Commission for Electronic Health (ACeH) would replace 
NEHTA and be established as a Statutory Authority reporting directly to the Standing 
Council on Health (SCoH).  Its role would include development and execution of e-
health strategies within the policy framework set by the Federal Minister of Health.  
The ACeH would centralise the system operation of the MyHR (new proposed name 
                                                 
33 Royle Review, above n9: at 79.  
34 Ibid 26. 
35 Ibid 79. 
36 Ibid. 
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for PCEHR System) to the Department of Human Services, under contract from ACeH.  
It would set and implement funding priorities for e-health initiatives, provide and 
manage vendor accreditation process and provide frameworks and requirements to 
allow value adding vendors to integrate with MyHR.  It would monitor performance, 
adoption and management of e-health systems, including oversight of the System 
Operator.  The proposed composition of the ACeH would include: Chair (nominated 
by the Federal Minister for Health), industry representative, private hospital operator, 
Jurisdictional representative (nominated by the Australian Health Ministers Advisory 
Committee (AHMAC)); general practitioner; medical specialist; pharmacist; allied 
health professional; health software industry representative; registered Nurse; aged 
care operator and consumer (nominated by the Consumer Advisory Committee).  
According to the blueprint in the Review, the ACeH would establish a number 
of advisory sub-committees in order to ensure consideration of issues under 
discussion.37  One proposed advisory committee is the Clinical and Technical 
Advisory Committee, which would bring together IT technical experts and clinicians 
to enhance e-health efficiency and effectiveness of clinical care as well as advise the 
ACeH on clinical and related technical functionality of the MyHR with the intention of 
increasing utility and functionality as well as investments in the MyHR.38  Proposed 
membership of the Clinical and Technical Advisory Committee would include: ACeH 
Board member (General practitioner); specialist medical practitioner, pathology 
representative, diagnostic imaging representative; pharmacist; software industry 
                                                 
37 Royle Review, above n9: at 22-23. 
38 Ibid 23. 
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representative; rural doctor; private and public chief information officer 
representative, member of the Consumer Advisory Committee and Department of 
Human Services representative (as system operator).39  
Recommendations are also made to establish a Jurisdictional Advisory 
Committees to ACeH, with a proposed membership of Chair (to be the Chair of ACeH); 
Jurisdictional Health representatives (nominated by the Director General of each 
Jurisdictional Health Department) and a Federal Department of Health 
representative.  The role of the Jurisdictional Advisory Committee is to provide advice 
on all issues directly relating to e-health.40  The Review also envisages establishment of 
a Privacy and Security Committee to ACeH, which would be responsible for 
examining legal and related issues regarding the MyHR including ownership, 
copyright, security, liability, confidentiality and data privacy.  The membership of this 
Committee would include: Chair to be federal Department of Health representative 
on the ACeH Board; general practitioner; medical specialist; medical insurer 
representative; software security expert; medico-legal representative; representative 
of the Privacy Commissioner and consumer representative. 
The proposed Consumer Advisory Committee to ACeH will, according to the 
Review enhance efficiency and effectiveness of clinical care; advise the Board on issues 
to break downs in collaboration or barriers to better execution; and facilitate consumer 
participation in healthcare.  Membership of this Committee would consist of 13 
members and include: a Chair; with only ‘up to three consumers representing 
                                                 
39 Royle Review, above n9: at 24. 
40 Ibid. 
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different consumer groups’; general practitioner; specialist medical practitioner; nurse 
practitioner; allied health professional; Department of Human Services representative 
(as System Operator) and Clinical and Technical Advisory Committee member 
representative.41  
The thesis accepts that a Consumer Advisory Committee be established but 
firmly rejects the Review recommendation relating to its intended role, its suggested 
sub-committee status level in the proposed structural hierarchy, its membership, and 
its limited line of reporting role (ACeH).  The proposed Consumer Committee 
membership is rejected for lack of proper consumer representation.  This is on the 
basis that it unduly preferences professional representation within what should be a 
consumer forum.  The Review proposal of consumer representative membership (up to 
3 members) is clearly inadequate in order to capture the diverse range of consumer 
groups concerns regarding e-health service delivery and privacy issues such as 
Aboriginal, mental health, disability, aged care and remote area services.  
Arguably, one of the most contentious Review recommendations, alongside the 
reduction of consumer representation and involvement in the PCEHR and e-health 
system, is maintenance of the Independent Advisory Council (IAC) with altered 
reporting line, direct to the Federal Minister for Health.  As earlier mentioned, the 
Review argues that the current reporting line of the IAC be changed to the federal 
                                                 
41 Royle Review, above n9: at 23-24. 
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Minister of Health and that current IAC continue because it ‘has proved to be a useful 
forum for oversight of the PCEHR process.’ 42   
II. THE NEED FOR A COUNCIL TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY 
Unlike the Review model outlined above, which preferences health industry and 
healthcare professional groups by reducing consumers to the status of sub-committee 
advisory group, a Council as proposed in this thesis would reprioritise and restructure 
the Review recommendations by emphasising citizen visibility, ‘voice’ and 
participation.  It would strengthen consumer involvement, encourage democratic 
citizenship, and subsequently healthcare privacy protection. It would be a cost 
effective mechanism that adds an extra layer of public administration sector 
transparency and provide a much needed ‘forum’ and ‘balance’ in the present and 
future governance and management of the PCEHR and e-health systems.   
Thus the overall restructure proposed in this thesis of the Review blueprint 
would shift the focus back to consumers, by spotlighting the largest group most 
affected by the electronic healthcare changes.  The importance and ongoing 
participation of health industry and professional groups to work in partnership with 
consumer expectations is also supported in the proposed governance arrangement 
mechanism.  
                                                 
42 Royle Review, above n9: at 26; see Paul Smith, ’Exodus of Doctor’s Adds to E-Health Uncertainty’ 
Australian Doctor (Australia), 28 August 2013, 18; Paul Smith, ‘GP E-Health Funding Win’ Australian 
Doctor (Australia), 31 August 2012, 1.  This rationalisation used by the Review for maintaining existing 
membership of the Independent Advisory Council, clearly does not mention nor take into account the 
mass walk-out and resignation of the medical practitioners from this Council in protest in 2013. 
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The creation of a Council would operate on a different dimension than other 
existing independent bodies such as the OAIC.  As noted in chapter 5, the PCEHR and 
Privacy legislation expands the role of the Information Commissioner in its capacity 
to handle complaints and set guidelines for the public and private sector in relation to 
information privacy.43  This independent administrative overview role of information 
privacy rights and protection is taken seriously by the Commission, which can be 
demonstrated by recent OAIC decisions.  For example, in May 2015, Timothy Pilgrim, 
the Information Commissioner determined the outcome of a complaint by 
complainant Ben Grubb in relation to access to personal information against Telstra 
Corporation Limited under s36 of the Privacy Act.44  Similarly another case relating to 
use and disclosure by a medical practitioner of a patient’s medical information and 
subsequent breaches of National Privacy Principles (NPPs) was determined by the 
Commissioner in March 2015.45  The outcome of these cases clarify the obligations that 
industry has in relation to personal privacy collection, use and disclosure protection 
under the Privacy Act and the ‘new’ APPs.  
As a consequence of its important role in privacy protection, it is acknowledged 
that the OAIC provides a robust and independent mechanism by which obligations 
relating to personal information protection, complaints and industry guidelines under 
the Privacy Act are determined.  Nevertheless, the thesis argues that by adding a 
                                                 
43 See chapter 5, pp174-183. 
44 Ben Grubb and Telstra Corporation Limited [2015] AlCmr 35 (1 May 2015) [This case concerned the failing 
of Telstra to provide the complainant with access to his personal information held by Telstra in breach 
of National Privacy Principle (NPP) 6.1 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)].  The determination found in 
favour of the complainant and clarified ‘personal information’. 
45 ‘EZ’ and ‘EY’ [2015] AlCmr 23 (27 March 2015) [this case concerned a complaint against a medical 
practitioner who released information to police officer]. 
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Council to the privacy rights and protection mix, which supports direct citizen access 
will positively supplement and enhance rather than diminish or duplicate healthcare 
information privacy protection oversight in Australia.  
As articulated throughout the thesis, a Council’s purpose is to further localise 
and strengthen consumer healthcare privacy protection, be a cost effective mechanism 
that provides an extra layer of public administrative sector transparency and 
encourage democratic citizen participation.46  It also aims to exemplify a much needed 
focus upon citizens as not just receivers of ‘goods and services’ by economic players 
and reintroduce ‘balance’ between all stakeholder interests, by providing a ‘forum’ in 
which citizens can voice their concerns be heard and counted.  A Council will ensure 
that ‘democratic’ administrative and institutional values built up over the years in 
Australia is afforded proper recognition, is ‘balanced’ and given ongoing protection 
in the modern knowledge and information economy era.47  Additionally, the 
promotion of ‘democratic citizenship’ will result in better collaboration between 
public and private authorities and includes:  
[E]ducation, dissemination, information, practices and activities which aim by equipping 
citizens with knowledge, skills and understanding motivation and behaviour, to empower 
them to exercise and defend their democratic rights and responsibilities in society, to value 
                                                 
46 See, for example, Council of European Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human 
Rights Education, Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 7 and Explanatory Memorandum, which states: 
‘Partnership and collaboration should be encouraged among the wide range of stakeholders involved 
in education for democratic citizenship and human rights at state, regional and local level so as to make 
the most of their contribution, including policy makers … and the general public’: at 10 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/edc/1_What_is_EDC_HRE/What_%20is_en.asp#TopOfPage 
(viewed on 12/11/2014). 
47 See, Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, “Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics” (April 2013) 11 (5) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 239, the authors 
argue the role of individual control and data must be in ‘usable format’ in the ‘age of big data’. ‘If 
organizations provide individuals with access to their data in usable formats, creative powers will be 
unleashed to provide users with applications and features building on their data for new innovative 
uses’: at 272.  Additionally, ‘traditional transparency and individual access mechanisms have proven 
to be an ineffective means for motivating individuals to engage their data’: at 272. 
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diversity and to play an active part in democratic life, with the view to the promotion and 
protection of democracy and the rule of law.48 
This Council is established under statutory authority, and is required to provide an 
annual report directly to parliament.49 It represents a broad range of citizen view with 
wide powers to hold hearings; access and disseminate information; and liaise with 
appropriate governing and coordinating bodies.  The Council model aligns with 
established Citizen Advisory Boards (CAB) and Citizen Advisory Councils (CAC) 
located in Europe, the US and Canada.50  However, unlike CAB or CAC, the Council is 
made up of one national forum with direct access to the Minister of Health and the 
federal Parliament rather than many states and local Community forum coming 
together.  It represents the combined interest (local, territory/state) of a wide range of 
PCEHR and e-health consumers.  Similar to CAB and CAC objectives, the Council 
increases the deliberativeness and overview of government by engaging volunteer 
citizens and allowing them to become part of the political and government processes 
that occur in their community.  This involvement serves to educate and ‘overcome 
citizen apathy and disinterest by crafting lively and engaging participation 
programs.’51 
                                                 
48 Council of European Charter on Education and Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights 
Education, above n46. 
49 See, for example, Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), which outlines the role of the Ombudsman to investigate 
maladministration in government departments (s 4(2), s 5).  The Ombudsman is also required to 
provide an annual report to parliament.  The Ombudsman falls within the Prime Minister’s portfolio 
under the 12 December 2013 Administrative Arrangements Order. 
50 Jason Courter, Citizen Advisory Board (4 June 2010) http://particidedia.net/en/methods/citizen-
advisory-board (viewed on 12/8/2015); DC Government, Metropolitan Police Department, Citizens 
Advisory Councils (CAC) http://mpdc.dc.gov/page/citizens-advisory-councils-cac (viewed on 
12/8/2015); Government of Canada, Correctional Service Canada, Citizen Advisory Committees 
(CAC) http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/cac/index-eng.shtml (viewed on 12/8/2015). 
51 See Jason Courter, Citizen Advisory Board, above n50, 1. 
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The Council’s responsibilities include but are not limited to ‘the study of critical 
issues, taking public testimony, performing independent research, and reviewing 
reports and recommendations’ of SCoH and other committees.52  These prepare the 
advisory body to ‘discuss, formulate, analyse and forward well-developed, 
considered recommendations to the legislative body.’53  It will provide a report of 
findings and recommendation to be tabled in Parliament.  Thus the Council is 
ultimately accountable to Parliament rather than the Health Minister, the Standing 
Council of Health (SCoH), or any other statutory Committee or body.  It will be a 
highly visible forum reinforcing for the community the importance and commitment 
of democratic open accountable Government processes and community involvement.  
Consequently, a Council mandate represents a wider view than just ‘individual’ 
privacy problems and its mission is more specific than just ‘collective decisions’ — it 
represents and fosters local and community involvement.  It is recognised that 
collective political pressure groups such as the Consumer Advocacy Forum, set up to 
lobby and promote a particular consumer viewpoint may prove inadequate in the 
modern economic environment, particularly as the number of economic actors 
increase their power base.  Unlike other groups such as the Consumer Advocacy 
Forum, which function as external political forces that politically advise or lobby 
Government, a Council operates within the formal political power structures of the 
system and is part of the PCEHR administrative political environment.  It provides a 
recognised ‘forum’ for transparent process of public scrutiny overview, which 
                                                 
52 Jason Courter, Citizen Advisory Board, above n50.  
53 Ibid. 
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ultimately benefits all stakeholders and reassures the Australian public that citizen 
‘voice’ and concerns is being considered and acted upon in an era of increasing global 
expansive and transforming technology and economic opportunities.  The overall 
purpose of a Council, then, is to focus on the local and national level of PCEHR and e-
health system privacy protection advances rather than international impact of 
electronic privacy reform.  
The structure of a Council to be capitalised on by the reforms recommended in 
this thesis is that it operates as part of the official governance:  the PCEHR and e-health 
political structure.  As suggested, it would be created by an Act of Parliament that 
outlines its structure, membership, objectives, functions and reporting obligations.  
After establishing the Council, the responsibilities of the Council must be clearly 
defined so that it can focus on the assigned task in order to be as effective as possible.  
Furthermore, there must be adequate funding and support staff provided in order to 
assist with the administrative elements of operation of the Council.  While there are 
many different ways to organise the membership and day-to-day function of a Council, 
it is important that the group is large enough to have a broad range of ideas while 
remaining small enough that it is easy to manage.  A key feature of the Council is its 
overview and decision-making capacity.  It is recommended that the Council has both 
an advisory capacity as well as administrative power to make policy decisions.  
Qualifications for appointment are proposed to be open any citizens able to 
show a legitimate interest and some proven experience in the healthcare and privacy 
area, drawn from a panel of names nominated by a representative range of consumer 
health bodies (from peaks to community health centres within the states and 
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territories).  Members do not need to come from a healthcare professional or IT 
background, in fact this may be discouraged because a Council will have the capability 
in its own right to gather and access experts in any area that it deems relevant as part 
of its overall function.  It is also imperative that members are statutorily empowered 
to (no gag provisions) and are capable of effectively communicating with the general 
public, Government and other important stakeholders.  As a result it is necessary that 
members display a high level of communication skill, knowledge and understanding 
of the problems and solutions needed to progress the debate and represent the 
interests and viewpoints of multiple healthcare consumers in relation to the 
governance and privacy debate.  
It is envisaged that a representative of the OAIC be appointed as a full member 
of the Council in order to contribute to the debate about resource allocation, privacy 
guidelines and any other legal mechanisms that already exist in relation to the PCEHR 
and e-health privacy protection in the area.  The proposed membership is set at up to 
20 representatives, who include:  two members from each state and territory, 
regardless of size, to be determined by each state and territory and chosen by lot (16 
members), the rationale for election of members by ‘lot’ for the Council follows the 
Athenian system (and jury selection method) ensuring that all eligible citizens have 
equal opportunity (lottery chance) in relation to being elected to the Council.54  With 
the ‘election’ of 16 state and territory members (through ‘lot’), an OAIC representative 
appointed by the Information Commissioner and two members of the public and 
                                                 
54 John Dryzek and Patrick Dunlevy, Theories of the Democratic State (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)  In 
Athens office holders were not elected, but instead selected by lot, to serve for a limited period.  This 
practice has recently been revived in practice associated with deliberative democracy: at 19, 218. 
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private health sector appointed by the Minister of Health (19 members).  All members 
are appointed for a period of two years. The Chair of the Council is counted as a 
separate member (bringing the total to 20 members) and will be elected by the Council 
members from the general state and territory membership (not the appointed 
membership) and the position will rotate annually. 
This membership number is judged to represent the most efficient balance in 
regard to a Council’s objective because too many or too few participating members 
may not adequately reflect or maximise the best possible outcome of discursive 
discourse and reporting.55  Additionally members must demonstrate their capacity to 
understand the issues that arise in e-health and privacy discourse and act in the 
interests of citizens rather than come to the forum with preconceived or political 
partisan ideals or ideas.  
Under the proposals advanced in this thesis the Independent Advisory Council 
established under the PCEHR Act and comprising of healthcare professionals and IT 
experts would become a sub-committee reporting to the Australian Commission for 
Electronic Health (ACeH) and absorbed into the Clinical and Technical Advisory sub-
committee.  The following is a diagram that represents the proposed thesis 
governance recommendation structure. 
 
Diagram 2 – New Governance Structure: 
                                                 
55 See, for example, Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human 
Rights Education, Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 7 and Explanatory Memorandum, above n46. 
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that this would not be an overly complicated nor duplicative process.  It would work 
in conjunction with other statutory bodies such as the Information Commissioner to 
ensure that these bodies are sufficiently resourced by Government in order to carry 
out their particular role.  As mentioned, a Council would be properly resourced and 
have access to relevant information and experts in the area under consideration.  It 
would report as required to the Standing Council on Health, the Health Minister as 
well as Parliament.  
 
III.  THESIS CONCLUSION 
 With the ultimate convergence of computers and communication technology it 
emerges that, as a society, Australians will be likely stepping into a future that is 
unknown and to some degree unpredictable.  However, this uncertainty of the future 
does not mean that one should not consider, contest, question or indeed cease to have 
an active role in how the future Government or governance mechanisms are 
eventually organised.  Believing that the intrusive adoption of technology advances is 
the only viable option available for people and that its unfettered progress is inevitable 
potentially disempowers an individual’s ability to contribute in a positive way to their 
community.  The provision of health and healthcare services in Australia, as well as 
how privacy is conceived including how our personal sensitive health information is 
collected, stored and disclosed in an increasingly ‘sharing’ and ‘networking’ society 
and the issue of diminishing democratic privacy protection rights remains an 
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important consideration and must be vigorously protected now and in the future for 
all the reasons set out in the previous chapters.56 
This thesis has argued that privacy and ongoing healthcare privacy protection 
remains an important consideration for society, individuals and the community and 
that changing our approach to how this will be understood and organised now and in 
the future should not be left to chance or be about capitalism and economic profit 
generation.  The blurring of lines between private and public, between political and 
economic distinctions, are being constantly challenged and eroded by rapid 
advancing technology and globalisation interests to the detriment of democratic 
values and processes.  This situation deserves serious citizen attention and increased 
active commitment by people power as citizens morally and legally ‘grapple’ with 
these changes in the modern information economy.  The various chapters in this thesis 
have highlighted the multi-dimensional aspects of modern era health, technology and 
privacy in Australia.  It has also organised this information by analysing the approach 
suggested by successive Australian Governments over the last few decades – the 
trilogy of legislation, technical and governance measures.  The chapters have argued 
that despite the best efforts by previous Governments to expedite and obtain economic 
value from the e-health program that we may need to consider a radically different 
approach, which combines a more ‘balanced’ collective and individual interest 
approach by all stakeholders to the healthcare privacy debate (consumers, industry 
and professional groups).  It is also argued in the thesis that the concept of privacy is 
                                                 
56 See Martha Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton University 
Press, 2010).  Nussbaum outlines the importance of ‘Socratic Pedagogy: The Importance of Argument’ 
to preserve transparency and accountability: at 47. 
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far more complex in the modern age than just relegating it to data information 
collection, use and disclosure – making it necessary to view privacy as an important 
value attached to broader human rights issues such as democracy.57   
Additionally, the thesis highlights the proposition that, because consumers 
stand to lose the most ‘rights’ by adopting the PCEHR and e-health system, they 
should become the political priority in relation to future decision-making activities.  
While the health profession and industry is important to support and promote the 
new system it must be viewed as just one important component; and as a consequence 
its interests should be protected and encouraged but not preferred or prioritised.  
Further it is contended that the introduction of a Council will provide a significant 
move towards promoting citizen ‘ownership’ and participation of the new electronic 
healthcare regime.  The thesis sets out the main arguments for why a Council needs to 
be considered and introduced as a highly desirable and viable option of promoting 
democratic citizen participation in the PCEHR and e-health system in Australia.  As a 
consequence, it is maintained that if privacy is an important human right worth 
protecting against economic and political exploitation then it stands to reason that it 
must be vigorously defended against the threat of individual complacency and 
compliance as we continue to engage in the new technological era. 
  
                                                 
57 See, Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by 
Commonwealth Laws: Issues Paper 46 (December 2014).  The terms of reference for IS 46 emerges from a 
number of modern day concerns relating to rights and freedoms such as freedom of speech, procedural 
fairness to persons affected by the exercise of public power.  It also identifies Commonwealth laws that 
encroach upon traditional rights, freedoms and privileges; and a critical examination of those laws to 
determine whether the encroachment upon those traditional rights, freedoms and privileges is 
appropriately justified: at 1, 5-7. 
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